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APPENDIX
11/21184
Elizabeth Holtzman
District Attorney
210 Jorelmon Street
Brooklyn, N.Y.
Dear Mrs. Holtzman:
I am not sure that I am writing to the right person, if not
possible you will be able to put this bit of information in the
right place.
I am writing concerning the New York (Brooklyn) Judicial
system. Which has turned out to be one big joke, a waste of
time and the tax payers money.
I am a common laborer not professing to know law, but I do
have common sense and understanding. I was summon to
Supreme Court 11115/84 to serve as a possible Trial Juror.
After walking about for four days, I was finally called and sent
to court room 574 part II, 11121184. Presiding Judge Leone,
defendant Mr. Rosada. There were a least sixty or seventy
people sent to room 574 to pick a jury of twelve plus two
alternates. The majority of the groups sent were Blacks. Mr.
Rosado is being tried for Murder 11123/84.
After telling us what the law expected of us as possible
Jurors, which as the Judge stated was common sense and a
promise from each of us to be fair and ·impartial then the
selection began; it made no difference to the Judge the District
Attorney or the defendants Lawyer that the majority of the
prospective Jurors were Black. They manage to pick thirteen
(13) whites and one black second alternate making sure of an
all white Jury.
We were also reminded that we if selected as a Juror, were
not suppose to take Sympathy into the founding of a Verdict.
But Mrs. Rosado was in the court room while the selection was
being made she is about seven months pregnant. She was
seated right a long with the prospective Jurors and if that isn't
a sympathy pitch I've never seen one. Some of us do have
common sense.

•
And so I ask you Mrs. Holtzman if we Blacks don't have
common sense and don't know how to be fair and impartial,
why send these Summons to us? why are we subject to finds of
250.00 if we dont appear and told it's our civic duty if we ask
to be excused. Why bother to call us down to these courts and
then over look us like a bunch of niave or better yet ignorant
children. We could be on our jobs or in schools trying to help
our selves instead of in court house Halls being Made fools of.
I will not sign IT1Y name because I am a little person and will
surely get the short end of the stick. I just thought it was time
for some one to Know about the Judicial system and if there is
anything that can· be done or anyone who wants to do it, the
matter will be taken care of. A Copy of this letter will be sent
to Eye Witness News.
Thanking You
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1. Constitutional Law e->221(4)

)lic:hael McCRAY, Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
)lobert ABRAMS, Respondent-Appellant.
No. 1272, Docket 84-2026.
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Argued May 22, 1984.
Decided Dec. 4, 1984.
Following affirmance of state court's
denial of defendant's motion for a new
trial, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443
N.E.2d 915, and denial of his petition for a
writ of certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court, defendant petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, 576 F.Supp. 1244, Eugene H.
Nickerson, J., conditionally granted the petition, and state appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Kearse, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) state is not permitted by Sixth Amendment to restrict unreasonably the possibility that the petit jury will comprise a fair
cross section of the community, and (2) black
defendant, who identified several minority
venirepersons who were excused despite
having proffered no discernible reason to
believe that they would not be unbiased
jurors and one black who was excused despite having an experience that one might
think would make him identify more with a
complaining witness than with a defendant,
made a prima facie showing that prosecutor exercised state's peremptory challenges
to exclude black and Hispanic jurors on
basis of their group affiliation and consequently in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights; however, a hearing should
have been held to give state an opportunity
to rebut the prima facie case.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded.
Meskill, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting
opinion.
Rehearing in bane denied 2 Cir., 756
F.2d 277.

Defendant could not mount a successful equal protection challenge to prosecution's racially discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges solely on basis of prosecution's acts in his case. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 14.
2. Jury e->33(1)

Defendant has no Sixth Amendment
right to a petit jury of any particular composition. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
3. Jury e->33(1.1)

State is not permitted by Sixth Amendment to restrict unreasonably the possibility that the petit jury will comprise a fair
cross section of the community. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.
4. Jury e->33(5.1)

A defendant may appropriately subject
to scrutiny under the Sixth Amendment the
prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges on the basis of its actions in his own
particular case. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
5. Jury e->33(5.1)

Sixth Amendment's guarantee of trial
by an impartial jury allows prosecution to
exercise its peremptory challenges to excuse jurors to whom, on the basis of their
personal history or behavior, some bias
may be imputed; however, it forbids exercise of such challenges to excuse jurors
solely on basis of their racial affiliation.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
6. Jury e->33(1.1)

In order to establish a prima facie violation of his right to the possibility of a fair
cross section in the petit jury, a defendant
must show that in his case the group alleged to be excluded is a cognizable group
in the community, and there is a substantial likelihood that the challenges leading to
that exclusion have been made on the basis
of the individual venireperson's group affiliation rather than because of any indication
of a possible inability to decide the case on

1114

750 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES

the basis of the evidence presented. U.S.
C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
7. Jury e=>33(1.1)

If defendant established a prima facie
violation of his right to possibility of a fair
cross section in the petit jury, burden of
proof shifts to state to rebut presumption
of unconstitutional action by showing that
permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result; in order to rebut defendant's showing, prosecutor need not
show a reason rising to the level of cause.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
8. Jury e=>33(1.1)

If court determines that prosecution's
presentation is inadequate to rebut defendant's proof of prima facie violation of his
right to possibility of a fair cross section in
the petit jury, court should declare a mistrial and a new jury should be selected
from a new panel. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
6.
9. Jury e=>33(5.1)

Black defendant, who identified several minority venirepersons who were excused despite having proffered no discernible reason to believe that they would not be
unbiased jurors and one black who was
excused despite having an experience that
one might think would make him identify
more with a complaining witness than with
a defendant, made a prima facie showing
that prosecutor exercised state's peremptory challenges to exclude black and Hispanic
jurors on basis of their group affiliation
and consequently in violation of his Sixth
Amendment rights; however, a hearing
should have been held to give state an
opportunity to rebut the prima facie case.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

Barbara D. Underwood, Asst. Disl
Brooklyn, N.Y. (Elizabeth Holtzman
Atty., Kings County, Allan P. Root,'
Kowalski, Asst. Dist. Attys., Broo
N.Y., on the brief), for respondentlant.
Before LUMBARD, MESKILL,
KEARSE, Circuit Judges.
KEARSE, Circuit Judge:
Respondent New York State Atto
General Robert Abrams (the "State")
peals from a judgment of the United Statll
District Court for the Eastern District
New York, Eugene H. Nick't.,rson, Judgl.
granting the petition of Michael McCray, a
black defendant convicted in New Yo..t
State Supreme Court of robbery, for a writ
of habeas corpus on the ground that the
prosecution's use of Eeremptory ch~llengel
to excuse all black and Hispanic venirepel"
sons from the jury that convicted McCraJ
viol~rial and eqUII
protectiOn provisiOns, respectively, of the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. McCray v. Abrams, 57f
F.Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y.1983). The distriet
court ordered the State to release McCraJ
unless it afforded him a new trial within 60
days. 1 The court stayed its judgme
pending this appeal.

Steven R. Shapiro, New York Civil Liber. ties Union, New York City, for petitionerappellee.

On appeal, the State agrees that a d»criminatory use of peremptory challenges
would violate a defendant's fundamental
rights. It contends, however, that the district court (1) erred in ruling that McCray
made out a prima facie case that the P~
cution so used its peremptory challenges JJl
his case, and (2) if a prima facie case wal
established, erred in not holding an evide~
tiary hearing giving the State an opportun!'
ty to rebut the inference that it had ex~
cised its peremptory challenges for a constitutionally forbidden purpose.

Although McCray has not been incarcerated
since his conviction, but rather has been al·
lowed, upon posting a bond, to remain at liberty
pending the conclusion of the proceedings chal·
lenging his conviction, he is, by virtue .:>f the
limitations placed upon his freedom, in "custo-

dy" within the meaning of the federal ha~
corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982).
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 93
S.Ct. 1571, 36 L.Ed.2d 294 (1973); Jones v.
ningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240, .'1 S.Ct. 373. 3 '
L.Ed.2d 285 (1963).

I.
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We hold that the district court properly
~
concluded that McCray established a prima
facrecaSe1natffie state's use of peremptorychailenges violated his SIXth mendment right to trial by an impartial jury, and
w~ t at ortion of the court's ruling.
We are persuaded, however, that the court
should have held a hearing to give t e
Stat£::an .QPp~ty to rebut the _!)rima
facie case, and we therefore vacate the
judgffient and remand for further proceedings.

----

I. BACKGROUND
On November 15, 1978, Philip Roberts, a
white art student, was assaulted and
robbed at gunpoint in downtown Brooklyn
by three black youths. Roberts returned
to his college dormitory and notified his
resident adviser and the police. The police
did not respond immediately, but on December 1 and 5, they took Roberts on a
tour of the area. The first expedition did
not produce an identification, but during
the second, Roberts identified McCray, who
was standing on a street corner near his
home, as one of the robbers.
McCray was arrested and charged with
robbery in the first and second degrees.
The arrest was McCray's first.

A. The State Court Proceedings
McCray's first trial was before a jury
composed of nine whites and three blacks.
The trial ended in a hung ·ury, with nine
jurors voting to convict and three voting to
acquit. It appears that either two or three
of the jurors who voted to acquit were
black (see Part I.C. infra ).
McCray was retried, with the same Assistant District Attorney ("ADA") as prosecutor. Under N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 270.25(2)(b) (McKinney 1982), each side was
entitled to fifteen erempto challen es.
After the exercise of eleven or twelve challenges by the State, McCray moved for a
'---mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor
appearea- ro-oe s ·~ usmg the
State-rs peremptorycFiallen es to exclude
blacks an
1spamcs rom the jury. In
support of this contention, McCray pointed

out that "[t]here have been seven black
people and one Hispanic ven[ire]man up to
this point. [The prosecutor] has challenged
each and every one of them. Of her eleven
challenges, she has used eight to challenge
blacks and Hispanics." (Transcript of
hearing dated April 24, 1980, at 5.)
McCray requested a hearing at which the
prosecutor would be asked to testify as to
why she excluded the venirepersons she
did. Following argument by McCray's
counsel, the court denied the request for a
hearing and the motion for a mistrial. The
record does not reflect that the prosecutor
made any statement with regard to her use
of challenges.
In a later opinion explicating its denial of
the motion, People v. McCray, 104 Misc.2d
782, 429 N.Y.S.2d 158 (Sup.Ct. Kings County 1980), the court stated that the prosecutor had denied excusing jurors on the
ground of race. /d. at 783, 429 N.Y.S.2d at
159. The court stated that it had denied
the motion for a mistrial because of the
presumption that peremptory challenges
are properly exercised and the administrative burden that would be entailed in reviewing their exercise. The court furtherJ
reasoned that excusing a juror of the same
race as the defendant on the ground of
perceived group affinity is "a time honored
basis for the exercise of peremptory challenges." /d. at 784, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
The case against McCray proceeded to
trial before an all-white jury (see Part I.D.
infra). The only evidence against him was
the identification made by Roberts. The
jury found McCray guilty, as charged, of
first and second degree robbery. McCray
was sentenced to concurrent prison terms
of 2 to 6 years on the first degree robbery
charge and 1112 to 4112 years on the second
degree robbery charge.
Prior to sentencing, McCray moved for a
new trial, again attacking the State's use
of its peremptory challenges. The court
denied the motion. McCray pursued his
contention on appeal without success. The
Appellate Division affirmed without opinion, 84 A.D.2d 769, 444 N.Y.S.2d 972 (2d
Dep't 1981). The New York Court of Ap-
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peals affirmed in a 4-3 decision, 57 N.Y.2d
542, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443 N.E.2d 915
(1982). The Court of Appeals majority, relying on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), concluded that neither federal nor state constitutional rights were implicated in the prosecutor's striking of all minority venirepersons, stating that "[t]he benefits of requiring the prosecutor to justify the exercise of
certain peremptory challenges are simply
outweighed by the damage to a system of
jury selection which best serves to guarantee a fair and impartial jury." 57 N.Y.2d
at 549, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 445, 443 N.E.2d at
919. The three dissenters viewed Swain as
not controlling in light of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury from
which no large, identifiable segment of the
community has been systematically excluded. ld. at 552-53, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 447, 443
N.E.2d at 921 (Meyer, J., dissenting); id. at
556-57, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 449, 443 N.E.2d at
923 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).

B. The Denial of Certiorari
McCray then sought a writ of certiorari
from the United States Supreme Court.
The Court denied the petition, 461 U.S.
961, 103 S.Ct. 2438, 77 L.Ed.2d 1322
(1983), but five Justices indicated their view
thata discri~ecuto
rial peremptones sfloulGnoto e considered
beyo~ Marshall,
joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from
the denial of certiorari, on the ground that
"Swain was decided before this Court held
that the Sixth Amendment applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment
. . . and . . . . should be reconsidered in
light of Sixth Amendment principles established by our recent cases." Id. at 2441
(opinion of Marshall, J., dissenting).
Three Justices, in an opinion by Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Powell, stated that they did not disagree
with Justice Marshall's assessment of the
importance of the issue. Rather, they voted ~eny certiorari on the ground that
"further consideration of the substantive
and procedural ramifications of the problem by other courts will enable us to deal

I

with the issue more wisely at a later date."
Id. at 2438 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
McCray moved in the New York Court of
Appeals for reargument in light of the
opmwns accompanying the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari. The motion
was denied without opinion, 60 N.Y.2d 587,
467 N.Y.S.2d 1031, 454 N.E.2d 127 (1983).

C.

The Present Habeas Petition

Having exhausted his state remedies,
McCray filed the present petition for habeas corpus in the district court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976), alleging that "[t]he
prosecution's use of peremptory challenges
to exclude all minority members (7 blacks,
1 hispanic) drawn for the jury panel on the
basis of race violates the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by an impartial jury and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed October 3, 1983, 1111.) In
support of the petition, the attorney who
had represented McCray at his second trial
sub~it stating, inter alia,
that it was his recollection that the three
jurors who had voted to acquit McCray at
his first trial had been the three black
jurors; that during jury selection at the
second trial, conducted by the same ADA
who conducted the first trial, he "noticed
that [the prosecutor] was pre-emptorily
[sic] challenging every single black and
hispanic potential juror"; that the prosecu·
tor peremptorily challenged seven blacks
and one Hispanic, at least three of whom
had not stated that they knew anyone who
had committed a crime or knew anyone
accused or suspected of committing a
crime; and that one of the blacks peremptorily challenged stated that he had either
a relative or a close friend who was a
victim of a crime and who had been shot
during the course of a robbery.
In opposition to the petition, the State
agreed that the Constitution should be construed to prohibit the prosecutor from using peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors solely on the basis of race.

.r.o..._
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and urged the ~ ibit such u e by

&he defendant as well. The ~te a~ed
that in the present case McCray had not
JD&(ie a prima facie showing that the proseeutor used peremptory challenges to exelude jurors solely on the basis of race. It
asserted that the prosecutor had not used
peremptory challenges to exclude every miDOrity member drawn for the jury panel, it
being the recollection of both trial counsel
t;bat one black juror had been selected to
eerve as an alternate. It stated that defense counsel had conceded that at least
some of the minority jurors challenged by
tbe prosecutor had made statements during
the voir dire that would lead the prosecutor
to seek to excuse them. The State conceded that the prosecutor had exercised seven
peremptory challenges against blacks and
one against a Hispanic, and stated that she
had used either three or four against white
venirepersons. Relying on the trial court's
opinion, 104 Misc.2d at 783, 429 N.Y.S.2d at
159, the State asserted that when the proseeutor's use of peremptory challenges was
questioned during the jury selection process, the prosecutor had denied excusing
jurors on the basis of race. The State did
not, prior to the district court's announcement of its decision on McCray's petition,
submit an affidavit from the ADA who had
conducted McCray's trials.
On December 19, 1983, in an opinion reported at 576 F.Supp. 1244, Judge Nickerson ruled in favor of cCray. TheCourt
ruled that judicial scrutiny of discriminatory prosecutorial peremptory challenges
was required by the Sixth Amendment. /d.
at 1248. Further, relying on the opinions
accompanying the Supreme Court's denial
of McCray's petition __.-f.o4 ertiorari, the
court concluded th~t'"Swain--V. Alabama is
no lo~~d law·;· an[that "[t]he equal
protection clause should be construed to
prohibit a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks solely on
the basis of race in any case." /d. at 1249.
According considerable weight to state
court developments in California and Massachusetts, see Commonwealth v. Soares,
877 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881, 100 S.Ct. 170, 62

I

L.Ed.2d 110 (1979); People v. Wheeler, 22
Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748
(1978), Judge Nickerson set out the procedure to be foll~se alleges t at th~tion is abusing its peremptory challenges. If the prosecution's
peremptories have been used in such~way
as to establish-a rima facie case of racial ?
discrimination, the presumption o proper
use of the peremptory gives way and the
burden shifts to the prosecution to justify
its challenges on nonraciaJ grounds. Citing
Wheeler, the court held that a prima facie
case of improper challenges may be established when the venirepersons excluded are
members of a " 'cognizable group' discrimination against which is prohibited," and the
probable reason for their exclusion is their
membership in the group rather than any

Z

j

predisposition regarding the specific case
at bar. 576 F.Supp. at 1249. Once this
showing is made, the prosecution may rebut the prima facie case by demonstrating
that its peremptory challenges were motivated by pe~ case-specific biases, ? /~
rather than by group association. Its ex- } ·
planati~ a level that ~ !would warrant a c~n- /J-.1-4-k.d~ c
eluding~ erred by
·
failing to inquire into the bases for the
prosecution's use of peremptory cnallenges
against black and Hispanic venirepersons,
the district court ruled that a new trial was
constitutionally required.

?

After the district court rendered its decision, the State moved to "amend the judgment and to expand the record," contending that the court had overlooked vital criteria for determining whether McCray had
established a prima facie case, and that the
State was entitled to a hearing on the merits of McCray's contention. In support of
this motion, the State submitted an affidavit from the former ADA who had conducted McCray's trials, describing her use of
peremptory challenges and the proceedings
on McCray's motion for a mistrial during
the jury selection process. The affidavit
stated that the prosecutor had not discriminated on the basis of race in selecting
jurors for the trials of McCray; that she
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/~

had challenged a number of jurors as a State's racially discriminatory use of ita I
result of their or their family's negative peremptories, ~that even if he did make
experiences with the criminal justice sys·
he necessary prima facie shoWing, the
tern because she believed those jurors we ~ ourr-shoul not - ~ the writ
biased against the prosecution; that she without holding a ean g
a low the
had unsuccessfully sought to have those State to presen rebutting evidence.
\
jurors excused for cause before excusing
Notwithstanding the State's doctrinal
\
them peremptorily; and that the first alter- concessions, we must begin with a review
nate juror was black and that she did not of the court's ruling that the Sixth and
excuse him although she still had peremp- Fourteenth Amendments bar the prosecu\
tory challenges available. The prosecutor tor's discriminatory use of peremptory
stated that the trial judge had convened a challenges, for the constitutional doctrine
hearing on McCray's motion for a mistrial; informs the analysis of both whether a
that the court asked her whether she had prima facie case has been established and
discriminated on the basis of race in select· what proceedings should follow the estabing the jury and that she had answered in lishment of such a case. Our review perthe negative; that she asked for permission suades us that the court correctly ruled
to explain, relying on notes she had kept, that the Sixth Amendment prohibits the
the reasons for her peremptory challenges; prosecution's use of challenges to discrimiand that the judge refused her permission nate on the basis of race and that McCray
to explain, stating that he was satisfied presented~dence iO esta ish a
that she had not discriminated on the basis prima acie case of sue use.
e agree
of race in making her challenges. The with ~r, that the State
prosecutor stated that after McCray's first should have been accorded an opportunity
trial, she had interviewed those jurors at to rebut that showing.
some length and that to the best of her
recollection, of the three jurors who voted
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND Swain
for acquittal two were black and one was
v. Alabama.
white, and that, according to the jurors
We begin with a review of {'SW(iin,v.
interviewed, the white juror who voted for Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.~13
acquittal was the "motivating force" be- L.Ed.2d 759, which is the only United
hind the remaining two votes for acquittal. States Supreme Court decision thus far to
Judge Nickerson treated the State's mo- address directly the constitutional validity
tion to amend judgment and expand the of the use of peremptory jury challenges to
record as a motion for reargument of the discriminate on the basis of race. Alpetition and denied it without comment. though much criticized, Swain has led most
This appeal followed.
courts to reject all constitutional challenges
to the prosecutor's alleged discriminatory
D. The Issues on This Appeal
use of peremptories.
On this appeal, the State makes a rela·
tively narrow challenge to the district A. Swain v. Alabama
Swain was a black defendant convicted
court's decision. Its posi~ is that the
court correctly held thafi.t:fle Sixth and by an all-white jury of the rape of a wh~te
Fourteenth Amendments bar the use of woman. In his case, the trial jury venu-e
peremptory challenges to strike potential had included eight blacks, two of whom
jurors on the basis of race. Further it were exempt; the prosecution used its pel"
states that the recollections of both trial emptory challenges to remove the other
counsel agree that the jury that convicted six. Swain also showed that in the county
in which he was tried there had not since
~Cray consisted of twelve white jurors.
l.7 ~ ue State arg)!es ~l_y t~ McCray _b.iled 1950 "been a Negro o~ a petit jury in eith?"
to establish a prima facie case of the a civil or criminal case . . . and that 1D

\

\
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e:riminal cases prosecutors ha[d] consistent1y and systematically exercised their
t;rikes to prevent any and all Negroes on
8
petit jury venires from serving on the petit
jury itself." 380 U.S. at 223, 85 S.Ct. at
837; see also id. at 231-32, 85 S.Ct. at
841-42 (Goldberg, J., dissenting: "[P]etitioner established by competent evidence
.. . that no Negro within the memory of
persons now living has ever served on any
petit jury in any civil or criminal case tried
in Talladega County, Alabama."). Invoking a long line of cases beginning with
Strauder v. West Virginia, 10 Otto 303,
100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880), that had
held that "a State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of
participation as jurors in the administration
of justice violates the Equal Protection
Clause," Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at
2Q3-{}4, 85 S.Ct. at 826-27 (citing Ex parte
Virginia, 10 Otto 339, 100 U.S. 339, 25
L.Ed. 676 (1880); Gibson v. Mississippi,
162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075
(1896)), Swain contended, inter alia, that
the prosecution's use of its peremptory
challenges constituted invidious discrimination in the selection of jurors, in violation
of his rights under the Equal Protection
Clause. The Supreme Court disagreed.
In Part II of its opinion, the Court discussed at some length the history and purposes of the peremptory challenge. Tracing such challenges back past The Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 4
(1305), the Court noted the persistent use
of peremptories in American trials and the
prevailing view that they are a necessary
part of a trial by jury, for they allow the
challenge of a person thought to be less
than fair and impartial but for whom cause
to strike cannot be shown, and permit the
removal of a person who may have been
offended by a probing voir dire. The Court
stated that "[t]he essential nature of the
peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the
court's control," 380 U.S. at 220, 85 S.Ct. at
836: and that " 'it is, as Blackstone says, an
arbitrary and capricious right; and it must
be exercised with full freedom, or it fails of

its full purpose,'" id. at 219, 85 S.Ct. at
835 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146
U.S. 370, 378, 13 S.Ct. 136, 139, 36 L.Ed.
1011 (1892)).
Given the nature and the history of the
peremptory challenge, the Court found
~erit in the proposition that the system,
"m and of itself, provides justification for
striking any group of otherwise qualified
jurors in any given case, whether they be
Negroes, Catholics, accountants or those
with blue eyes." 380 U.S. at 212, 85 S.Ct.
at 831. The Court concluded that "we cannot hold that the striking of Negroes in a
particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws." ld. at 221, 85 S.Ct. at
836.

In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it
serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we

cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his challenges in any given case. The presumption in any particular case must be that
the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury
to try the case before the court. The
presumption is not overcome and the
prosecutor therefore subJected to examination by allegations that in the case
at hand all Negroes were removed from
the Jury or that they were removed because they were Negroes. Any other
result, we think, would establish a rule
wholly at odds with the peremptory challenge system as we know it.
ld. at 222, 85 S.Ct. at 837 (emphasis added).
The Court went on to say, in Part III of
its opinion, that a defendant could require
judicial inquiry into the prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges if he could show
that
the prosecutor in a county, in case after
case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible
for the removal of Negroes who have
been selected as qualified jurors by the
jury commissioners and who have sur-
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vived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit
juries . . . . If the State has not seen fit
to leave a single Negro on any jury in a
criminal case, the presumption protecting
the prosecutor may well be overcome.
Such proof might support a reasonable
inference that Negroes are excluded
from juries for reasons wholly unrelated
to the outcome of the particular case on
trial and that the peremptory system is
being used to deny the Negro the same
right and opportunity to participate in
the administration of justice enjoyed by
the white population. These ends the
peremptory challenge is not designed to
facilitate or justify.
!d. at 223-24, 85 S.Ct. at 837-38. The
Court found, however, that Swain had not
met this standard of proof.

B. Mission Impossible
Not surprisingly, almost no other defendants in the nearly tw<J decades - since the
Swain decision nave met this standard of
pro~er.- For example, in United
States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961, 96 S.Ct.
1745, 48 L.Ed.2d 206 (1976), the defendant
showed that "[d]uring the year 1974 in the
15 cited cases involving black defendants a
total of 70 Negroes were potentially available as trial jurors and 57 of those were
2.

Equal protection challenges were likewise rejected in, e.g., United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d
1207, 1213-17 (5th Cir.197l) (In trials held during a certain week, the government peremptorily challenged 10 out of 12 blacks in cases where
the defendant was black, but only three out of
12 blacks where the defendant was white.);
State v. Da vis, 529 S.W.2d 10 (Mo.Ct.App.1975)
(The prosecution peremptorily challenged seventy-five percent of black venirepersons in thirty-one criminal cases involving black defendants.); see also United States v. Newman, 549
F.2d 240 (2d Cir.1977) (rejecting statistical evidence as not probative of extent to which blacks
were peremptorily excused within division in
which trial was held); United States v. Boyd, 610
F.2d 521, 526 (8th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1089, 100 S.Ct. 1052, 62 L.Ed.2d 777 (1980);
United States v. Durham, 587 F.2d 799, 801 (5th
Cir.1979); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d
1064, 1076 (5th Cir.1977) (of six blacks in original venire, one excused for cause, other five
excused peremptorily by government), cert. de-

stricken by the government through the
use of its peremptory challenges." !d. at
848. At Carter's first trial two of four
blacks were peremptorily challenged by the
government; at his second trial, all five
blacks were so challenged. His equal protection argument was rejected. In United
States v. Danzey, 476 F.Supp. 1065 (E.D.N.
Y.1979), aff'd mem., 620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 878, 101 S.Ct. 225, 66
L.Ed.2d 101 (1980), four blacks were peremptorily challenged by the government,
and one black was seated on the jury only
after the prosecutor had exhausted his
challenges. The prosecutor explained to
the trial judge: " I make it a practice to
attempt to exclude as best I can all jurors
so that to [sic] exclude jurors of the same
ethnic background as the defendant." !d.
at 1066. Danzey's equal protection argument was rejected.z Not until State v.
Brown, 371 So.2d 751 (La.1979), and State
v. Washington, 375 So.2d 1162 (La.1979),
involving a prosecutor who admitted the
practice of striking blacks and whose use
of peremptory challenges had been repeatedly appealed by black defendants, did
any court find the Swain burden satisfied.
As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent
to the denial of McCray's petition for certiorari, "[i]n the nearly two decades s~nce it
was decided, Swain has been the subJect of
almost universal and often scathing critinied, 434 U.S. 1020, 98 S.Ct. 743, 54 L.Ed.2d 767
(1978); United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40,
42-43 (8th Cir.) (all three blacks peremptorily
challenged by government), cert. denied. 426
U.S. 922, 96 S.Ct. 2631, 49 L.Ed.2d 377 (1976);
United States v. Pollard, 483 F.2d 929, 930 (8th
Cir.1973) (all four blacks peremptorily chal·
lenged by government), cert. denied, 414 u.s.)
1137, 94 S.Ct. 882, 38 L.Ed.2d 762 (1974;
Greene v. United States, 486 F.Supp. 199, 200
(W.D.Mo.) (all five blacks peremptorily c~
lenged by government), alf'd, 626 F.2d 75 (8
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 876'
101 S.Ct. 220, 66 L.Ed.2d 98 (1980); Rogers ~·
State, 257 Ark. 144, 515 S.W.2d 79 (1974) (all sax
blacks peremptorily challenged by state),~
denied, 421 U.S. 930, 95 S.Ct. 1656, 44 L.3d· 14
87 (1975). See generally Annot., 79 A.L.R.
(1977) (Swain standard not found satisfied;
any case from any jurisdiction); J. Van ~ ~
Jury Selection Procedures 154--60 & nn.
(1977).
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tS2Z (1983) (opinion of Marshall, J., dissenting; footnote, citing numerous _writings,
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86 Yale L.J.
1715, 1723 & n. 36 (1977); Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practice in
Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and
0 Constitutional Analysis, 81 Mich.L.Rev.
1 1o-11 (1982). Many of these commentahave been critical, in our view rightly,
of the nearly impossible task set for the
defendant in Part III of the Swain opinion,
ie., to show that in all cases, in all circumstances, whoever the victim, whoever the
defendant, blacks were excluded from juries without cause.
We disagree as well with some of the
fundamental premises found in Part II of
Swain. For example, the Court's state(
ment that there was no violation of equal
protection because blacks and whites "are
alike subject to being challenged without
cause," 380 U.S. at 221, 85 S.Ct. at 836,
ignores practice. In most communities a
majority of those eligible for jury duty are
white; and as a practical matter, the prosedoes not peremptorily excuse whites
because they are whites. Thus, al· "~~"'~..._ the implication in Part III of
is that "the Negro [should have)
L.._ the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white population," id. at 224,
85 S.Ct. at 838, we think the assumption of
Part II that that right is not violated simply because both blacks and whites are
"subject to" being peremptorily excluded is
fanciful.
More importantly, Swain's basic premise
furthers the erosion of that right. The
Swain Court found it permissible for a

f}

3. Compare Ross with Ham v. South Carolina,
409 U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973),

in which the Court had held that the Due Process Clause required the granting of the defendant's request for voir dire questions exploring
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prosecutor to eliminate all blacks in any
given case simply because they are blacks,
because the "presumption . . . must be that
the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury
.. .. " /d. at 222, 85 S.Ct. at 837. The
implication of this presumption, however, is
that in any given case before the court,
whites can be fair and impartial, whereas
blacks, simply because they are blacks,
cannot. The application of this premise as
Swain suggests to "any given" case-as
for example, where a black defendant is
accused of a homicidal attack on a white
person, e.g., Ri@!:!!o v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589,
96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976), or
where there may be less of a racial undercurrent, as where a black defendant is accused of receiving stolen property, e.g.,
People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435
N.Y.S.2d 739 (2d Dep't 1981), appeal withdrawn, 55 N.Y.2d 879 (1982), or even
where a white defendant is charged with
an offense against a white victim, e.g., Peters v. Kijj, 407 U.S. 493, 92 S.Ct. 2163, 33
L.Ed.2d 83 (1972)--results in the conclusion
that in each case only white jurors will be
sufficiently fair and impartial to adjudicate
the controversy. Yet, it is fallacious to
assume that all persons sharing an attribute of skin color, or of gender or ethnic
origin, etc., will ipso facto be partial to
others sharing that attribute. Thus, in
jury selection contexts other than those
involving peremptory challenges, the Court
has rejected the notion that a particular
racial or ethnic group will make determinations solely on the basis of their group
affiliation. In Ristaino v. Ross, for example, the Court ru~t)he mere fact
that the victim of the crimes alleged was a
white man and the defendants were Negroes" did not give the defendant a consti- \
tutional right even to cause a voir dire
question relating specifically to racial prejudice to be asked in addition to the usual
questions as to general bias.3 424 U.S. at

j

racial prejudice because the black defendant
was charged with possession of marijuana, was
a civil rights activist, and contended that he had
been framed because of his civil rights activities.
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597, 96 S.Ct. at 1021. And in Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499, 97""S:Cl1272,
1282, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977), the Court rejected any presumption that a given ethnic
group will not discriminate against members of their own group. •
According to Swain, however, there is no
type of case in which blacks qua blacks
may not be summarily eliminated on the
presumption that the prosecutor is merely
seeking a "fair and impartial jury." The
premise of Swain and the rarity of wholesale challenges to white venirepersons thus
serve only to limit artificially the opportunity of blacks for participation in our system
of justice, and to perpetuate an invidious
proposition of racial inferiority that has
been outlawed in virtually every area of
public affairs-in employment, in education, in housing, in property rights. How
unfortunate that the invidious proposition
has been allowed to flourish in the administration of justice.

C. State Court Developments
In light of the near impossibility experienced by defendants in attempting to meet
the requirements set by Swain, a small
number of state courts have fashioned
standards based on their state constitutions
to guarantee to the defendant a trial before
a jury that has not had cognizable groups
eliminated by the discriminatory acts of the
prosecutor. In most instances, the state
court was influenced by the fact that at the
time Swain was decided, the Supreme
Court had not yet ruled that the guarantee
of the Sixth Amendment of trial by an
impartial jury was binding on the states
through incorporation into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The first such case was People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583
P.2d 748 (1978). In Wheeler, the prosecutor had peremptorily challenged every
black person called from the venire, without any effort to challenge them for cause
and with little or no questioning that could
have disclosed any biases. The California
Supreme Court ruled that the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective

black jurors on the sole ground of "group
association" violated the defendant's right
to a jury drawn from a representative cross
section of the community, as guaranteed by
Article I, Section 16 of the California Constitution ("Trial by jury is an inviolate right
and shall be secured to all .. .. "). The
court stated that while the constitutional
provision did not grant the defendant a
right to a jury that mirrored the demographic composition of the population, it
did entitle him to "a petit jury that is as
near an approximation of the ideal crosssection of the community as the process of
a random draw permits." 148 Cal.Rptr. at
904, 583 P.2d at 762.
The Wheeler court stated that the defendant could establish a prima facie case
by showing that the persons excluded were
members of a cognizable group within the
meaning of the representative cross-section
rule, and that there was a strong likelihood
that these prospective jurors were challenged not as a result of any specific bias
but only because of their group association.
Upon such a showing by the defendant, the
burden shifts to the prosecution to justify
its use of the peremptory challenge on specific bias grounds reasonably relevant to
the case at hand. The prosecution's reasons need not rise to the level needed to
sustain a challenge for cause. !d., at
906-07, 583 P.2d at 764-65.
Wheeler was followed shortly by Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387
N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881, 100
S.Ct. 170, 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979), in which
the prosecution had peremptorily challenged twelve of the thirteen black jurors
drawn from the panel. Following the lead
of the California Supreme Court in Wheeler, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court ruled that Article 12 of the Declara·
tion of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution, which guarantees the right to trial
by jury of one's peers, protected the defendant against the prosecution's use of its
challenges on racially discriminatorY
grounds.
In State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612
P.2d 716 (Ct.App.1980), the Court of Ap-
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94 N .M. 486, 612
the Court of Ap-

Is of New Mexico rejected a claim by a
:endant that his constitutional rights had
been violated when the prosecution used a
peremptory challenge to excuse the one
black member of the venire, holding that
the defendant had not made out a prima
facie case of discrimination. The court
went on to state, however, that "improper,
systematic exclusion by use of peremptory
challenges can be shown . . . under the
Jfheeler-Soares rationale and supported by
Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico
Constitution, where the absolute number of
challenges in the one case raises the inference of systematic acts by the prosecutor."
612 P.2d at 718.
In New York, two courts ruled that the
New York Constitution forbade the prosecutor's discriminatory use of his peremptory challenges. In People v. Kagan, 101
Misc.2d 274, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.
County 1979), in which the defendants were
Jewish, the trial court ruled that the prosecutor was forbidden to use his peremptories to challenge Jews simply because they
were Jews. The court found, however,
that the defendants had not established a
prima facie case of such use. In People v.
Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739
(1981), in which the defendant was black,
the Appellate Division, after "extensive
and thoughtful analysis," People v.
McCray, 57 N.Y.2d at 552 n. 1, 457 N.Y.
S.2d at 446 n. 1 (Meyer, J., dissenting),
ruled that the prosecution's use of all of its
peremptory challenges to excuse all black
venirepersons violated the New York Constitution. The appellate court quashed the
results of the jury selection procedures and
ordered a new tria1. 4 Both Kagan and
Thompson appear to have been overruled
sub silentio by the New York Court of

Appeals's ruling in People v. McCray. See
also People v. Payne, 106 Ill.App.3d 1034,
62 Ill.Dec. 744, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982),
rev'd, 99 Ill.2d 135, 75 Ill.Dec. 643, 457
N.E.2d 1202 (1983).
Most recently, in State v. Neil, 457 So.2d
481 (Fla.1984), the Florida Supreme Court
"[b]elieving that it is time in Florida to hold
that jurors should be selected on the basis
of their individual characteristics and that
they should not be subject to being rejected
solely because of the color of their skin," id.
at 482, held that Article I, section 16 of the
Florida Constitution prohibits both the
state and the defense from using peremptory challenges in any given case to exclude
prospective jurors solely because of their
race, id. at 486-487. The court ruled that
the test set out in Swain is no longer to be
used by Florida courts when confronted
with an allegation of discriminatory use of
peremptories.

4. The standard of appellate review suggested by
the court in People v. Thompson differed somewhat from that suggested by the Wheeler and
Soares courts. The Thompson court indicated
that even if a significant number of black jurors
had been peremptorily challenged, the trial
court need not inquire into the prosecutor's
reasons for those challenges if the trial court's
own observations of the jury selection process
indicated that the peremptories were properly
exercised. 79 A.D.2d at 11~11. 435 N.Y.S.2d at

755. The court concluded that since the reasons
underlying the use of peremptory challenges
may "not [be] as readily apparent to those who
were not in the position of the Judge who attended the voir dire," the exclusion of a signifi cant number of black jurors would be "insufficient, in and of itself, to warrant reversal of a
trial court's determination not to make inquiry"
into the use of the challenges. /d. at 111, 435
N.Y.S.2d at 755; accord State v. Neil, 457 So.2d
481 at 485-486 (Fla.1984).

D. Applicability of Swain's Equal Protection Analysis to the Present Case
[1] In light of (a) the criticisms of
Swain, (b) the developments in Sixth
Amendment doctrine since the decision of
Swain, (c) the state court developments
curtailing the use of peremptory challenges
on a discriminatory basis, and (d) the intimations in the opinions joined by five Justices in connection with the denial of
McCray's petition for certiorari that the
time is drawing near for a reconsideration
of Swain, both McCray and the State urge
us to rule that Swain is no longer good
law. While the assaults on Swain are not
without considerable force, we are constrained to note that, on the question of the
vulnerability of the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges to attack under the
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Equal Protection Clause, Swain is clear,
direct, and unequivocal. It states that a
defendant may not mount a successful
equal protection challenge to the prosecution's racially discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges solely on the basis of
the prosecution's acts in a single case.
Since McCray's contentions rest solely on
the State's use of its peremptories in his
own case, he does not meet the requirements set by Swain. We therefore decline
to rest our decision in this case on equal
protection principles.
We are not, however, required to read
Swain as setting the standards for all other provisions of the Constitution. It is true
that at the end of Part II of the Swain
opinion, the Court stated that in light of
the importance of the peremptory challenge system it could not hold that "the
Constitution" required an examination into
the prosecution's reasons for the exercise
of such challenges. 380 U.S. at 222, 85
S.Ct. at 837. And we note that at least one
commentator has taken these words literally, inferring that Swain has held the peremptory challenge "immune . . . from federal constitutional inquiry of any sort."
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 Harv.
L.Rev. 70, 194 (1983). We think it inappropriate and improvident to consider this reference out of the context of the opinion as
a whole. All of the Court's constitutional
analysis focused on the Equal Protection
Clause. We do not believe the single general reference was intended to remove this
focus.
Nor do we view United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.1977), the only
prior opinion of this Court addressing the
prosecution's peremptory use of its challenges on a racial basis, as dispositive of
Sixth Amendment issues. Newman was
argued and decided on the basis of districtwide statistical data submitted in support
of a due process theory. The Court disagreed with the use of district-wide data,
noting that the community of which a jury
is to represent a fair cross section is the
division in which the defendant is tried, not
the entire district. The Court held that
Swain was the governing authority and

that the statistical analysis was flawed,
and concluded that the "due process claims
made by the defendants in this case have
no support in law nor do the facts alleged
have support in the evidence." /d. at 250.
We see no evidence in the Newman opinion
that the parties presented any substantial
argument that the government's racially
discriminatory use of its peremptories in a
given case might violate the Sixth Amendment.
Accordingly, we tum now to the Sixth
Amendment.

III.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides in pertinent part that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury .... " In Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20
L.Ed.2d 497 (1968), decided three years after Swain, the Supreme Court ruled that
this provision is applicable to the states:
Because we believe that trial by jury in
criminal cases is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice, we hold that
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a
right of jury trial in all criminal cases
which-were they to be tried in a federal
court-would come within the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee.
/d. at 149, 88 S.Ct. at 1447 (footnote omitted). Many cases construing the scope of
the states' responsibilities in light of the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee were to follow.

The Development of Sixth Amend·
ment Doctrine As Applicable to tM
States
In a long sequence of cases, the Supreme
Court has faced such questions as whether
the Sixth Amendment permitted the exclusion of blacks women and conscientioua
objectors frorr: jury pa,nels; whether
verdicts of guilty could be less than unaru;
mous; and whether juries could consist 0
groups smaller than the traditional twelve.
The answers to these questions have var-
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sent the sense of the community and hence
~n whether the practice in question de- not satisfy the fair cross-section requireprived the defendant of the possibility of a ment of the Sixth and Fourteenth AmendjurY that represented a cross section of the ments .... "); id. at 246, 98 S.Ct. at 1042
(opinion of Brennan, J.).
community.
In Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90
s.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970), the Court S.Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972), the Court
considered whether the Sixth Amendment ruled that the Sixth Amendment did not
required that all juries consist of twelve prohibit the states from allowing conviction
persons, rather than six as permitted by by verdicts of 11-1 or 10-2 rather than
Florida law for noncapital offenses. Not- requiring unanimity. Four Justices obing that Duncan v. Louisiana had describ- served that
ed the rationale for a right to a jury trial as
" . . . the essential feature of a jury obviproviding "an inestimable safeguard
ously lies in the interposition between
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecuthe accused and his accuser of the comtor and against the compliant, biased, or
monsense judgment of a group of layeccentric judge," 391 U.S. at 156, 88 S.Ct.
men ... . " Williams v. Florida, supra,
at 1451, the Williams Court stated that
[399 U.S.] at 100 [90 S.Ct. at 1906]. A
the essential feature of a jury obviously
requirement of unanimity, however, does
lies in the interposition between the acnot materially contribute to the exercise
cused and his accuser of the commonof this commonsense judgment. As we
sense judgment of a group of laymen,
said in Williams, a jury will come to
and in the community participation and
such a judgment as long as it consists of
shared responsibility that results from
a group of laymen representative of a
that group's determination of guilt or
cross section of the community who have
the duty and the opportunity to deliberinnocence.
ate, free from outside attempts at intimi399 U.S. at 100, 90 S.Ct. at 1906. The
dation, on the question of a defendant's
Court concluded that the twelve-person reguilt.
quirement was not of constitutional dimension and that a six-person jury was of 406 U.S. at 410-11, 92 S.Ct. at 1633 (opinion
sufficient size to comprise a cross section of White, J.). Similarly a fifth Justice statof the community. The Court stated that ed that "the Court has held that criminal
the number of persons on the jury should defendants are entitled, as a matter of due
"be large enough to promote group deliber- process, to a jury drawn from a representaation, free from outside attempts at intimi- tive cross section of the community. This
dation, and to provide a fair possibility for is an essential element of a fair and imparobtaining a representative cross-section of tial jury trial." Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
the community." /d.
U.S. 356, 378, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1642, 32
In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 98 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972) (opinion of Powell, J.,
S.Ct. 1029, 55 L.Ed.2d 234 (1978), the Court concurring in the judgment in Apodaca v.
ruled that a jury of five was too small. Six Oregon).
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
Justices observed that so limited a number
probably could not adequately include a 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), which
cross section of the community. See id. at · may have been decided on the basis of due
239, 242, 98 S.Ct. at 1038, 1040 (opinion of process, rather than Sixth Amendment,
Blackmun, J., expressing "substantial principles (see Part III.B. infra ), the Court
doubt about the ability of juries truly to considered a challenge to an Illinois statute
represent the community as membership that permitted the state to challenge for
decreases below six"); id. at 245, 98 S.Ct. cause potential jurors who were opposed to
at 1042 (opinion of White, J.: "a jury of capital punishment. Under the Illinois sysfewer than six persons would fail to repre- tem, the jury not only decided guilt, but, if
750 F.2d-26
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it found the defendant guilty, it determined
whether his sentence should be imprisonment or death. The Court reversed Witherspoon's conviction on the ground that it
was
self-evident that, in its role as arbiter of
the punishment to be imposed, this jury
fell woefully short of that impartiality to
which the petitioner was entitled under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
/d. at 518, 88 S.Ct. at 1775. The Court
concluded that "in a nation less than half
of whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of [persons
who believe in that penalty] cannot speak
for the community." /d. at 519-20, 88
S.Ct. at 1776 (footnote omitted).
In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95
S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), the Court
considered a statute that provided that no
woman was to be selected for jury service
unless she had filed with the clerk of the
court a written declaration of her desire to
serve. The result was that in the parish in
which the petitioner was tried, although
53% of those eligible for jury service were
women, no more than 10% of the venirepersons were women. The Court concluded
that the provision violated the Sixth
Amendment since it operated to exclude
women from jury service and thus unduly
restricted the possibility of a defendant's
having a petit jury that represented a fair
cross section of the community:
We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury
trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and are convinced that the requirement has solid foundation. The purpose
of a jury is to guard against the exercise
of arbitrary power-to make available
the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a
judge. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.,
at 155-156 [88 S.Ct., at 1450-1451]. This
prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the
jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool.

Community participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is
not only consistent with our democratic
heritage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal
justice system. Restricting jury service
to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in
the community cannot be squared with
the constitutional concept of jury trial.
419 U.S. at 530, 95 S.Ct. at 697-698. The
Taylor Court concluded that "[i]f the faircross-section rule is to govern the selection
of juries, as we have concluded it must,
women cannot be systematically excluded
from jury panels from which petit juries
are drawn." 419 U.S. at 533, 95 S.Ct. at
699.
The Court cautioned that it did not mean
to imply that petit juries actually chosen
must mirror the community or reflect the
various distinctive groups in the population. Its holding was not that the defendant was guaranteed a jury of a particular
composition, but rather that he was entitled
to a venire from which distinctive groups
had not been systematically excluded. 419
U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 701.
In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99
S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the Court
struck down a statute that exempted women from jury duty upon their request for
exemption. The Court held that "such systematic exclusion of women that results in
jury venires averaging less than 15% female violates the Constitution's fair-crosssection requirement." /d. at 360, 99 S.Ct.
at 666.
The Court's acknowledgement of the
cross-section ideal in state trials is also
reflected in many of its earlier rulings in
federal cases. In Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed.
680 (1942), the Court analyzed the nature
of the right to a jury trial in the context of
the Sixth Amendment's strictures on the
federal government and concluded that it
would be impermissible to limit venireworn·
en to those who were members of specifiC
civic organizations:
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[T]he proper functioning of the jury systern, and, indeed, our democracy itself,
requires that the jury be a "body truly
representative of the community," and
not the organ of any special group or
class. If that requirement is observed,
the officials charged with choosing feder·
al jurors may exercise some discretion to
the end that competent jurors may be
called. But they must not allow the de·
sire for competent jurors to lead them
· into selections which do not comport with
the concept of the jury as a cross-section
of the community. Tendencies, no mat·
ter how slight, toward the selection of
jurors by any method other than a process which will insure a trial by a repre·
sentative group are undermining processes weakening the institution of jury
trial, and should be sturdily resisted.
315 U.S. at 86, 62 S.Ct. at 472.
Similarly, in Ballard v. United States,
329 U.S. 187, 67 S.Ct. 261, 91 L.Ed. 181
(1946), the Court exercised its supervisory
power to bar the exclusion of women from
jury service in the federal courts, observing
as follows:
The truth is that the two sexes are not
fungible; a community made up exclu·
sively of one is different from a community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other is
among the imponderables. To insulate
the courtroom from either may not in a
given case make an iota of difference.
Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if
either sex is excluded.
/d. at 193-94, 67 S.Ct. at 264 (footnote
omitted). And in Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L.Ed.
1181 (1946), a civil case, the Court held
improper the routine exclusion from the
jury venire of all persons who worked for a
daily wage:
The American tradition of trial by jury,
considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a
cross-section of the community. This
does not mean, of course, that every jury
must contain representatives of all the
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economic, social, religious, racial, politi·
cal and geographical groups of the com·
munity; frequently such representation
would be impossible. But it does mean
that prospective jurors shall be selected
by court officials without systematic and
intentional exclusion of any of these
groups.
/d. at 220, 66 S.Ct. at 985 (citations omit·
ted).
More recently, in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493, 92 S.Ct. 2163, 33 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972), in
which the Court remanded, on due process
grounds, for a hearing on the allegations of
a white defendant that blacks had been
systematically excluded from the grand
jury that indicted him and the petit jury
that convicted him, three Justices elaborated as follows :
When any large and identifiable segment
of the community is excluded from jury
service, the effect is to remove from the
jury room qualities of human nature and
varieties of human experience, the range
of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It i$ not necessary to assume
that the excluded group will consistently
vote as a class in order to conclude, as
we do, that its exclusion deprives the
jury of a perspective on human events
that may have unsuspected importance in
any case that may be presented.
/d. at 503-04, 92 S.Ct. at 2169 (opinion of
Marshall, J.; footnote omitted). Even the
three Justices who dissented from the judgment of the Peters Court
completely agree[ d] that juries should
not be deprived of the insights of the
various segments of the community, for
the "common-sense judgment of a jury,"
referred to in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 156 [88 S.Ct. 1444, 1451, 20
L.Ed.2d 491] (1968), is surely enriched
when all voices can be heard.
407 U.S. at 510-11, 92 S.Ct. at 2172 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Finally, we note that in none of these
cases did the Supreme Court require the
defendant to make a showing that the jury
that resulted from the challenged practices
was in fact a biased jury. If the Court
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found that the defendant had made a showing that the cross-section requirement had
been violated, it concluded that he was
entitled to relief or further proceedings
simply on the basis of the violation of his
Sixth Amendment right. See, e.g., Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 538-39, 95 S.Ct.
at 701-02 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

B. /The Import of the Sixth Amendment
for the Final Phase of the Jury Selec-

l tion Process

The jury selection process obviously does
not end with the assembling of th~ venire,
and it is the final phase of the process, the
actual selection of the petit jury, with
whic~ Although,
as discussed in Part II above, a few courts
and commentators have concluded that peremptory challenges exercised at this stage
may properly be subjected to the cross-section requirement, 5 a far larger body of case
authority h~velOQ.ea iriS~ort Of the
proposition that the cross-ie"ction fequirement o t e 1xth Amendment does not
extena~e ana tfius haS no
applicabiliTy to the prosecution's exercise
of its peremptory challenges.6 The latter
rulings are said to be mandated by the fact
that most of the Supreme Court decisions
invalidating the exclusion of cognizable
groups in the jury selection process have
focused on the selection of the venire rather than the selection of th~tit jury, and
by the Court's statement in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 701, that
there is no requirement that the petit jury
5.

See Gngsby v. Mabry, 569 F.Supp. 1273, 128586 (E.D.Ark.), stay granted, 583 F.Supp. 629
(E.D.Ark.1983); State v. Neil, 457 So.2d at 486;
People v. Wheeler, 148 Cai.Rptr. at 903-D4, 583
P.2d at 761-62; Commonwealth v. Soares, 387
N.E.2d at 513; State v. Crespin, 612 P.2d 716;
Winick, supra, 81 Mich.L.Rev. at 62-66; Note,
supra, 86 Yale L.J. at 1731-32.

6.

See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679
(7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Thompson, 730
F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir.1984); United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1319-20 (8th Cir.1983) (en
bane), cert. denied,- U.S. - . 104 S.Ct. 744,
79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984); Weathersby v. Morris,
708 F.2d 1493, 1497 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied,
U.S. - , 104 S.Ct. 719, 79 L.Ed.2d 181

actually reflect a cross section of the community.
[2] We agree entirely with the proposition that the defendant has no right to a
petit jury of any particular composition . . . ...... ..__.....
The random drawing of petit jurors from
the venire is by its very nature inconsistent
with any guarantee of a particular resulting composition. But we disagree with the
conclusion of those courts at have reasoned that the lac of such a guarantee
means
men ment has no
implications or
pro ess o se ectmg the
petit jury frOmlFie venire. We think such
a ~usionistlei'ied by the Supreme
Court's repeated emphasis on the cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment
and the fundamental value judgments underlying that requirement.
[3] We begin by analyzing the goal of
the guarantee that the venire itself represent a fair cross section of the community.
The venire qua venire is a body that, assuredly, gives service to the community by
standing ready to serve on a petit jury if
called upon to do so; but it is a group that
takes no action and makes no decisions.
No defendant has ever been tried before a
venire; the venire is not the body that
deliberates in the jury room; no defendant
has ever been found guilty by a venire. If
there is a Sixth Amendment requirement
that the venire represent a fair cross section of the community, it must logically be
because it is important that the defendant
have the chance that the petit jury will be
similarly constituted. The necessary impli(1984 ); People v. Williams, 97 Ill.2d 252, 73
III.Dec. 360, 372-73, 454 N.E.2d 220, 232-33
(1983), cert. denied,- U.S. - , 104 S.Ct. 2364,
80 L.Ed.2d 836 (1984); People v. McCray, 57
N.Y.2d at 545, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 442-43, 443
N.E.2d at 916-17. See also Gilliard v. Mississip·
pi,- U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 40, 40-44, 78 L.Ed.2d
179 (1983) (Marshall , 1., dissenting from denial
of certiorari (collecting cases)); State v. Neil,
457 So.2d at 484 n. 3 (collecting cases); Saltz·
burg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the
Clash Between Impartiality and Group Represen·
cation, 41 Md.L.Rev. 337, 360 (1982); Note, The
Defendant 's Right to Object to Prosecuton·at Mis·
use of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 Harv.L.Rev.
1770, 1780 ( 1979).
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We note that it is not entirely clear
whether Witherspoon was decided on Sixth
Amendment grounds or on due process
grounds. The Witherspoon trial had occurred years before the Court's decision in
Duncan v. Louisiana made the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial requirements applicable to the states; and in DeStefano v.
Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 88 S.Ct. 2093, 20
L.Ed.2d 1308 (1968), announced two weeks
after Witherspoon, the Court ruled that
Duncan was not to be applied retroactively. Nonetheless, the Witherspoon Court
stated that "this jury fell woefully short of
that impartiality to which the petitioner
was entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." 391 U.S. at 518, 88
S.Ct. at 1775 (emphasis added). In any
event, even if Witherspoon was decided
under general principles of due process
rather than under the Sixth Amendment, it
would defy reason to believe that the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment into the
Fourteenth lessened the amount of scrutiny to be given to the final phase of the
state jury selection process.

Clteu750F.ld1113 (1984)

cation is that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant that possibility. It
guarantees not that the possibility will ripen into actuality, but only the fair and
undistorted chance that it will. We thus
agree that the Sixth Amendment does not
re~l @ § En! ure ~presen tJve character o ttie venire be carrted
over to t~ry; we . m the AmendrnenfSimply prohiliits the state's s stematic el ma
o t e possi i tty o sue a
carry-over.
~conclusion that the Sixth Amendrnent guarantees the defendant the ''possibi~ of a cross-sectional J:!etit j~ry is sup[ ported by, for example, ll!:!!!w v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223, 98 S.Ct. 1029, 55 L.Ed.2d 234,
in which there was no suggestion that the
venire was improper. The Court held that
the calling of only five persons from even a
valid venire to form the petit jury was
inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment, in
part because so small a group had an unreasonably low possibility of comprising a
cross section of the community. The state
was not permitted to deal with the valid
venire in a way that so limited the possibility that a fair cross section might be drawn.
We find even clearer support for the
proposition that the process of selecting a
jury from a proper venire is subject to
constitutional scrutiny in WithersEoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20
L.Ed.2d 776, which focused squarely on the
challenge stage of the proceedings. There
was no implication that those who objected
to the death penalty were excluded from
the venire; the venire was validly constituted. The statute that was invalidated was
one that permitted the state to challenge
for cause any venireperson who opposed
the death penalty, and thus to eliminate
such persons as a group in the very last
phase of the jury selection process. Witherspoon is thus irreconcilable with the notion that the challenge stage of jury selection is not subject to constitutional scrutiny. If the only constitutional requirement
were that there be a fair cross section on
the venire, with no concern for what followed, the challenges for cause in Witherspoon would have escaped review.

I~ su~ the conclusion we draw from the
Supreme Court cases is tha,t whatever the
nature of the state statute or ractice may
be (e.g., granting exemptions rom jury service as in Duren, or adjus ng the size of
the petit jury as in Bal w, or defining
"cause" to cha1lenge as i Witherspoon, or
departing from the tra · ional requirement
of unanimity as in AP, daca ), and whatever the stage of the s ection process that is
subjected to that tatute or practice (e.g.,
selection of th venire as in Taylor, or
selection of t e petit jury as in Witherspoon, or the erations of the petit jury as
in Apodaca), the state is not _Eermitted by
the Sixth Amendment to restrict unreasona_!ilir the possibility that the etit ·u will
com~air cross section of the community.
__::_--

C. Peremptory Challenges and the Proper Scope of the Courts Focus
We turn next to the questions of whether
and on what basis peremptory challenges,

(~
U4A- ~
1 _ . 1.

~ I~
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as contrasted with challenges for cause,
may be subjected to scrutiny under the
Sixth Amendment. As noted above, some
believe that Swain immunized peremptory
challenges from all constitutional scrutiny,
and indeed, it appears that Swain's extensive review of the history of the peremptory challenge system and its conclusions as
to the importance of that system in American jury trials have created a myth that
peremptory challenges are sacrosanct. We
believe the proper view is that they are not.
First, as the review in Swain makes
lear, the peremptory challenge is not rootd i~tion; 1t ~com1 1 .u~on law and it is now a creature of rule
vJ.~- g' a~ute. But it is not provided for in
~ ~ the Constitution of the United States, nor
~
in any state constitution that we know of.
It ~n~ ~; it may be an
~ inva uable right in certain circumstances;
/J ~. r
but it is not a i ht of constitutional di en~
sion. As a matter of soun jurisprudence,
therefore, when a defendant has made a
prima facie showing that the prosecution's
use of its peremptories conflicts with a
fundamental right that is protected by the
Sixth Amendment, it is the inscrutability of
the peremptory challenge that must yield,
not the constitutional right.
Nor does Swain stand for the proposition that the peremptory challenge is beyond scrutiny even under the Equal Protection Clause. Part III of the Swain opinion,
although dictum, set forth the circumstances that a defendant would have to show in
order to subject the prosecution's use of
peremptories to inquiry by the court. Although the standards set by Swain have
proven to be practically impossible to meet,
they were nevertheless enunciated. Plainly, therefore, even the Swain Court did not
believe that peremptory challenges are immune from remedial judicial action should
the defendant make a prima facie showing
that they conflict with a constitutional
right.
Finally, we see no meaningful distinction,
for Sixth Amendment purposes, between a
stat e's exclusion of Identifiable _groups
from the p~itjury by means of a statute

or practice, as in Witherspoon, and the
exclusion of such groups by means of the
systematic action of the prosecutor, who is
an agent of the state. The latter is equally
state action and should be equally subject
to scrutiny. Indeed, one of the rationales
for according any right to a jury trial is
that it provides "a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor." Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 530, 95 S.Ct. at
698; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at
156, 88 S.Ct. at 1451. Plainly the hedge is
blighted if the prosecutor is allowed arbitrarily to remove entire segments of the
panel and thereby destroy any possibility
that the jury may represent a fair cross
section of the community.
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[ 4] For purposes of determining what a
defendant must show in order to establish
a prima facie case of a prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges in violation of the
Sixth Amendment, we think the principal
difference between Sw~ protection...____
analysis and proper analysis under the
Sixth Amendment lies in the appropriate
the court's focus . The Sixth
scope
Amendment provides that the right of the
accused to trial by an impartial jury shall
exist in "all c~lrniDarprosecUtions." (Emphasis added.) Thus, that Amendment protects each defendant who is to stand trial,
not simply the last in a sequence of defendants to suffer the deprivation of an impartial jury. Accordingly, we construe the
Sixth Amendment's provision to re uire the
court
ec1 e each case on the basis of
the acts or practices complained of i;"J.hat
very-cage, and not to require the defendant
to show, as Swain requires for an equal
protection claim, that those acts or practices have had undesirable effects in case
after case. We confess that we are not
sure why the Equal Protection Clause
should protect only the last of a number of
defendants to be subjected to discrimination, but we are sure that it is not sound to
extend that proposition to the interpretation of a constitutional provision that is
expressly directed to "all" criminal prosecutions.
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Accordingly, we conclude that a defendant may appropriately subject to scrutiny
under the Sixth Amendment the prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges on
the basis of its actions in his own particular
case.
,....._...,
D. Impermissible Exclusions Under the
Sixth Amendment
[5] In addition to the Sixth Amendment's conception of the ideal jury as one
that represents a cross section of the community, several princi les provide guidance
for determmm wliet er an ale ation of
the systematic peremptory exclusion of
blacks and Hispanics rom t e petit jury
states ~ ~ under the
mendment.
Firsr,t.liegoal of ju selection is to assure
that each juror is ree f om bia
By this
we mean that he or she is 1 e y to be able
to decide the case solely on the basis of the
evidence before the jury. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 219, 85 S.Ct. at 835.
Further, the notions that all persons who
share an attribute, such as the same skin
color, will ipso facto view matters in the
same way, and that minority groups are
less able than whites to decide the case
solely on the basis of the evidence, are both
fallacious and pernicious. "As early as
1880, [the Supreme] Court recognized that
blacks as a class are no less qualified to sit
on juries than whites · · · ·" Duren v. Mis)
souri, 439 U.S. at 371 n.* , 99 S.Ct. at 672
n. • (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Any notion
that white persons can be objective in viewing a case on its merits and that blacks qua
blacks cannot, is particularly objectionable.
In a case where a black defendant has been
charged with a crime that has aroused racial passions, one may believe that whites
qua whites are more likely than blacks qua
blacks to convict; this, however, does not
bespeak a greater objectivity so much as it
does a greater propensity to convict. Obviously, the responsibility of the state and its
prosecutor is not to secure a conviction at
all costs; it is to see that justice is done,
and the constitutional wisdom is that justice is best served by a jury that represents
a cross section of the community, not one
from which cognizable groups have been

!A--

systematically eliminated because of their~
group affiliation.
Accordingly, w~ude that the Sixth ----Amendment's guarantee of trial by an impartial jury allows the ,ErosecJ!.~ion to exercise its 'i>erem tory challenges to excuse
ju[Qrs.JQ whom, on the bas1s of their ,perso~ or ~. some bias may
be imputed; but it forbids the exercise of
such chalk nges to excuse jurors solely o
the basis of their ra~iation. Th.-.
""~~
IV. PROCEDURES UNDER THE
L _.....,../.._. ~ ~ ,.
SIXTH AMENDMENT
~ ~~
In setting forth the factors that a de- - !{,,._,_.....~
fendant must show in order to establish a
Z:..~
prima facie case that the prosecution has
;,used its peremptories in a way that violates
the Sixth Amendment, we think it appropri- ~ ''
ate to adapt the Supreme Court's test for
the establishment o a pr1ma fac1e case a
Sixth Amen men VIO ation wit res ct to
th~r , as set ort in 0frJm v. Missou- ~
ri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d
579. There the Court stated as follows:
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-sectio~ irement,
~
the defendant must sho ( that the
group alleged to be exclu e is a "dis11-/.~
tinctive" group in the community; (2)
that the representation of this group in
venires from which juries are selected is
not fair and reasonable in relation to the
number o uch ~rsons in the community; an (3 hat this underrepresentation
is due to ~~yste~ the

"'

grou~ess .

/d. at 364, 99 S.Ct. at 668.
[6] It is evident that the second factor
stated by the Duren Court, i.e., that the
resulting group was in fact not representative of the community, is not applicable to
the petit jury stage. The first and third
factors, however, are plainly reteVant ana
m~. We conclude that in oroer to
establish a prima facie violation of his right
to the possibility of a fair cross section in
the petit jury, the defendant must show
that in his case, (1) the group alleged to be
excluded is a cognizable group in the com~

{_~~
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prima facie case, " ' "the burden of proof
shifts to the State to rebut the presumption
of unconstitutional action by showing that
permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result." ' " Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1280,
51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977) (quoting Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241, 96 S.Ct. 2040,
2048, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), which quoted
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632,
92 S.Ct. 1221, 1226, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972)).
[8] In order to rebut the defendant's
showing, the prosecutor need not show a
reason rising ~here
are a~n which a party
may believe, not unreas ably, that a prospective juror may h e some slight bias
that would not
port a cha enge for
cause but tha ould make excusing him or
her desirab e. Such reasons, if they appear
to begenuine, should be accepted by the
court, which will bear the responsibility of
assessing the genuineness of the prosecutor's response and of being alert to reasons
that are pretextual. See, e.g., People v.
Hall, 35 Cal.3d 161, 197 Cal.Rptr. 71, 75,
672 P.2d 854, 858 (1983) (en bane) (reasons
proffered by prosecutor for peremptorily
excusing blacks were equall ap licab to
whites not excused; eld, defendant's prima facie showing not rebutted). If the
court determines that the prosecution's presentation is inadequate to rebut the defendant's proof, the court should declare a mistrial and a new jury should be selected
from a new panel.

.--l
a -.'

Plainly these principles and procedures
V,¥1.-.
require a ~on of the way in which
the peremptory challenge system works.
I}_ Vv
The modificat.i~s re~ired, however, only
~ n ~e- cases in which a defendant makes
~;,_ _
a facie showing that the prosecutor
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has used those challenges in a way that is
inconsistent with the guarantee of the
Sixth Amendment. In any case in which
such a showing is not made, the prosecution may exercise its peremptory challenges without any inquiry into their bases.
And where the court does inquire, after a
prima facie showing has been made, the
pro cution need not show use for the
excuse of t e urors m uestion but only
genuine reasons other than roup affiliati2!1
e would think t e num er of occasions in which a defendant would be able to
make out a prima facie case that the prose- £<'~...&~-..
cutor's use of peremptories was systemati~r7-c.e4-~"
cally excluding a cognizable group from
the jury solely on the basis of the group's
affiliation would be few; we would hope
the number would decrease. In any event, .e.t.':IJ"-6
this limited requirement for modification of
the traditional, but nonconstitutional, system is a small price to pay for the vindication of a constitutional right.
Nor do we think the necessary procedures place an unreasonable burden on the
court. The process of identifying discriminatory conduct and pretextual explanations
is performed daily in the course of litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and a host of other statutes. It
should not be considered unduly burdensome, in those cases where a prima facie
showing has been made, to scrutinize the
prosecutor's actions when a defendant's
life or liberty may be at stake.
Finally, we note that in states that have
ruled that the prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges is subject to scrutiny
under the state constitution, we have seen
no indication in the reported. authorities or
the commentaries that the implementation
of such scrutiny as has been required has
created an undue burden for the prosecution or the courts. In People v. Hall, the
California Supreme Court declined an invitation to overrule its five-year-old decision
in Wheeler, stating that it had no empirical
evidence that the Wheeler procedures had
proven unworkable. 197 Cal.Rptr. at 76 &
n. 11, 672 P.2d at 859 & n. 11. And in the
present case, the State advises us that in
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the two years between the decision of the
New York Appellate Division in People v.
Thompson, holding that the racially discriminatory use of peremptories by the
prosecutor was invalid under the New York
Constitution, and the implicit overruling of
that decision by the New York Court of
Appeals in People v. McCray, the Thompson rule did not create any practical problems whatever.

U.S. 282, 70 S.Ct. 629, 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950),

Application of the foregoing principles to
the present case poses two questions: first,
whether McCray established a prima facie
case; and second, whether the State is entitled to a hearing at which it may present
evidence to rebut that case. We answer
both questions in the affirmative.

we note that the selection of that alternate
did not occur until after McCray had challenged the prosecutor's use of eight of the
State's eleven peremptories to rid the jury
of all the blacks and Hispanics called to
that point. McCray had established his
prima facie case at the time of his first
objection to the prosecutor's actions. The
trial court should have inquired into the
prosecutor's reasons for the use of the
State's peremptories against the minority
members of the venire and, in the absence
of a response showing permissible reasons,
a mistrial should have been ordered and the
jury selection process begun afresh.
The question that remains is whether the
record that now exists warranted the district court's conditional granting of the
writ without further proceedings.

A. McCray's Prima Facie Showing
[9] The district court correctly ruled
that McCray had made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised the
State's peremptory challenges to exclude
black and Hispanic jurors on the basis of
their group affiliation. McCray's trial
counsel objected during the voir dire and
detailed the prosecutor's use of the State's
challenges, which up to that point had eliminated all of the blacks and Hispanics
drawn. He identified several minority venirepersons who were excused despite having proffered no discernible reason to believe that they would not be unbiased jurors, and one black who was excused despite
having had an experience that one might
think would make him identify more with a
complaining witness than with a defendant.
McCray's showing was ample to shift to
the State the burden of coming forward
with some reason other than group affiliation for the challenges.
We are not persuaded to the contrary
view by the State's argument that one
black venireperson was eventually seated
as a jury alternate. Questions of possible
tokenism aside, see, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31
L.Ed.2d 536 (1972); Cassell v. Texas, 339

B. The Need for a Hearing on the State's
Proffer of Rebuttal
The State advances two bases for its
argument that even if McCray did make a
prima facie showing that the prosecutor
exercised the State's peremptories on the
basis of race, the district court should not
have granted the conditional writ of habeas
corpus. First, it argues that the district
court should have deferred to the trial
court's "decision to credit" the prosecutor's
denial that she had so used the State's
peremptories. Alternatively, it contends
that the district court itself should have
held a hearing on the State's proffer of
rebutting evidence. We reject the former
contention but agree with the latter.
The State's first contention is governed
by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which requires the
district court to defer to factual findings by
the state court only if (1) they are evidenced by reliable written indicia, (2) the
court's factfinding procedure was adequate
to afford a full and fair hearing, and (3) the
findings are fairly supported by the record.
Here the district court was not required to
accept the State's view that the state trial
court made any finding that the prosecutor
did not exercise the peremptory challenges
impermissibly. The trial court made no

V.
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such finding in its written opinion. Nor is
such a finding reflected in any transcript or
in any other writing in the record.
All that appears in the record is the trial
court's statement in its written opinion,
published nearly two months after the conduct of the voir dire, that the prosecutor
denied having used the State's peremptories discriminatorily. Even that statement,
however, is not supported by the record.
The transcript of the argument and colloquy that followed McCray's objection to the
prosecutor's actions during the voir dire
reveals no statement whatever from the
prosecutor. Further, it clearly appears
from the record that the trial court refused
to conduct any sort of hearing. Accordingly, the district court was not required to
infer that the state court had found no
racially discriminatory use of the peremptory challenges nor even to defer to the trial
court's statement that the prosecutor had
denied such use.
While the failure of the trial court to
inquire into the prosecutor's reasons for
the peremptory exclusion of minority venirepersons might well suffice to cause a
state appellate court to order a new trial
without further proceedings, see, e.g., People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.
S.2d 739 (1981), there are circumstances
here that suggest that the district court
should have held a hearing to conduct an
inquiry into those reasons.
First, principles of federalism and comity
suggest that a writ of habeas corpus not be
granted freeing a state defendant or granting him a new trial without giving the state
every opportunity to respond to the petitioner's allegations. Thus, in Bermudez v.
Reid, 733 F.2d 18 (2d Cir.1984), in which
the state had repeatedly defaulted in its
obligation to respond to the allegations of
the petition, we reversed the district court's
granting of the writ on the basis of those
defaults. We ruled that the court was
required to conduct a hearing into the allegations to determine whether the petitioner
could make some factual showing that his
federal rights had been violated, and that,
notwithstanding the earlier inexcusable de-

faults, the state should be given notice of
the hearing in order that the court might
consider the petition on the basis of the
best available evidence.
We see no basis here for departing from
the principle established by Bermudez, especially since the State has not defaulted
and has urged that it be allowed to present
rebutting evidence. We realize that the
State did not come forward with an affidavit by the ADA who conducted the McCray
trials until after the district court had rendered its decision conditionally granting the
writ. But we see no indication that the
State intended to default in any way, and it
could well have been that the State believed there was no immediate urgency to
come forward with a factual showing in
light of the uncertainty that the federal
constitutional contentions advanced by
McCray, which had theretofore been rejected by virtually every other court to consider them, would be accepted, and the fact
that McCray himself had requested, if
those contentions were accepted, that a
hearing be held. Further, we note that the
ADA who tried McCray stated in her affidavit to the district court that she had
offered to explain to the trial court her
reasons for each challenge; that at that
time she had notes relating to the voir dire;
and that the trial court refused to permit
her to present her reasons. While such a
proffer by the ADA is nowhere reflected in
the record, we do not know that it did not
occur.
We recognize that more than four years
have elapsed since the conduct of the voir
dire in question, and that the State's practical burden of rebutting the prima facie
showing made by McCray has increased
with the passage of time. Nonetheless, in
all the circumstances of this case, we think
it appropriate for the district court to conduct a hearing into the State's proffered
rebuttal of the prima facie case established
by McCray.
C ONCLUSION

We agree with the decision of the district
court insofar as it ruled that McCray estab-
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lished a prima facie case that the State
violated his rights under the Sixth Amendrnent by exercising its peremptory challenges to exclude black and Hispanic pro8pective jurors on the basis of their group
affiliation. The order conditionally granting the writ is vacated and the matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MESKILL, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
Although the majority's effort to combat
what it perceives to be a form of discrimination is well intentioned, the result
reached is unworkable and contrary to the
law of this and almost every other circuit.
Until today's decision, federal appellate
case law dealing with the racial makeup of
juries was uniform; to establish a violation
of the Constitution, the defendant had to
prove a systematic exclusion of blacks
from petit juries that extended over a number of cases. Absent such a showing, the
objective existence or nonexistence of a
"proper" reason for the prosecutor's use of
a peremptory challenge was irrelevant because the "presumption in any particular
case must be that the prosecutor is using
the State's challenges to obtain a fair and
impartial jury to try the case before the
court." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
222, 85 S.Ct. 824, 837, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965)
(emphasis added).1
The majority recognizes that Swain is
the starting point for any analysis of the
alleged discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges. The teaching of Swain is
clear. After reviewing the nature and purpose of peremptory challenges and commenting on their importance in our system
of justice, the Court stated:
In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it
serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we
I. The majority refers on several occasions to the
state's concession that the use of race as a factor
in making peremptory challenges violates the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. However,
the majority recognized that the state's concession of a possible equal protection violation was

cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's
reasons for the exercise of his challenges
in any given case. The presumption in
any particular case must be that the
prosecutor is using the State's challenges
to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try
the case before the court. The presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor
therefore subjected to examination by allegations that in the case at hand all
Negroes were removed from the jury or
that they were removed because they
were Negroes. Any other result, we
think, would establish a rule wholly at
odds with the peremptory challenge system as we know it.
380 U.S. at 222, 85 S.Ct. at 837 (emphasis
added).
While the majority finds Swain distasteful, it concedes that for purposes of
McCray's equal protection claim Swain is
controlling. However, in an attempt to circumvent Swain, the majority finds that a
string of Sixth Amendment cases opens the
door Swain so clearly closed. The majority's approach is contrary to the law established in a host of federal appellate court
decisions, including the law of this Circuit.
In United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d
240 (2d Cir.1977), decided after almost all
of the Sixth Amendment cases on which
the majority relies, we recognized the continued validity of Swain. Although Newman involved a due process claim, the
Court was cognizant of Sixth Amendment
standards, stating that the case before it
concerned the defendants' right to "a fair
and impartial jury and one which represents a fair cross-section of the community. " 549 F.2d at 244. In rejecting the
defendants' challenge of the prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges, the Court
stated:
erroneous. I agree with them on that point, but
I also find the state's concession of a possible
Sixth Amendment violation to be erroneous.
Moreover, given the precedent in this area, I
find the state's concession to be incomprehensible from a legal viewpoint.
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Nor under the circumstances did the defendants under any existing law have
the right to inquire into and interrogate
the prosecutor about his reasons for peremptorily challenging the four Black veniremen in the jury pool. Swain v. Alabama, supra, is the governing authority
on this matter.
549 F.2d at' 246 (emphasis added).
Moreover, in United States v. Danzey,
476 F.Supp. 1065 (E.D.N.Y.l979), a Sixth
Amendment claim was brought under facts
similar to those in the case before us. Indeed, the prosecutor in Danzey admitted:
"I make it a practice to attempt to exclude
as best I can all jurors . . . of the same
ethnic background as the defendant." !d.
at 1066. In rejecting the defendant's Sixth
Amendment claim, Judge Nickerson found
Swain and Newman controlling. We affirmed without opinion, 620 F.2d 286 (2d
Cir.l980), and in a concurrence in the denial
of a petition for a rehearing en bane, four
members of our Court stated that the "use
of peremptory challenges based on a group
bias assumption denies no cognizable legal rights 'in any particular case.' " United States v. Danzey, 622 F.2d 1065, 1066
(2d Cir.) (emphasis added, quoting Swain,
380 U.S. at 221), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 878,
101 S.Ct. 225, 66 L.Ed.2d 101 (1980). They
went on to add "no relief is appropriate
unless the offending pattern is sufficiently general and pervasive to support a
clear inference of motivation or intent to
discriminate against a particular racial or
ethnic group." 622 F.2d at 1066 (emphasis
added, citing Newman, 549 F.2d at 249-50).
The majority should not so lightly disregard our prior decisions.
Even if the Jaw of our Circuit were not
clear, the overwhelming weight of authority from other circuits calls for a rejection
of the majority's approach. At least five
circuits have rejected the notion that the
Supreme Court's later Sixth Amendment
decisions, particularly Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690
United
(1975), have undercut Swain.
States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 681-82 (7th
Cir.l984) (practical considerations support

prevailing view that Swain is still controlling law); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212,
1219 n. 14 (11th Cir.l983), cert. denied, U.S. - , 104 S.Ct. 3546, 82 L.Ed.2d 849
(1984) (Sixth Amendment analysis of Taylor does not extend to petit juries); United
States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145, 146-47
(4th Cir.l983) (appellant made Sixth
Amendment claim, Swain cited as controlling); United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d
1313 (8th Cir.l983) (en bane), cert. denied,
-U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 744, 79 L.Ed.2d 202
(1984) (Taylor's Sixth Amendment analysis
does not overrule Swain ); Weathersby v.
Morris, 708 F.2d 1493, 1497 (9th Cir.l983),
cert. denied, - U.S. - - , 104 S.Ct. 719,
79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984) (Taylor analysis does
not extend to petit juries). Moreover, three
other circuits have recently reaffirmed the
validity of Swain, although it is unclear
from their decisions whether Sixth Amendment claims were advanced.
United
States v. Cane[, 708 F.2d 894, 898 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. - - , 104
S.Ct. 165, 78 L.Ed.2d 151 (1983) ("We decline to change the rule that neither side
need justify the use of peremptory challenges."); United States v. Jenkins, 701
F.2d 850, 859-60 (lOth Cir.l983) (Swain
called for rejection of appellant's claim
which only challenged conduct at his trial);
United States v. Durham, 587 F.2d 799,
801 (5th Cir.l979) (defendant must show
systematic exclusion of blacks from petit
juries).
The weight of authority against the majority's Swain /Sixth Amendment analysis
exists for good reason: the Sixth Amendment cases are not inconsistent with
Swain. Like Swain, the Sixth Amendment
decisions that involve exclusion of prospective jurors focus on systematic exclusion.
See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968)
(state may not challenge for cause pote~
tial jurors opposed to death penalty; possibly due process rather than Sixth Amendment grounds); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 533, 95 S.Ct. 692, 699, 42 L.Ed.2d
690 (1975) ("women cannot be systematically excluded from jury panels from which
petit juries are drawn"); Duren v. Missou-

u.s. 357, 360,
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ri 439 U.S. 357, 360, 99 S.Ct. 664, 666, 58
L:Ed.2d 579 (1979) (the "systematic exclusion of women that results in jury venires
averaging Jess than 15'lo female violates
the Constitution's fair-cross-section requirement").
Moreover, the Sixth Amendment cases do
not show a retreat from Swain. For example, in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92
s .Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972), on which
the majority relies, Justice White stated:
All that the Constitution forbids, however, is systematic exclusion of identifiable segments of the community from
jury panels and from the juries ultimately drawn from those panels; a defendant
may not, for example, challenge the
makeup of a jury merely because no
members of his race are on the jury, but
must prove that his race has been systematically excluded. See Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208-209 [85 S.Ct.
824, 829-830, 13 L.Ed.2d 759] (1965) ....
406 U.S. at 413, 92 S.Ct. at 1634 (plurality
opinion; emphasis added). In addition, in
Taylor, the Court made it clear that it
imposed
no requirement that petit juries actually
chosen must mirror the community and
reflect the various distinctive groups in
the population. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition, Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284
[67 S.Ct. 1613, 1625, 91 L.Ed. 2043]
(1947); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S., at
413 [92 S.Ct. at 1634] (plurality opinion);
but the jury wheels, pools of names,
panels, or venires from which juries are
drawn must not systematically exclude
distinctive groups in the community and
thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.
419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 702 (emphasis
added). I therefore find the majority's
2. The majority places great emphasis on the
absence of a constitutional provision allowing
peremptory challenges. While there is no constitutional requirement for peremptory challenges, the challenge is designed to secure an
impartial jury, which is the overriding Sixth
Amendment objective. The Supreme Court has
recognized its importance in holding the per-

analysis of the interaction between Swain
and Sixth Amendment precedent unpersuasive.
Even if we could decide this case in a
vacuum, removed from the precedent
against the majority's approach, there are
a number of practical factors that militate
against the majority's decision. First, the
majority gives far too little weight to the
peremptory challenge's long history as a
tool used to ensure an impartial jury.2 An
attorney who uses her challenges to exclude from the jury members of the same
race, religion, sex, occupation, class or ethnic background as her opponent's client is
not invidiously discriminating against members of that group. Rather, the attorney is
trying to ensure that her client faces a jury
that at least will be unbiased and at best
will be receptive to her view of the case.
We must remember that at the same time
the defense counsel, who may well have
more challenges, is engaged in the same
process. The result of this adversarial system should be an impartial jury. As the
Supreme Court recognized in Swain, the
nature of this system means that peremptory challenges are often
exercised on grounds normally thought
irrelevant to legal proceedings or official
action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people
summoned for jury duty. For the question a prosecutor or defense counsel
must decide is not whether a juror of a
particular race or nationality is in fact
partial, but whether one from a different
group is less likely to be . . . . Hence
veniremen are not always judged solely
as individuals for the purpose of exercising peremptory challenges. Rather they
are challenged in light of the limited
knowledge counsel has of them, which
emptory challenge to be "a necessary part of
trial by jury," Swain, 380 U.S. at 219, 85 S.Ct. at
835, and "essential in contemplation of law to
the impartiality of the trial," Lewis, 146 U.S. at
378, 13 S.Ct. at 139. Thus, I believe that the
majority has unduly minimized the significance
of the peremptory challenge.
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may include their group affiliations, in
the context of the case to be tried.

v. County of Nassau, 581 F.Supp. 493,

380 U.S. at 220-21, 85 S.Ct. at 836 (footnotes omitted).

In addition, the majority fails to confront
the obvious implication of its ruling for
defense attorneys . As the Seventh Circuit
recently recognized, "[i]t would be hard to
argue that only a defendant should be allowed to challenge racially motivated peremptory challenges. . . . As it cannot be
right to believe that racial discrimination is
wrong only when it harms a criminal defendant, and not when it harms the law
abiding community represented by the
prosecutor . . .. " Clark, 737 F.2d at 682.
See also Florida v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481
(Fla.1984) (Alderman, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 48990 n. 35, 387 N.E.2d 499, 517 n. 35, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 881, 100 S.Ct. 170, 62
L.Ed.2d 110 (1979); People v. Wheeler, 22
Cal.3d 258, 282 n. 29, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 907
n. 29, 583 P.2d 748, 765 n. 29 (1978).

Although the majority finds such group
based assumptions "fallacious" and " pernicious," an attorney has not only a right but
an obligation to challenge a prospective
juror who may be biased, even if the basis
of her belief is a broad generalization,
which may not in fact be true. Thus, the
actual issue in this case is not whether a
prosecutor may systematically exclude
members of some group from sitting on
juries but whether a prosecutor may use
peremptory challenges to exclude individual members of a group because she believes that in that particular case they
may be biased in favor of members of the
defendant's group. 3 A competent prosecutor will only strike a member of the defendant's group in situations where she believes
the possibility of that individual having a
group bias-even if very small-is greater
than the possibility of some other prospective juror having a bias. Where the group
based assumption against members of the
defendant's group is outweighed by some
other assumption, the prosecutor will turn
to the other assumptions; for instance, if a
black college student is being tried in a
draft registration case, the prosecutor may
prefer to challenge a white social worker
rather than a black veteran. By banning
the use of such assumptions, the majority
has severely limited the effectiveness of
the peremptory challenge. See also King
3. At times in its opinion the majority attempts
to cast the case before us as one involving
systematic exclusion. Indeed, based on the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial
jury in "all criminal cases," the majority states
that a systematic exclusion may be established
in an individual case. Majority Op. at 113~1131,
1_132. I find it d_ifficult to accept its interpreta·
lion of systematic. In Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the
Court defined the term systematic in the following passage: "(Petitioners'] undisputed demon·
stration that a large discrepancy occurred not
just occasionally, but in every weekly venire for
a period of nearly a year manifestly indicates
that the cause of the underrepresentation was
systematic-that is, inherent in the particular

500-01 (E.D.N.Y.1984).

This very problem, and the negative impact it will have for defendants, was foreseen in Newman.
The right to peremptory challenges is
of great importance, both to the Government and to the defendants-but mostly
to the defendants, because they are personally involved in the result of the trial
and for this reason usually have more of
the peremptory challenges than the
Government. These challenges provide
one of the most effective assurances that
a party will have a fair and impartial
jury . . . . Once, however, a plaintiff or
prosecutor is required to submit to interjury-selection process utilized." 439 U.S. at 366,
99 S.Ct. at 669. Thus, to establish systematic
exclusion, even in Sixth Amendment cases, the
defendant must show case after case exclusion.
If in the case before us the defendant could
make this showing, Swain would outlaw the
practice and there would be no need to look to
the Sixth Amendment. However, such an ana!·
ysis does not satisfy the majority because 1t
finds a Swain violation too difficult to prove.
Thus, it redefines systematic and develops an
~i~r test. What the majority ignores in so. domg IS that perhaps the reason Swain violaUOD5
have not been proved in an "acceptable" nu111·
ber of cases is that they do not exist in an
acceptable number of cases.
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rogation concerning his reasons for making a peremptory challenge, it will probably not be long before defendants will be
required to do likewise. This, in all likelihood, would spell the end of peremptory
challenges; and Blacks and other recognizable minority groups would thereby
suffer a major loss in the removal of one
of the greatest safeguards the Jaw has
provided for a fair trial.
549 F.2d at 250 n. 8. 4
The majority also fails to confront the
virtual limitlessness of its Sixth Amendment analysis. To establish a prima facie
case under the majority's standard, the defendant need only show "(1) the group alleged to be excluded is a cognizable group
in the community, and (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the challenges leading to this exclusion have been made on the
basis of the individual venireperson's group
affiliation rather than because of any indication of a possible inability to decide the
case on the basis of the evidence presented." Majority op. at 1131-32 (emphasis added). Thus, a group based assumption may
not be used to exclude a member of any
Sixth Amendment "cognizable" or "distinctive group." "Distinctive groups" under
the Sixth Amendment are those that "are
sufficiently numerous and distinct" that if
they are systematically excluded from jury
venires, "the Sixth Amendment fair-crosssection requirement cannot be satisfied."
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99
S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979) (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531, 95 S.Ct. at

698). For example, in any given community, people opposed to the death penalty
may be a "distinctive group" and thus under the majority's analysis they may not be
peremptorily challenged. 5 It also appears
that men, women, old people, young people,
laborers, professionals, Democrats, Republicans, etc. are distinctive groups. Therefore, no group based assumptions may be
used to eliminate any member of these
groups. Such a change is not simply "a
modification of the way in which the peremptory challenge system works," Majority op. at 1132. It effectively eliminates the
peremptory challenge for all but the most
frivolous reasons (people who wear gray,
smile, or wear contact lenses).

4. The extension of the majority's restrictions to
the defense will create problems. The prosecution will then have every right. for example, to
contend that a black defendant may not use his
peremptory challenges exclusively against
whites. This not only doubles potential delay
and requires all attorneys to keep records of
who they are challenging and why, it may also
mean that a minority defendant will have to
challenge some minority prospective jurors peremptorily in order to rebut a charge of discrimination. Furthermore, the defense is often entitled to more peremptory challenges than the
prosecution is, see, e.g., Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(b).
Consequently, in order to avoid an inference of
discrimination the defense may be forced to
challenge more minority prospective jurors than

the prosecution would. This is even more "pernicious" than the result the majority condemns.

I believe the result the majority reaches
spells the end of the peremptory challenge
as an effective jury selection tool. Again a
return to Swain is appropriate. As the
Supreme Court stated in Swain, the peremptory challenge is by definition "an arbitrary and capricious right; and it must be
exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its
full purpose." Swain, 380 U.S. at 219, 85
S.Ct. at 835 (quoting Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 378, 13 S.Ct. 136, 139,
36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892)). It added: "The essential nature of the peremptory challenge
is that it is one exercised without a reason
stated, without inquiry and without being
subject to the court's control." Swain, 380
U.S. at 220, 85 S.Ct. at 836. The Court
concluded by recognizing that once the
prosecutor is required to explain her challenge,

5. Such a result is contrary to the holdings of at
least two circuits which have considered this
issue. Dobbert v. Strickland, 718 F.2d 1518,
1524-25 (I Jth Cir.1983) (although under Witherspoon state may not challenge prospective jurors opposed to death penalty for cause, state
may peremptorily challenge those prospective
jurors); Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067, 1070
(5th Cir.1982) (Witherspoon inapplicable to situation where prospective juror was peremptorily
challenged). Thus, to the extent that the majority relies on Witherspoon, Majority Op. at 1129,
its result is again contrary to the law of
other circuits.
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[t]he challenge, pro tanto, would no
longer be peremptory, each and every
challenge being open to examination, either at the time of the challenge or at a
hearing afterwards. The prosecutor's
judgment underlying each challenge
would be subject to scrutiny for reasonableness and sincerity. And a great
many uses of the challenge would be
banned.
380 U.S. at 222, 85 S.Ct. at 837.
The continued validity of the Court's concern in Swain was recently pointed out by
the Seventh Circuit. In expressing its
doubt that Swain has been undercut by the
Sixth Amendment cases, that court recognized the practical considerations that
weigh against such an analysis. First
among these was "[t]he potential for
stretching out criminal trials that are already too long, by making the voir dire a
Title VII proceeding in miniature." Clark,
737 F.2d at 682. The court also observed
that if the prosecutor is faced with having
to defend his peremptory challenges,
it is hard to see how the peremptory
challenge . . . will survive. Whenever
counsel alleged that his opponent had a
racial or similar type of motivation in
exerc1smg a peremptory challenge
(whether he used that challenge to exclude a white or a black-and it would
have to be one or the other--or, extending the principle as one could hardly resist doing, a man or a woman, a Jew or a
gentile, etc.) the opponent would have to
come forward with a reason for wanting
to exclude the juror. In other words he
would have to provide good cause, or
something very close to it; and the peremptory challenge would collapse into
the challenge for cause.
/d.
The majority, however, steadfastly asserts that it is not imposing a cause stan-

dard. However, the line it is attempting to
draw is at best gossamery. Moreover, any
inquiry into the motivation of the prosecutor entails a tremendous burden. As
Judge Wexler recently explained:
Even assuming the existence of a clear
theoretical rule regarding what types of
peremptory challenges are legal, enormous difficulties would arise from any
attempt to implement such a rule in practice. A great deal of time, effort and
expense would be necessary to attempt
to determine whether any given peremptory challenge is legal. Any such determination would entail the extremely difficult task of assessing the internal motives of the attorneys. It might also
require an inquiry by the Court into the
ethnic or religious backgrounds of prospective jurors, thereby promoting the
very emphasis on such factors which the
rule seeks to avoid.... Most important
of all, attorneys, confronted with a rule
completely or partially restricting their
right to act with the internal motive of
helping their clients when making peremptory challenges, will be under enormous pressure to lie regarding their motives. Such a rule will foster hypocrisy
and disresp€ct for our system of justice.
Indeed, it is even possible that an attorney may lie to himself in an effort to
convince himself that his motives are legal.
King v. County of Nassau, 581 F.Supp.
493, 501-{)2 (E.D.N.Y.1984) (holding Swain
is still controlling law).6
In sum, the majority reaches its conclusion only by rejecting the overwhelming
weight of authority and by minimizing the
burdens that its result will place on the
court and the litigants. Although it is offended by any group based assumptions, it
fails to recognize that in a particular case
such assumptions are not illogical and may

6. The majority believes that its prima facie test
will be difficult to meet. I find its belief unwar·
ranted. To establish a prima facie case in their
case-by-case approach, the defendant will only
have to show that members of the distinctive
group were repeatedly challenged. Thu~. if a
venire contains three members of a "cognizable

group" and all three are challenged or maybe
two of three are challenged, a prima facie case
appears to be established. I find it hard to
believe that this result will occur in only a "few;
cases. Moreover, the impact of the thr~at .0
having to justify every challenge will be s•gn•fi·
cant, see supra note 4.
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ants were not entitled to bill of particulars;
(2) defendants were not entitled to severance of trials; (3) evidence was sufficient
as to guilty knowledge and intent; (4) certain documents seized by investigator while
armed with warrant and lawfully on defendant's premises to arrest him were
properly seized under plain view doctrine;
and (5) defendant's postarrest admission to
coconspirator who visited his home was not
made in violation of defendant's right to
counsel.
Affirmed.

I. Indictment and Information e=>l21.2(9)

Defendants charged with mail fraud in
connection with scheme to defraud insurers
were not entitled to bill of particulars,
where elements of mail fraud scheme were
described in detail in indictment, where
each mail fraud count in indictment spelled
out conduct of defendants in furtherance of
scheme, where each defendant was furnished by way of discovery insurance files
mentioned in indictment and additional pertinent documents, and where prosecutor
met with defense counsel shortly after filing of indictment to explain Government's
contentions regarding basis of alleged
frauds and offered to provide defendants
with copies of all relevant documents. 18
U.S.C.A. § 1341; Fed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rule
7(c), 18 U.S.C.A.

Argued Oct. 11, 1984.
Decided Dec. 18, 1984.

2. Indictment and Information e=>121.1(3)
Whether to grant bill of particulars
rests within sound discretion of district
court.

Defendants were convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, Henry Bramwell, J .,
of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy,
and mail fraud in connection with scheme
to defraud automobile insurance companies
under state "assigned risk" plan, and they
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Mansfield, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) defend-

3. Criminal Law e=>622.5
Defendant charged with mail fraud
waived any right that he might have had to
severance of his trial from that of other
defendants charged with numerous offenses in connection with mail fraud and
racketeering scheme, where defendant
failed to request severance before trial.
Fed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rules 8, 12(b)(2, 5), (f),
14, 18 U.S.C.A.
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SUMMARY:

~
This 1s the ·case

where a black Kentucky bur-

glary defendant claimed that the prosecution's use of peremptory
challenges to excuse all black
Sixth Amendment.

· ury venirepersons violated the

The previous pool memo noted that this was a

certworthy issue in view of a circuit split, but recommended that
case

creating

the

circuit

- 2 -

split,

/

McCray v.

Abrams,

750

F. 2d

1113

(CA2

1984) ,

cert

petn

filed March 4, 1984 (No. 84-1426).
On closer examination, the petn in McCray is a terrible candidate for deciding the Sixth Amendment issue.

The first ques-

tion presented in that petn reads as follows:
1. Whether the sixth amendment right to .
trial by jury, made applicable to the state
through the fourteenth amendment in Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 u.s. 145 (1968), prohibits the
use of the peremptory challenge in a criminal
case, by prosecutors or defense counsel, to
exclude prospective jurors solely on the
basis of race.
Despite urging this

the petn subsequently

notes that the pet

concedes

at the Sixth amendment

applies to this
On this petition for a writ ~ certiorathe state contends that the· court below
CO£! ~Ctl ~ held that the sixth amendment prohifiit]:tb~ ate from using peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors on the
basis of race, and correctly held that a prima facie showing requires an evidentiary
hearing rather than the immediate grant of
the writ.
The state contends, however, that
t~ese decisions, although correct, are worthy
of this Court's review.
ri,

~

McCray Petn at 7.
concession

in

F.2d, at 1118.
decide

an

the

Indeed, petr New York apparently made the same
Second

Circuit.

See

Abrams

v.

McCray,

750

Needless to say, I doubt the Court will want to

important

Sixth Amendment

issue which has split the

circuits in a case where both petr and resp

ta~e

the same posi-

tion on the merits.
~

It remains to decide whether the Batson case is a good case

to resolve the conflict.

In that regard,

I note only that the

•

•
record

- 3 -

in this case is clear of any procedural defaults -- the

petr clearly made the Sixth Amendment argument at each stage of
the

state proceedings,

them.

and

the state courts expressly rejected

It is also clear that the peremptories in this case were

used in a manner to exclude all blacks from the jury (there was
one black alternate in this case).

The only drawback to a grant

in this case, and it may be a significant one, is that the Court
cannot expect particularly able advocacy of the State's position,
judging from the resp to the petn.

This is a possible GRANT.

March 27, 1985

Syverud

opn in petn

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
April 12, 1985, Conference
List 2, Sheet 3
No. 84-6263
Batson (burglar)

Cert to Ky. S.Ct.

(per curiam)

v.
Kentucky

1.

State/Criminal

SUMMARY:

Timely

Petr, a black defendant, claims that the pros-

ecution's use of peremptory challenges to excuse all four black
jury venirepersons from the jury panel violates the Sixth Amendment.
2.

FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

Petr was indicted and tried

in Jefferson County Circuit Court in Kentucky on charges of sec-

- 2 -

ond degree burglary and receipt of stolen property.
etta Spencer

Mrs. Henri-

identified petr at trial as the person who she had

seen enter her house and flee with purses containing jewelry.
A jury venire was drawn

for

the

trial

that

included four

blacks; the prosecution and defense were each allowed six peremptory challenges.

The · prosecution used its peremptory challenges

to excuse two white venire members and all four black venire members.

Petr's counsel thereupon objected on the grounds that the

prosecution's use of peremptory challenges violated the sixth and
fourteenth

amendments.

Petr

requested

that

panel that had been selected be excused.

the

all-white

jury

The trial court over-

ruled the objection and the panel was sworn.

[The transcript of

the colloquy between the trial judge and counsel on this issue is
included

in the Petn at A-14-18.]

Petr was convicted and sen-

tenced to 20 years in prison.
Petr
tucky.

appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Ken-

As in the trial court, petr argued that the prosecution's

use of peremptory challenges viola ted the Sixth Amendment.

[The

relevant portion of petr's brief in the Ky. S.Ct. is contained in
the

petn at A-10-13] .

Petr

argued

that Swain v.

Alabama,

380

u.s. 202 (1965}, while rejecting an equal protection challenge to
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, nevertheless did not
reach or decide the issue of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.
cited

the opinions of

this court accompanying

Petr

the denial of a

petn for certiorari in McCray v. New York, 103 s.ct. 2438

(1983}

as indicating that five Justices may prefer a different rule than

- 3 -

Swain

in

the context of Sixth Amendment challenges to the dis-

crimina tory

use

of

Petr

peremptory challenges.

further

argued

that state courts in Massachusetts, California, and Florida have
relied on their

state constitutions and

reversing convictions where

the Sixth Amendment

in

the prosecution employed peremptory

challenges to exclude -members of one race from a jury panel.
The

Kentucky

Supreme

Court

unanimous per curiam opinion.

affirmed

the

Petn at A-1.

conviction

in

a

Petr's Sixth Amend-

ment challenge was rejected in a single paragraph:
Appellant acknowledged that the United
States Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama, 380
u.s. 202 (1965), held that preemptory [sic]
challenges against blacks, by themselves, do
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment equalprotection clause.
However, appellant urges
this court to adopt the position of other
states based upon the Sixth Amendment and
their own state constitutions, that preemptory [sic] challenges against minority groups
can be unconstitutional if they were shown to
be a pattern of challenges against jurors
from a discrete group and a likelihood that
the challenges were based solely upon group
membership.
People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748
(Cal. 1978), and Commonwealth v. Soares, 387
N.E.2d 499 {Mass. 1979).
We have recently
reaffirmed our reliance upon Swain in Commonwealth v. McFerron, Ky.,
S.W.2d
{1984), holding that an allegation of the
lack of a fair cross-section jury which does
not concern a systematic exclusion from the
jury drum does not rise to constitutional
proportions, and we decline to adopt another
rule.
Petn at A-5-6.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The

concise

petn

primarily

repeats

the

arguments made in JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissent from denial of certiorari

in McCray v. New York, 103 S.Ct.

Brennan's dissent from denial

2438

{1983)

and Justice

in Thompson v. United States, 105

- 4 -

S.Ct. 443

(1984).

As this Court recognized in Taylor v. Louisi-

ana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), a fair trial requires a jury made up of
a

fair

cross

section

of

the

community.

This

Sixth Amendment

right was violated by the use of peremptory challenges to exclude
all members of the panel who were of the same race as the defendant.

Swain is inapplicable, both because it does not involve the

Sixth Amendment and because the burden it imposes on a defendant
that of showing systematic exclusion in a pattern of conduct
by prosecutors -- is insuperable.
Admittedly,

the opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS,

joined by JUS-

TICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE POWELL in denying the petn in McCray v.
New York, supra, called for the Supreme Court to hold off on this
issue until a later date so that other courts could consider it.
The STEVENS opinion also noted the lack of circuit split.

In the

two years since McCray, however, most states have, like Kentucky,
simply

refused

Swain.

Only New Mexico and Florida have joined the ranks of Mas-

sachusetts
states

to

and

have

reconsider

California

shown

no

in

interest

the

issue

adopting

and

new

instead

rules.

relied

The

in reconsidering Swain,

so

on

other
this

Court should step in and do the job.
In addition, a circuit conflict has developed since McCray.
In McCray v.

Abrams,

CA2

a

affirmed

750 F.2d 1113

district

(CA2 December 4,

1984), the

court's determination that a defendant

could challenge on sixth amendment grounds the use of peremptory
challenges

to excuse all the black and Hispanic members of the

jury venire.

The decision in McCray is in square conflict with

the decisions of the CAB in United States v. Thompson,

730 F.2d

- 5 -

82 (1984) and the CA4 in United States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145
(1983).

In light of the Circuit conflict, the issue is now ripe

for decision by this court.
The Kentucky Attorney General argues that Swain v. Alabama
should be left intact and should govern this case.

There is no

judicial dissatisfaction with Swain other than the CA2's recent
decision in McCray v. Abrams, and that is an "aberrance".
ars

have

criticised

knowledge

that

the

often

odds

with

at

court."

the

rule,

analytical
the

but

"it

Schol-

is a matter of general

treatises of legal theorists are

constitutional

law

announced

by

this

While racial discrimination is to be deplored, a defend-

ant is not entitled by the Sixth Amendment to "a jury of any particular composition."
4.

DISCUSSION:

Citing Taylor v. Louisiana, supra.
The issue squarely presented in the petn is

obviously one on which this Court will have to grant certiorari
at some point in view of the CA2's recent decision in McCray, 750
F. 2d 1113.

The CA2 case arose on review of the habeas petn of

the same defendant's whose Sixth Amendment claims this Court declined

to

S.Ct. 2438
case

review
(1983).

on

direct

appeal

in McCray v.

New York,

103

Judge Kearse's opinion for the panel in that

(her opinion was

joined by Judge Lumbard)

reviewed all the

federal and state developments since Swain and concludes that the
Sixth Amendment constrains the exercise of peremptory challenges
to exclude
ation.

jurors

solely on

the

basis of

their

racial affili-

Judge Kearse's opinion concluded that McCray made a prima

facie case that jurors were excused solely because of their race,
but remanded so that the State could be given an opportunity to

- 6 -

•

present evidence rebutting that prima facie case.
dissented,

arguing

that

the majority's

Judge Meskill

rule was unworkable and

would impose an insuperable burden on trial courts in the administration of peremptory challenges.
While this Kentucky case presents a certworthy issue in view
of

the circuit split; it would be more sensible to resolve the

issue

in the McCray case itself rather than in this case.

Kentucky

Supreme

Court

opinion

is

nowhere

near

either the majority or the dissent in the CA2.
filed

by

the

New

York

Attorney General

as

thorough

The
as

A cert petn was

in McCray on March

4,

1985, but the petn has not yet been circulated to the conference.
Abrams
this

v.

McCray,

No.

84-1426.

issue

this

coming

term,

If

the Court wishes

to decide

it should do so in McCray rather

than this case.

I recommend a HOLD until the Court decides whether to grant
Abrams v. McCray, No 84-1426.

There is a response.

March 25, 1985

Syverud

opn in petn
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MEMO TO FILE
This

case

was

granted

to

u.s.

vitality of Swain v. Alabama, 380
this Court

rejected

consider

the

present

202 (1965)

in which

the claim that prosecutor ial use of

preemptive challenges to strike black prospective jurors,
by itself, violate equal protection.
This Case
There

is

no

real

dispute

as

to

the

evidence

upon

which petitioner, a black was convicted of second degree
burglary,

and

violation

of

offender,

petitioner

evidence

at

of

receiving

Kentucky

trial

law.

was

stolen
As

property,
a

sentenced

both

persistent
to

20

in

felony

years.

The

(apparently accepted by both parties)

was that the victim of the burglary identified petitioner
as

the

purses.
had

intruder

saw

in

her

home

stealing

several

A neighbor also testified that at that time she

observed

house,

she

and

petitioner
later

saw

standing
him

near

running

the
away.

burglarized
Finally,

apparently undisputed evidence showed that petitioner and

..

•

•

·'

a

codefendant

2.

pawned

separately)

(tried

rings

two

belonging to the burglary victims.
Kentucky
carefully

Rules

drawn.

of

Criminal

On

the

Procedure

basis

of

seem

the

to

voir

be

dire,

challenges for cause are made first by the prosectuion and
then

by

the

defense.

If

a

sufficient

number

of

prospective jurors survive these challenges, each side is
given a list of the qualified jurors equal to the number
of jurors to be seated plus the total number of peremptory
challenges allowed the parties.
then

exercised

Peremptory challenges are

"simultaneously"

by

each

party

st r icking

names from the list, and returning it to the trial judge.
Where a felony is charged,
challenges

and

the

entitled to eight.
of

qualified

lot.

juror,

the state has five peremptory

defendant

or

defendants

jointly

are

If this process results in a surplus
the

actual

jury panel

is chosen by

the prosecutor used \four] ~ is six

In this case,

peremptory challenges to strike black prospective jurors,
leaving

an

discharge
Amendment
section

of

all

white

the panel,
right
the

to

jury

panel.

contending
"an

The

moved

to

he was denied his Sixth

impartial

community".

Petitioner

trial,
TC

denied

[by)
the

a

cross

motion,

making a distinction between the composition of the venire

•

..

3.

(the group from which
trial jury itself.

the

trial

jury

is drawn)

and

the

The Kentucky Court of Appeals made the

same distinction,

in effect

ruling

that the

"fair cross

section doctrine" does not apply if the venire is properly
~

constituted and

the trial

members

venire

of

the

jury is drawn by lot from the

who

remain

after

challenges

for

cause and preemptively
As we see so often in the criminal cases that come
here,

no

evidence

claim
in

persistent

i ~cence

of

this

case,

felony

is

and

offender,

In

made.

petitioners
one

would

view

of

record
assume

the

as

a

that

a

fairminded all black jury would have convicted him.
Petitioner's Contentions
Petitioner
undercut

by

argues

that

subsequent

Swain's

decisions.

aurhority
First,

has

been

Duncan

v.

Louisiana (1968) decided for the first time that the Sixth
Amendment

right

Petitioner
(1975)

as

then

words,

from

a

fair

trial

reads V Taylor

holding

representative
panel

to

of

which

petitioner

the
the

that

v.

the

community
trial

strongly

jury

applied

to

Louisiana,
"trial

the
419

u.S.

522

jury"

must

be

the

venire

or

as

well

is

selected.

disagrees

states.

with

the

In other
Kentucky

Court's view that the fair cross section requirement does

•
not

4.

apply

properly

to

the

trial

selected,

jury

challenges

if
for

the

venire

cause have

has

been

been made,

followed by the peremptory challenges allowed both sides

•

under the particular state law.

hope

Although I have not reread Taylor v.

Louisiana

to do so),

Taylor did not

my

recollection

is

that

(and

make clear the distinction claimed by petitioner.
Petitioner
peremptory

challenges

[California]."
the

"proposes

those

similar

peremptory

challenges

are

particular group of people."
based on

the

remedy

for

improper
that

to

use

found

of
in

This would "permit a defendant to question

prosecutor's

that

a

"reasonable

challenges
being

when

used

to

it

appears

exclude

a

This remedy is said to be

inference"

that arises when it

appears that a prosecutor is excluding otherwise qualified
jurors solely on the basis of race.

It is not entirely

clear to me what happened under the petitioner's proposed
remedy

when

defense

counsel makes

such

a

challenge.

I

suppose a trial judge would then require the prosecutor to
explain,

and

in view of the

"reasonable

burden to rebut this would be on the State.
The SG's amicus brief

inference",

the

s.

I

th~brief

find

more helpful than that of the

agrees fully with the ~
----:-- /
distinction drawn by the Kentucky court between the /V enire

Kentucky

and

the

Attorney

General.

jury finally

He

selected

to try

says that "Taylor v. Louisiana, 419

The SG

the case.

u.s.

522 (1975) makes

clear that the fair cross section doctrine applies only to
} jury venires and lists, and not to the actual petit juries
chosen from them.
fair

cross

But even if the rule were overwise, the

section cases would

Swain because even as

not

require

revision of

[these
,,
cases] prohibit only s ~ stematic exclusion as reflected in
------~

a

applied to juries venires,

~---~-------------

consistent pattern of

brief 4,

5 et seq.

availability
under

our

jury

trial

of

that

SG' s

The SG also emphasizes that the free

peremptory

system,

See

underrepresentation."

"an

challenges

integral

coexists

with

always

feature
the

of

fair

has

the
cross

been,

criminal
section

doctrine under the Sixth Amendment."

I

In emphasizing
"systematic

there

exclusion"

of

was no proof
blacks

or

in

of

pattern of underrepresentation" of blacks,

this case of
"a

consistent

the SG argues

there must be such proof before there is any inference of
racial discrimination that shifts the burden of proof to
the prosecutor.

•

6.

The SG also makes the point that racially motivated
exclusion
could

(characterized as a pernicious practice)

be exposed where

offices

and

it existed.

organizations

of

easily

"Public defenders's

defense

counsel

could

relatively easily keep the records necessary to make the
required proof."

The SG, in commenting on Swain, observes

that it rests on the assumption that,
information
upon

available

which

to

to

litigants

exercise

given the

(and

peremptory

their

limited
counsel)

challenges,

the

possibility that a prosecutor had been influenced in his
challenges by a common
to

create

a

prima

group identity ••. is insufficient

facie

case

of

unlawful

intentional

discrimination."
The brief on behalf of the Commonwealth of Kentucky
starts out with the statement that "The use of peremptory
challenges affects every criminal trial in America.
American
great

adversary

importance

system,

peremptory

challenges

Under
are

in affording the parties the confidence

that the case will be heard by an impartial jury.
challenges

are

of

an

"integral

choosing an impartial jury,

part

of

the

mechanism

Such
for

just as is voir dire and the

exercise of challenges for cause."

..
7.

I

note

that

the petitioner's brief has a quotation

from LaFave's book on Criminal Procedure that rebuts,

to

some extent, the SG's contention that systematic exclusion
on the basis of race must be shown.

LaFave said:

Although courts are inclined to say that the
defendant's burden of showing such systematic
exclusion
by
the
prosecutor
'is
not
insurmountable,'
experience
has
clearly
indicated the virtual impossibility of doing so.
A great many cases are to be found holding the
defendant did not meet this burden, but there
are almost none ruling that the defendant had
established such systematic exclusion by the
prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges.
This being so, courts have not had occasion to
address the conundrum posed by this branch of
Swain: whether, assuming proof of systematic
exclusion, the prosecutor is now barred from
using
his peremptory strikes against black
jurors,
or
whether
it
is
then
merely
necessary~hat
the
prosecutor
give
some
explanat P;n for such strikes, such as that it is
his view that black jurors would unduly favor a
black defendant (the kind of contention,. as
noted earlier, which the peremptory challenge
has served to keep out of sight).'
2 LaFave &
Israel, Criminal Procedure §21. 3 (d) "Peremptory
Challenges," p. 739 (1984).

The case
says,

presents

exclusion

of

a

any

troublesome
identifiable

issue.
group

As

the

from

SG

jury

service because of prejudice against the race or origin of
the group would be "pernicious".

But it is not clear to

me how our system would operate if Swain were overruled or

•

..

substantially modified
country,

and

as

petitioner

particularly

heterogenious

people

8.

in
our

certain
nation

In

suggests.
areas,
is

we

this

have

a

of

a

composed

substantial number of different groups of racial, ethnic
and national origin.
Area:

Consider the Washington Metropolitan

I believe I saw recently that there are literally

thousands of Vietnamese and Southeast Asian refugees who
are in the schools and labor force here.
Chicano

population

is

quite

In addition, the

substantial

(to

the

point

where some of the schools teach both Spanish and English) •
No

doubt

other

identified and

such

racial

and

ethnic

groups

could

implicated in particular trials.

be

We have

on our argument docket a CA6 case involving the validity
of layoffs of white school teachers, despite seniority, in
order to preserve teaching positions for minorities.
collective
blacks,

bargaining

Indians,

descent"

agreement

Orientals,

from being laid off.

purported

and

used the

of

protect
"Spanish

Would each of these groups

be entitled to representation on a
members was the defendant?

persons

to

The

jury when one of its

If a peremptive challenge were

say to strike a person of Spanish descent - would

Court

be

required

to

hold

a

prosecutor must justify the strike?

hearing

at

which

the

•

•

l

9.

My own experience in civil litigation leaves no doubt
in

my

mind

~

1-o 1\ potential

that

lawyers

quite

(or

challenges

indeed

understandably
challenge

use

for

cause)

jurors whom they think may be unsympathetic to

their client case.

In Richmond, for exampler records are

kept by both the plaintiffs'

and the defendants' bar

the performance of members of
suit cases.

the

jury venire

on

in damage

A particular trial court may have the same

venire, from which petit juries are drawn, for a period of
several months.
amounts

of

By keeping records of jury verdicts, and

jury

awards

by

particular

members

of

the

venire, lawyers can identify sympathetic or unsympathetic
members of the venire whom they will then try to strike.
As responsive as one may be
have

no

doubt

that

peremptory challenges

racial

to petitioner's claim
consideration

in some cases) ,

it

may

(as I
prompt

is not easy to

suggest a change in this traditional system that would not
result in substantial new problems without benefiting any
particular race.

Moreover, I am unwilling to believe that

many blacks will convict or acquit on the basis of race.
Indeed, most crime by blacks is committed against blacks as FBI statistics prove.
other

cities

including

In the District of Columbia and
Richmond,

blacks

constitute

a

' a

•

'

majority
clerk.

•
of

most

juries.

I

want

10.

the

views of my

It might be well to examine the common law with

some care as well as the use of peremptory challenges in
the colonial courts.
LFP, JR.

•

.
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ConnECTIONAL FACILITY,

Decided and Filed October 29, 1985

Before: MERRITT and JONES, Circuit Judges; and BELL, •
District Judge.

ror tilt' Nnrth-

JONES, Circuit Judge. This appea] from denia] of a Petition
for a writ 2.f habeas~corpus concerns the systematic use of pereQ1ptory challenges, in a single criminal prosecution, to excuse
m e mbers of a jury venire from service on a state petit jury solely
on the basis of their race. The decisive Jegal issues are whether
the selection of the jury by the prosecutor and defense counsel
violated either the Fourteenth Amendment 's guarantee of <'qual
•Ttw Honora hit· Sanuwl H. IWII. l lnitt>d Statt>!i District Jud~t·
f'rn Distrid or Ohio, sitting by df'signation .
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We also conclude tl1at a crimit of the systematic use of perthe prosecution or defense
rors solely on the basis of their
thin the meaning of tlw Sixth
ts the jury's decision-making,
and denies both the ddendant
that the Constitution requires.
tall' trial court's findings that
sel syslt'matically t'xcust'd proe, we reverse the district court's
and Booker's petition for issuof ~tichigan promptly retries

e district court's dt'nial of his
rpus, which lw filed pursuant
his co-defetHiant are two black
tht' armed robbery of a shoe
Michigan, outside Detroit. The
female clerks at gunpoint and
k of the store. At trial, in the
nty, one clerk testified that
f her clothes below the waist ,
d a sexual act. The defendants
t they were mistakenly identi75, a jury composed exclusively
defendants of armed robbery.
defendant was charged with
victed of assault and battery.
tt'rm of fifteen to twenty-five
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After properly exhausting his appeals in the Michigan courts
without receiving redress, see Rose v. Lundy, 4.55 U.S. 509
(1982), Booker sought habt>as relief in the District Court for
the Western District of Michigan. The district court addressed
the merits of Booker's claim that the jury selection process \\'aS
so infected with racism that the resulting trial violated the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court adopted the
following findings and recommendations of the United States
Magistrate and denied both Booker's Fourteenth Amendment
claim and his Sixth Amendment claim.
It is an inescapable conclusion from a study of the arguments made by the parties that each side was excusing
jurors primarily on the basis of their race. The spectacle
of attorneys on both sides of a case dismissing jurors simply
on the basis of their color is a deplorable one which tarnishes the image of our system of justice. Ultimately, it
appears that such trial strategy is nevertheless permissible
under some circumstances. Since I so read the Supreme
Court's decision in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965),
I respectfully recommend that habeas relief on this ground
be de11i«:>d for the reasons discussed below.

The magistrate accurately described the jury selcctim1 in this
case. The 'Vhite jury was the result of an open battle of peremptory challenges in which the prosecutor claimed he was
responding to racist exclusions by the defe:>nse counsel, who in
turn denied using .peremptory challenges solely on the basis of
race. The state trial court judge noted that the jury venire began
with ~substantially more white jurors than there were black."
Tr. at 379. The record reveals that the prost>cutor exercised
twenty-six of his allotted thirty peremptory challenges. The
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to excuse twenty-two
black potential jurors, in several instances without addressing
a11y ·questions to the excused juror. The two dde11dants used
all forty of their combined peremptory challenges and e:>xcused
thirty-seven white prospective jurors.

rden, etc.
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d been selected, the defendants
to select another panel. During
fense counsel charged the proseors solely on the basis of race.

ecutor indicated his satisfaction
ery early in the proceeding was
k people on the jury.

ourt that this methodical excluhe jury, even though albeit perseeutorial misconduct at its most
not deny this c·harge:

ould have passed the jury and
le, if they will remember, and
this.

aid, I was satisfied with the jury
five or six black people in that
o say otherwise.

gued that the reasons the proseck prospective jurors, in a case
dants and two white female vicf those prospective jurors' race:

t were down here were systeme jury.

peculate. Mr. Easton [the prosed to the Court's attention that
rs in the court. Perhaps, certain
ough lips from certain of the
to speculate on why. Because
was shocked by the systematic
nt about excluding every black
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If there was any doubt, I heard Mr. Easton say to Mr.
Ackerman, we can get a conviction in this case if we don't
get a black jury.
Now, I'll ask him to deny that. If he wants to deny it.
heard him say it.
And that furnishes, clears up any doubt in this matter
as to what the specific intention here was.
The specific intention is to get a white jury to try two
black men where thne are two girls, two white girls who
are the complaining witnesses.
Tr. at 375-76.
In his response, the prosecutor did not deny the statement
attributed to him by defense counsel. He did not deny systematically excusing black prospective jurors solely on the basis of
race. Instead, the prosecutor attempted to justify his practice.
I'm a friend of blacks, yellows, everything, but I have
a July, too.
And I have had four consecutive hung juries three years
ago.
I.'m a trial lawyer.

....

...

This is my hundred fifty-sixth jury trial in this building
in the last four and a half years.
I have had hung juries because of the systematic eliminating of middle-aged white people.

I didn 't start it. They started it.

They polarized the jury to the point the ones that did
come up here, I sit here and look at nine black people
and I look at five white people.

cle11, etc.
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e done that , since they took off
e men and ladies in some cases,

ve a right in this country too.
to be partial. I don't think these

be partial becaust• of race. I'm

lain to Mr. White, the last black
c:>xplain to him why I took him
ile, I didn't want to put you in

ealizes, I'm looking at the standn and the otlwr gt>nllemen, findth maybe len white people and
<>nce they might believe, I don't
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ecause:> you're black.
.
.

I told Officer Ackerman, at the
too long that I'm going to have
y.

unsel dosed by denying that they
el an all black jury.

ange, the trial court noted that
e counsel had used their perempose of excusing potential jurors
389. The trial court then denied
e trial judge determined that no
ntrol the use of peremptory chalor or defense counsel.
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. 202 (1965), forecloses Booker's
e of peremptory challengc:>s vioent. Swain was a black man who
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was convicted in an Alabama court, by a jury composed of white
citizens, of the rape of a white woman. Swain was sentenced
to death. On review by the Supreme Court, Swain alleged that
the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove all six
blacks from the jury venire constituted invidious discrimination
that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court rejected this claim. After a thorough
review of the long common law history of the peremptory challenge and its nature and function in the modern jury system,
the Court declined to subject a prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges ~in any particular case to the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause." I d. at 221.
The Court arrived at this conclusion despite its finding that
the peremptory challenge is a creature of statute rather than
a constitutional requirement. Id. at 219. As a tool by which to
insure selection of a fair and impartial jury, the peremptory
challenge is ~one of the most important of the rights secured
to the acCljSed." Id. (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S.
396, 408 (189·!)). Peremptory challenges are available to the
prosecution only to maintain an even-handed balance between
the defendant and the state without which the availability of
peremptory challenges to the accused might enable him to
select a jury biased in his favor. Id. at 220.
According to the Court's analysis in Swain, the proper function of the peremptory challenge is to promote the tw() preemincut characteristics of an impartial jury. By enabling the part it's
to elimwate the;extremes of partiality on both sides," id. at
219, the peremptory challenge contributes to selection of a jury
that both will make findings of fact on the basis of the evidence
presenteJ at trial and will ~satisfy the appearance of justice."
Id. (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (19.55)). The
peremptory challenge promotes these goals by supplementing
the more stringently defined challenge for cause. Peremptory
challenges enable the parties to strike a juror on the basis of
a partiality that is merely suspected, not readily designated or
Jemonstrated, or that counsel may have created by vigorous
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reason to challenge for cause.

>mptory chalh." nge is to t>nable
for the most slender and evaund that its Messential nature~
stated , without inquiry and
s control." ld. at 220 (citations
s f rt•edom is that under Swain
is of -their group affiliations,"
d. at 221. Although the Court
n tht> face of traditional Fourcasonl'd that tilt' onlv alterna!'clltor's judgment u;Hlt"rlying
reasonableness and sincerity."

hat -swain has been the subscathing criticism.~ McCray
19~3) (Marshall, J. , joined by
l of certiorari) (footnote omitMcCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d
g commentaries). A majority
ed its willingness at the proper
onstitution prohibits the use
ude members of a particular
v. New York, 461 U.S. 961

a , that a prosecutor's use of perempors solely lx•cause of their race "in
t•nth Amendment. Swain, 380 U.S.
burdt•n of demonstrating such excluast twenty ~T:Irs. See United Stales
Cir. 1983) (en bane), cert . denied,

ndoned Swain, under the authority
. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1984);
, 3H7 N.E.2d 499, cert . d(•nled, 444
Cal .3d 2.'58, .51)3 P.2d 7-tl) (1971)). An
xprt>!>St'd its intt'ntion to follow this
iSt>s. See State v. Crespin, 9-t N.M.

I
I

1

No. 83-1136

Booker v. ]abe, Warden, etc.

9

(1983) (Stevens, J., joined by Justices Blackmun and Powell, concurring in denial of certiorari; Justices Marshall and Brennan,
dissenting from detlial of certiorari). Moreover, the Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari to review a decision in which
the Kentucky Supreme Court relied on Swain to reject a defendant's dwllenge to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
in his individual trial. See Batson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 84-SC-733-MR (Ky., Dec. 20, 1984) (unpublished), cert.
granted, 10.5 S.Ct. 2111 (1985).

w

Were it within our power to right the manifest error that
we believe Swain represents, we would hold that the prosecutor's conduct in the present case violated the Equal Protection
Clause. We recognize both that our authority as an intermediate
court is limited and that we cannot anticipate the outcome of
Batson. Therefore, although we agree with the Second Circuit's
cogent criticism of Swain in McCray v. Abrams, we also accept
that Swain is Mclear, direct, and unequivocal" in prohibiting
an equal protection challenge to the prosecution's racially discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges solely on the basis
of the prosecution's acts in a single case.R McCray v. Abrams,
7.50 F .2d at 11 2-t. The prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
to select the jury in Booker's trial, although egregious conduct,
did not violate the Equal Prolt'ction Clause as in!Prpreted in
Swain.

III.
This holding, hO\~ever, does not end our analysis. We do not
join those Circuits that have interpreted Swain to immunize
t~e use of peremptory challenges in each case from jmlicial
scrutiny, regardless of the constitutional provision such inquiry
seeks to enforce. See United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313,
1320 (~th Cir. 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 10-t S.Ct. 7-t.t
( 19~-t ); United States v. W hitfie/d, 715 F .2d 145, 147 (-tth Cir.
19~3); United States v. jenkins, 701 F.2cl 850, 859-60 (lOth
Cir. 1983); United States v. Durham, 587 F .2d 799, ~01 (5th
Cir. 1979 ). The Supreme Court's discussion of perem ptnry chal-
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419 U.S. 522 . .52G-30 (197.5). We also believe that a jury that
satisfies this constitutional mandate is the product of selection
methods that provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community. See Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 7H, 100 (lHIO).
The Sixth Amewlmcnt does not require that each criminal
petit jury ·mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population." Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538. Both
random selection of potential jurors from the venire and the
limited size of a jury in relation to the community it represents
rend<:>r impossible compldt> representation on any single jury .
Standing alont>, the fact that in the present case a jury of white
citizens tried two black defendants does not violate the Sixth
Amendment. For more than forty years, howewr, the Supreme
Court has prohibited jury selection practices that systematically
exclude certain potential jurors as a distinct group and result
in juries that art- unrepresentative of the community . The Court
did not consider these Sixth Amendment authorities when it
decided Swain. See 3HO U.S. at 203-05.
In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), the Court
held that systematic exclusion from a federal jury venire of all
women who were not members of the Illinois League of Women
Voters would violate the Sixth Amendment.
Lest ~he right of trial by jury be nullified by the
improper constitution of juries, the notion of what a proper
jury is has become inextricably intertwined with the idea
of jurv;""' trial. ~
Our notions of what a proper jury is have developed
in harmony with our basic con(.'epts of a democratic society
and a representative government. For ~It is part of the
established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of
p~1blic justice that the jury be a body truly representative
of the community." Smith v. Texas, 3ll U.S. 12H, 130
[ 1940].

n , etc.
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[l]t is not e nough to say that women when sitting as jurors
neither act nor te nd to act as a class. Men likewise do not
act as a class. But, if the shoe were on the other foot , who
would claim that a jury was trul y representative of the
communit y if all men were intentionally and systematically excluded from the panel? The truth is that the two
sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively
of one is diffe rent from a community composed of both;
the subtle inte rplay of influence one on the other is among
the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either
may not in a given case make an iota of difference.

Id. at 193-94 (footnote omitted). The Court also stated that the
actionable injury occurreJ to the public's interest in the integrity of tire jury system.
[T]he exclusion of women from jury panels may at times
be highly prejudicial to the defendants. But reversible
error does not depend on a showing of prejudice in an
individual case. The evil lies in the admitted exclusion of
an eligible class or group in the community ... . The injury
is not limited to the defendant-there is injury to the jury
system, to the law as an institution, to the community at
large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes
of our courts .

Id. at 195.
Collectively, Glasser, Thiel, and Ballard teach that an impartial jury is the product of jury selection methods that do not
systematwally exclude members of a distinct group from jury
service. Competence of jury service is an individual rather than
a group characteristic. The violation lies in the exclusionary conduct or policy, not in any documented partiality by a particular
jury. Although the defendant may benefit by reversal of the
verdict, it is the integrity of the judicial system and the public's
right to a de mocratically representative jury that are demonstrably impaired. These cases were decided before Duncan v.
Louisiana applied the Sixth Amendment to the states. Review
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ual defendant was actually prejudiced by the jury's composi
tion. Hather, Justice Marshall expressly determined that th1
injury arose from the loss of a diversity of voices and experience
on tlw jury during its deliberations.
[W]e are unwilling to make the assumption that the exclu
sion of Negroes has relevance only for issues involving race
When any large and identifiable segment of the commu
nity is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remov1
from the jury room qualities of human nature and varietie
of human experience, the range of which is unknown an<
perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that th•
excluded group will consistently vote as a class in orde
to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jur~
of a perspective on human events that may have unsus
pected importance in any case that may be presented.

!d. at 503-04 (Marshall, J., plurality). Justice Marshall als1
emphasized that the systematic exclusion of cognizable group
from the jury jeopardizes the integrity of the judicial process
!d. at 502.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), is the semina
authority governing the application of the Sixth Amendmen
to state jury trials. In Taylor, the Court expressly .accepted "th1
fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury tria
guaranteed bv the Sixth Amendment." !d. at 530. Therefore
the Court co~1cluded that "women cannot be 'systematicall)
excluded from the jury panels from which petit juries an
drttwn." Id. 'M 533. The Court both expressly adopted the ratio·
· nale of Ballard as applicable under the Sixth Amendment anc
favorably quoted the Peters plurality. Id. at 532 & n.l2. Ir
Taylor, the Court again acknowledged the dual purpose of tht
impartial jury: first, to guard the defendant "against the exercisf
of arbitrary power," and second. to make a critical contributior
"to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justict
• system ." Id . at 530. Most recently, In Duren v. Missouri, 43~
U.S..'3!)7 (1979). the Court held that a state statute tha i
t•xt•mplt•d women from jury sf.rvice upon thC'ir reqtH'SI, a11<l
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invoke judicial scrutiny, and the procedures that shall direct
the trial court's inquiry.

It is readily apparent that currt>ntly a party may usc pt>remptory challenges systematically rather than individually. At present, nothing prevents the prosecutor or defensf' counsf'l from
deciding, perhaps before voir dire begins, to exercise every peremptory challenge to excuse potential jurors who share a single
characteristic. The Supreme Court has observed that a juror·~
impartiality is a matter of his or her individual ~state of mind:
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 724 (1961) (quoting United State~
v. Wood , 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936)), rather than the skir:
color, gender, nationality, or similar characteristic that idcnli·
fies the person as a member of a distinct group. The Suprem<:
Court's Sixth Amt·ndment analyses uniformly refuse to counte·
nance a presumption that jurors will reach their verdict as [
result of a partiality arising from their group identity. There
fore, the preemptory challenge, when systematically exercised
is a tool of jury self'ction that is capable of obstructing the Sixtl
Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury.
The nature of the peremptory challenge does not exempt it
abuse from scrutiny under the Sixth Amendment. First, as tht
Court observed in Swain, the peremptory challenge is a statu
tory right that Congress or any state legislature could abolisl
at will. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (quoting Stilson v. United States
250' U.S. 583, 586 (1919)). See also Rosales-Lqpez v. Uuitec
States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 n.6 (1981) (plurality). Second, nothin!
in the rationales of the Supreme Court's decisions on jury impar
tiality sugghts a reason to exempt peremptory challenges fron
scrutiny if their systematic use in a particular case obstruct
the formation of an impartial jury. Third, as a statutory too
the peremptory challenge is designed to further the Sixt'
Amendment's goal of creating an impartial jury; abuse of th
peremptory challenge undermines its very reason for existin~
Fourth, as the Second Circuit has noted, Swain does not insulat
the peremptory challenge from all scrutiny, even under th
Equal Protection Clause. Swain required a showing of systerr
atic abuse of peremptory challenges in case after case.
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his prosecution." Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (quoting Hayes v
Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)). We construe the Sixtl
Amendme11t's guarant<·e of impartiality to require no less. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly reversed verdicts rendered b~
improperly constituted juries not only on the ground that the
defendant was injured, but also on the ground that an improp
erly unrepresentative jury impairs the public's interest in a jur~
system of manifest integrity. See, e.g., Ballard, 329·U.S. at 195
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530. 3

.---

(

We co11clude that a prosecutor's systematic use of peremptor;
challenges to excuse members of a cognizable group from :
criminal petit jury offends the Sixth Amendment's protecti01
of the defendant's interest in a fair trial and the public's interes
in the integrity of judicial process, as well as the prosecutor'
special duty as ~the servant of the law" to see that ~guilt shal
not escape or innocence suffer." Berger v. United States, 29:
U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Although the Sixth Amendment by its term
protects the right of ~the accused" to trial by an impartial jury
it does not guarantee a criminal defendant the right to tria
before a jury that is partial to his cause. The spectacle of :
defense counsel systematically excusing potential jurors becaus1
of their race or other shared group identity while the prosecuto
and trial judge were constrained merely to observe, could on!:
iiupair the public's confidence in the integrity and impartialit:
of the resulting jury. Therefore, we hold that under the Sixtl
....

3 Although the supreme courts of Florida, Massachusetts. and Californi
have departed from Swain, each has also recognized its two vital lessons. I
State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla . 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mas:
461,387 N.E.2d 499, cert . denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); and People v. Wheele1
22 Cal. 3d 2.58, 583 P.2d 748 (1978), state courts subjected peremptory chal
lenges to judicial review . In each instance, however, the court rt>quired a sho"
ing that [>('remptory challenges were being systematically used to strike jur01
solt•ly lwcause of a shared group characteristic IX'fort• the trial court was auth.rized to inquire into a party 's discretion . Neil, 457 So.2d at 486; Soares , 38
N.E.2d at .517; Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 764. In each instance the state cou1
impost'cl tht' limitation equally upon prosecution and defense. See Wheele1

583 P.2d at 7(14 ; Neil , 457 So.2d at 487 ; Soares, 387 N.E.2cl at 5W.

\Varden , etc.
No. tl3-ll3()

utor nor defense counsel may sysory challenges to excuse members
service on a criminal petit jury.

h the procedures by which a Sixth
g out of an abuse of peremptory
ated and remedied. In each case,
initially that both parties are exerenges in a nondiscriminatory manrt's authority to examine the use
t make a timely motion for a misotion will generally end upon the
tion process.

a facie case of a Sixth Amendment
monstrates that:

be excluded is a cognizable group
(2) there is a substantial likelihood
ding to this exclusion have been
e individual venirepersons' group
cause of any indication of a possie case on the basis of the evidence

2. This standard is adapted from
preme Court in Duren v. Missouri,
to the jury venire. As the language
2 illustrates, there are numerous
mmunity.

establishes a prima facie showing
mptory challenges, which the trial
rd, does the burden shift to the
to any inquiry concerning its exeron of the distinctive character of
es that the non-moving party need
he le vel of cause for excusing the
o rebut the moving party's prima
rcuit has observed :

No. 1):3-113()

Booker v. }abe, Warden, etc.
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There are any number of bases on which a party may
lwliew, not unreasonabl y, that a prospective juror may
have some slight bias that would not support a challenge
for cause but that would make excusing him or her desir able. Such reasons, if they appear to be genuine, should
be accepted by the court, which will bear the responsibility
of assessing the genuineness of the [non-moving party's]
response and of being alert to reasons that are pretextual.

McCray, 750 F .2d at 1132 (citation omitted). See also Wheeler ,
583 P.2d at 760-61. If the trial court finds that the non-movin!!
party's explanation of its use of peremptory challenges does not
rt'hut the moving party's prima facie case of a Sixth Amendment violation, the judge will. declare a mistrial, and a new jury
will be selected from prospective jurors who were not previously
associated with the case.
These measures will remove one more barrier to the realization of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that criminal charge ~
will be tried to an impartial jury. The cost of this increased
equity is minimal, particularly when weighed against the
importance of maintaining the integrity of the jury system .•
We concur in the Second Circuit's expectation that the instance~
requiring invocation of these procedures will be rare, and it ~
hope that the number will decline. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1132.

V.
A review of the record reveals that the state trial judge and
the partie~ followed the procedures we have established and
the trial court found that the parties systematically exercised
their peremptory challenges on the basis of race. The trial judge
would have ordered a mistrial except that he did not deem himself empowered to do so. First, the defense counsel raised thf
issue through a timely motion for a mistrial , to which the tria'
4
Wt- do not shaH• the Seventh Circuit's view that voir dire will regular!~
become ·a Title VII proceeding in miniature." United States v. Clark, 73i
F.2d o79, 6H2 (7th Cir. 19H.t).
.

arden, etc.
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g with both the prosecutor and
ach party identified the cognizadly had systematically excused.
sed black prospective jurors, and
white prospective jurors. Third,
by each party establishes more
that the peremptory challenges
f group affiliation. Twenty-two
challenges that the prosecutor
blacks. Thirty-seven of the forty
defendants exercised in combihites.

each party ample opportunity
had systematically exercised its
minate racially. The prosecutor
he excused prospective jurors
counsel ~gave it to me, so I'm
at 381. The systematic nature
became clear when he tacitly
emptory challenges kuntil they
t 381. See also tr. at 385. Rather
iality that he suspected individprosecutor attempted to excuse
he defense counsel kstarted the
3HG. Sec also tr. at 382. The
duct alone would justify a mis-

esponses, and apparently rejects as pretextual. the trial court
and the defense had systematichallenges to exelude prospecIt is clear that the state judge
he had considered it an autho-

my personal observations.

No. 83-1136

Booker v. }abe, Warden, etc.

2J

I haw noted, of course, that the Prosecutor has used
his peremptory challenges for the most part to exclude
black jurors.

By the same token the lawyers for the Defendants conversely used their peremptory challenges for the purpose
of excluding white jurors.
Those are the observations that 1 have formed in the
three days.
And my personal feeling is that I disagree with both
of your strategy. And I think it is quite evident that you
can get a fair jury with people of both races. And I don't
think there's any argument about that.
However, I have no control over the challenges that the
Prosecutor uses. When I say challenges, I mean peremptory. I have no control over the peremptory challenges that
the defense lawyers use.

And I have no alternative under the existing law, I deny
the motion for mistrial.
Tr. at 389-90. The trial court found the facts necessary to support the legal conclusion that the jury which resulted from the
open' battle of peremptory challenges was not impartial within
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.
Therefore, we reverse the district court and remand this case
with directions to issue the writ Booker seeks unless the State
of Michigan retries him within sixty days from the issuance
of our mandate or within such further time as the district court
may allow for good cause shown.

/

BENCH MEMORANDUM

Mr. Justice Powell

To:

From:

November 26, 1985

Anne
No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky
(cert. to Ky. Sup. Ct.)

(argument December 11, 1985)

Question Presented
Does the federal Constitution forbid a prosecutor to use
his

peremptory

black

challenges

defendant,

black

to

strike,

persons

over

contained

Background
background

Swain v. Alabama, 380

to

u.s.

this
202

case

in

the

jury

a

venire

~~~
~ '"O>~.
1 ~~ ;:_qv 5 ~

solely because of their race?

fue

the objections of

~

(1965).

Court's decision

in

In Swain, the prosecutor

used peremptory challenges to strike from the petit jury the six
blacks available in the venire.

The

defendant argued that this

•
conduct violated
Amendment.
particular
laws."

the

2.

Equal

Protection Clause of

the

Fourteenth

The Court decided that the striking of blacks "in a
case

Ibid.

[was not]

at 221.

a

denial of

equal protection of the

The decision was based on the nature and

history of peremptory challenges and on the presumption "in any
particular

case"

that

challenges

to obtain a

"the

prosecutor

fair

and

is

impartial

using

the

jury."

Id.

State's
at

222.

The Court believed that this presumption was not overcome by an
allegation that in one case the prosecutor struck all available
blacks from the venire.

The Court went on, however, to note that

the presumption protecting the prosecutor might be overcome if a

------- - --------------

defendant could produce proof that the prosecutor systematically

----

exercised his peremptories to remove blacks in case after case.
Accordingly,

I believe that, in Swain, the Court recognized that

use of peremptories to strike black jurors because of their race
was prohibited by the Four teen th Amendment.

The holding in the
---=-

case

involved

the l nature

of

the

proo!J r~ ablish

-----'--~

invidious use of peremptories.
The

facts

uncomplicated.

and

procedural

history

of

this

case

are

Petr was convicted by a Kentucky jury of burglary

and receiving stolen property, and was sentenced to twenty years
in prison on a finding of recidivist status.

During voir dire,

the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges to strike the
four

black

jurors

included

in

the

venire.

Petr

objected

and

moved to discharge the panel on the ground that the prosecutor's
action

violated

Amendments.

his

rights

under

The TC denied the motion.

the

Sixth

and

Fourteenth

•
On

appeal

concerning
terse

his

claim

the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges.

In a

decision,

to

Ky.

the

Sup.

court

Ct.,

rejected

petr

3.

the

pressed

Ky.

claim.

Sup.

Ct.

declined to follow the position taken by other states that have
held that a prosecutor's exercise of peremptories in a particular

--

case

o discriminate against blacks violates the Sixth Amendment

-

~------

and provisions of their state constitutions.
v.

Wheeler,

N.E.2d

499

22

Cal. 3d

(Mass.

258

( 197 8) ;

1979).

See, e.g.,

Commonwealth

Rather,

the

v.

court

People

Soares,

387

reaffirmed

its

reliance on Swain and held that "an allegation of the lack of a
fair

cross-sectional

exclusion

from

proportions."

the

jury which
jury

drum

does

does

not
not

concern
rise

a

systematic

to constitutional

App. at 8.
Discussion

In
issue,

voting

to

deny

cert.

in

a

recent

case

raising

this

three Justices expressed their willingness to reconsider

Swain. The three voted to deny cer t.

in that case because there

was then no conflict within the federal system and because it was
a sound exercise of discretion to allow the States "to serve as
laboratories"
reconsidered

further
it.

to

McCray

(opinion of Stevens,

J.,

study
v.

the

New

issue

York,

463

before

u.s.

the

Court

961

(1983)

joined by Powell and Blackmun,

J. J.) .

Two other Justices dissented from denial of cert. in McCray, id.
at 963

(opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.).
Since
~
-:\
C/fz.
McCray, l C~ C~ have ruled that the use of peremptor ies to d..
strike

__
blacks

in

a

particular

,.------Amendment _...;---Sixth
rights.

See

case
Booker

may
v.

violate
Jabe,

No.

a

defendant's
83-1136

(CA6

C./-1 (.

4.

Oct.

29,

198S); McCray v.

Abrams,

7SO F.2d 1113

(CA2 1984).

panel of CAS has reached a similar result under
--------------------------~--~'-------powers, United States v. Leslie,
7S9 F.2d 366
(rehearing en bane granted).
addition

to

the

courts

of

A

supervisory
(CAS

198S)

Moreover, state supreme courts, in
California

Wheeler, supra; Soares, supra,

and

Massachusetts,

~

have reached similar conclusions

based on their state constitutions, see Riley v. State, 496 A.2d
~

997

~

(Del.

Sup.

Ct.

198S);

State

v.

Neil,

4S7

So.2d

481

(Fla.

1984); see also State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486 (1980).
1

believe

that

the

use

by

prosecutors

of

peremptory

challenges to strike black jurors is a "pernicious practice" that
will not cease until this Court announces that a defendant may
make out a prima facie equal protection violation by proof of
prosecutor's

action

recommendation,

in

a

ar

case.

1

realize

that

the ~-

my

if adopted, would require the Court to overrule

that portion of Swain concerning how a defendant can prove his
claim.

But, in my view, Swain has had the unfortunate result of

diluting

the

effectiveness of

the Court's decisions

forbidding

racial discrimination in selection of the jurors who make up the
venire from which the petit jury is selected.
now

represented

in

the

venire

rejection of discriminatory

due

to

this

Though blacks are
Court's

selection practices at

repeated

that

level,

the discrimination has resurfaced at the level of the peremptory

---

challenge

and,

under

Swain,

is

largely

immunized

from

review.

The following points, briefly stated, represent my thoughts about
this issue.

~

-

s~

5.

First, as early as 1880, the Court recognized that a black
defendant forced

to go to trial by a

jury

.,drawn from a panel

from which the Sate has expressly excluded every man of his race,
because of color alone, however well qualified in other respects ..
is denied equal protection.
303,
face

309

(1880).

prevented

~trauder

v. west Virginia, 100

u.s.

While Strauder involved a statute that on its
blacks

from

serving

as

jurors,

the

case

also

recognized that the State could not discriminate against blacks
because of their race in selecting the jury panel.

Ibid. at 305.

The Court stated:
.,The very fact that colored people are singled out and
expressly denied by a statute all right to participate
in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of
their color, though they are citizens, and may be in
other respects, fully qualified, is practically a brand
upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice
.,../-~
which is an impediment to securing to individuals of
~
the race that equal justice which the law aims tf.~r
secure to all others ... !d. at 308.
·
!))> '
In my view, a prosecutor's use of peremptories to strike lacks
because

they

are

black

is no less a

inferiority~

brand of

In

some ways, the practice may be a worse stigma because of when it
occurs.

That

is,

a

black

person

chosen

to

be

in

the

venire

through color-blind selection procedures is then informed, after
he fulfills his civic duty to obey the summons,
wanted because he has turned out to be black.

that he is not

1 have attached to

this memo a letter written to the District Attorney of Brooklyn,
New York, and included as an appendix to her amicus brief, by a
black person who was struck

from a

that

peremptory

discriminatory

use

of

jury.

His experience shows

challenges

can

have

an

6.

impact on individual perceptions of the fairness of the

criminal

justice system.
Second,

in

Swain,

the

Court

reviewed

the

history

of

peremptory challenges and concluded that the use of peremptories
has deep roots in our system.

Similarly, the various briefs that

have been filed in this case by the parties and by amici discuss
that

history
Swain

While

and

draw

shows

that

u.s.

credentials," 380

upon

it

to

the

support

their

peremptory

conclusions.

system

has

"old

at 212, its discussion also suggests that

the prosecutor's use of peremptories is not as firmly grounded as
the defendant's right to use them. 1

My view is that longstanding

history cannot justify a holding that peremptories may be used to
-----------------~--------------------------------discriminate on the basis of race.
The underlying justification
-~

for

peremptories

is

that,

by

allowing

the

parties

to

remove

jurors as to whom they have an objection not rising to the level
of cause, the fairness of the trial will be enhanced.
based

on

racial

There simply
biased

in

bias

cut

directly

is no support for

favor

of

that

justification:

the view that a person will be

defendants

defendants of another color,

against

Challenges

of

his

own

color

or

and such challenges lend a

against
strong

appearance of unfairness to the jury system.
Third,

the

amicus

briefs

citing to many cases raising the

persuasively
issue,

demonstrate,

by

that discriminatory use

1 I will further research the history of peremptory challenges.
The memo does not reflect that effort because I wished to give
you my thoughts well in advance of argument on this case.

7

•

•

7.

of peremptories is a pervasive problem that has eluded judicial

v

treatment because of the holding in Swain.
v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113
placed

an

Similarly, in McCray

(CA2 1984), CA2 observed that Swain has

insurmountable

burden

of

proof

on

defendants.

I

realize that the SG's brief takes the position reflected in Swain
that it should not be difficult for defendants to show systematic
use

of

peremptor ies

to exclude

blacks.

With

respect,

It appears that

that practice flatly contradicts this position.

~ 1

1 think

only two defendants have ever made the showing required by Swain,
and both cases involved a particular prosecutor who admitted that
he

struck

blacks

repeatedly

appealed

supra,

1120

at

rejected);

see

Committee,
in

which

and

whose

use

by

black

defendants.

n.

&

also

2

of

(collecting

Amicus

Brief

peremptories
McCray

cases
of

in

claim

difficult

was

for

.,....--

rejected).

defendants

The

to

amici

v.

which

NAACP,

and American Jewish Congress at 13

had

Abrams,

claim was

American

Jewish

(collecting cases

explain

that

it

abuse

systematic

show

been

- - --------------------------For example, the amici claim that courts do

peremptories.

-------.....-

routinely record voir dires,
the grounds of excusal.

in

the

investigate
McCray,
Liberties

middle

Moreover,

systemic

New

York

Union,

of

at

voir

defendants may

44

n.

that

transcripts

reflect

race

of

the

when

See

Liberties

demonstrates
the

dire

practice.

Civil

of
not

the race of the jurors excused, or
not have

resources to undertake an adequate investigation, and the
arises

is

12.
of

jurors

Amicus

is

and

One

state
dire

that

it

no

Brief

Union,

voir
so

there

do
is

not

t

Michael

American
case

issue

time

of

the

Civil

plainly
routinely

difficult

to

•
determine

how

many

8.

blacks

are

struck.

People

v.

Wheeler,

22

Cal. 3d 258, 263 (1978).
Fourth,

I

believe

that

the

issue

in

-------

vitality of
proof.

-

they

the

-- -are black,

-·

but,

rather,

is

of

the

manner

in

which

petr

-------------~0

community
protection

to strike

a

jury

is

representing

the

' f ourteenth

the

source

of

fair

a

'-I

the

his

~ xth Amendment~
section of

cross

Amendment

framed

- --- - - - -

---- ~-----

of

not

the continuing

has

question presented, the Court must decide if the
~-

is

Swain holding concerning defendant's burden of

Because

guarantee

case

perempt ~ies

whether to condemn a prosecutor's use of

- --blacks because

this

of

guarantee

constitutional

the

equal

prohibition.

Then, the CQUrt ~ e how a defendant may prove his claim.
(a)

I feel strongly that the Court should not rely on the

fair cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment.
is clear

~ ~-

.Jt

First, it

that the Sixth Amendment cases do not purport to hold

that a particular petit jury must represent a cross section, but

~ that the pool from which the petit jury is drawn must do so.

~ylor
~ that

~that

v.

petit

Louisiana,

jury,

defendant

Jr--

~/ composition).

~~ affirmatively
challenges

as

419

u.s.

opposed

is

Second,

522,

to pool,

entitled
by

538

to

holding

(1975)

(no requirement

must mirror community or
jury

that

the

of

any

particular

prosecutor

may

not

thwart the cross-section ideal by using peremptory

to strike blacks,

the Court would

implicitly extend

the cross-section requirement to the petit jury.
such extension would be extremely difficult

I

think

to limit,

with

that
the

result that a defendant potentially could complain any time he
believed that the prosecutor used peremptories to strike members

9.

of

some

identifiable

complain

if

For

group.

persons

example,

allegedly

sharing

the

defendant could

similar

views

on

a

particular issue were excluded.
On the other hand, there is precedent supporting a holding ~
that

Fte~

, the

prohibits

the

t~lk

States

discriminate against persons because of their race when selecting

jurors--:---E~~

That

defendant

to

has

composition;
free

no

right

his right

Amendment,

emphasizing

that

By

the

its

a

jury

is to have a

of discrimination.

Fourteenth

authority

relying

of

is

a

clear

that

particular

the

~

racial

jury selected by a process
on

Court could

concern

makes

;¥1:1-

the

core

adopt

a

with

values of

the

narrow

holding,

discrimination

against

-----~---

1

blacks.

realize

minorities.
groups

that

such

a

holding

would

implicate

other

But the holding would properly be limited to suspect

and could

not

be

extended

to encompass other

kinds of

groups.
(b)
Amendment

If

the

forbids

Court

a

does

prosecutor

reaffirm

Court should not lightly overrule
such

decision

is

Fourteenth

the Court then is faced with

the burden of proof erected by Swain.

that

the

to use peremptory challenges to

discriminate on the basis of race,

believe

that

There is no doubt that the

its precedent.

justified.

The

But,

here,

requirement

1
in

Swain that a defendant establish systematic use of peremptories
to

r:t

strike

blacks

over

a

number

of

cases

conflicts

ecent decisions showing that a person may challenge
iscrimination

dev~ma
·-.

aimed
facie

solely
proof

~~~,

at

him

rules.

through

~'

use

of

with

more

intention~
judicially

United States Postal

•
Service Bd.

10.

of Governors v.

Aikens,

u.s.

460

711

(1983)

(prima

facie Title VII disparate treatment case, which requires proof of
intentional

discrj mination,

does

not

require

"direct" proof of

discriminatory intent and can be made out by showing employer 1 s
actions

in connection · with one

Ibuglas Corp.

v.

Green,

employment decision) ;

u.s.

411

792

(1973)

McDonnell

(establishing prima

facie proof rules for use in Title VII cases).

I see no reason

why similar prima facie rules could not be used to govern this

--

claim.

Moreover,

particularly
protection
violation

well

rights
of

-- respect,

with

one

reasoned.
are

I

Since

individual,

person 1 s

do

rights

not
it

think
is

there

clear

is

should

that Swain

no

depend

that

reason
on

is

equal
why

proof

a

that

others also have been denied their rights in the past.
(c)

There

remains

establish his claim.

the question of how a

In this connection,

defendant may

the state courts have

acted as laboratories, and their decisions are instructive.
~~People

v. Wheeler,

burden of proof
this

area.

22 Cal.3d 258

rules

When

a

In

(1978), Ca. Sup. Ct. developed

that could guide the Court 1 S decision in

defendant

believes

that

the

using peremptor ies on the ground of racial bias,

prosecutor

is

he must raise

the point in timely fashion and must make a prima facie case of
discrimination.

That showing can be based on the totality of the

circumstances of the particular case.
following

showing

(as

protection holding).

adapted

to

C~ up.

fit

my

Ct. requires the

recommended

equal

~ the defendant must establish that

black jurors are being struck.

Second, he must show, under all

the

"a

circumstances

of

the case,

strong

likelihood

that

such

~

9

•

~~

~~..AJ!V'l
~-

c:P"~~

of their

persons are being challenged

[race]

second

showing

can

be

made

through

rather than

Ibid. at 280.

because of any specific biasn held by the juror.
This

..R

evidence

that

the

prosecutor has struck all or most blacks from the venire or nhas
used

a

disproportionate

blacks.

Id.

jurors

share

number

of

his

peremptories

againstn

The circumstances may also reveal that the struck
only

race

and

that,

heterogeneous.

Moreover,

the

question

jurors

identify

black

to

fact

in

other

that

a

respects,

they

are

prosecutor

does

not

specific bias

that

they may

actually harbor, but then automatically uses his peremptories to
strike them, may give rise to an inference of discrimination.

At

this point, the burden will be on the prosecutor to articulate a
neutral reason,

not

rising

to the level of cause,

for

striking

the jurors in question.
(d)
followed,

There

is

no

question

the peremptory challenge

that,

if

this

approach

system would change.

view, such change would be for the better.

is

In my

The experience of the

States that have prohibited racial use of peremptories shows that

------

peremptory
announced

challenges

this

peremptor ies

in a

simple answer.
stop

this

rule,

have

survived.

most

prosecutors

First,

once

the

would

stop

exercising

racially discriminatory manner.

That

Court

is

the

Second, for the prosecutors who allegedly do not

practice,

assess the evidence.

the

trial

court will

be

in a

position

to

I have faith in the ability of trial judges

to implement the system particularly since it involves burden of
proof and credibility decisions with which they are familiar.

~

12.

Third,
lived with

the

experience

this system for

of

the

states

that

have

several years shows that the system

does not place an undue burden on TCs or require abandoment of
peremptory challenges.

For example, amici explain that they have

examined

reported

all

California

of

the

-----

and

Massachusetts,

similar approach.
there

have

cases

been

both

involving
of

which

this
have

claim

in

adopted

a

Since California adopted the approach in 1978,

fifteen

reported

cases

involving

the

claim.

Since Massachusetts adopted the system in 1979, there have been
thirteen cases.

Moreover,

the cases also show that prosecutors

have been able to satisfy TCs that they are not discriminating on
the basis of
847

(1980)

race.

~,

(court

Commonwealth v.

accepted

juror's "demeanor, manner and
v.

Walker,

157

Cal.

prosecutor's

10 Mass.

challenge

1060

(1984)

App.

based

'the smirk on her face'");
3d

App.

Kelly,

(court

on

People

accepted

prosecutor's explanation that juror "stood out as 'a comic'").
Fourth,
be

reversed

I believe that convictions will rarely,

on

this

The

ground.

nature

of

the

if ever,

peremptory

challenge system will require a defendant to raise the claim in a
timely fashion

in the TC.

If the defendant does not raise the

issue and make a record, there will be no basis for him later to
contend

that

his

rights

have

been violated.

Moreover,

the

TC

will be in the best position to evaluate the evidence, which will
involve the credibility of the prosecutor's neutral explanation.
Since the nature of the determination is very case-specific and

..·

fact-bound,

I . believe that a TC's

de~ion

that a prosecutor did

not discriminate will rarely be set aside on appeal.

See People

13 •

..
v. Walker,

supra

(appellate court used very narrow standard of

review to evaluate decision of

nexperienced trial judgen).

the Court did decide to adopt this new approach, it could
the decision prospectively only,

If
apply

in light of the fact that the

decision would be a departure from precedent.
Finally,

I

raises several
prohibited from
group?

0 What

confess

that

~roach

the

that

I

advocate

questions~ For example, is defense counsel also ~
us ~ peremptories to strike members of a racial ~

remedy

should

be

adopted

in a case where

decides that the prosecutor has improperly struck jurors on the
basis of race?
~ese

How far does this holding extend?

I believe that

-

questions do not cast doubt on the validity of the narrow

holding that the prosecutor is forbidden to strike blacks because
they are black and that the defendant's prima facie case can be
established
believe

that

questions

-

based

on

on

the

the

Court

this

record.

facts
should
The

of

a

not
lower

I

also

answer

the

can grapple

with

particular
undertake
courts

case.
to

subsidiary questions as they must whenever the Court announces a
new holding.
should

be

The question of remedy seems to me to be one that
left

to

development

by

the

lower

courts

since

particular remedies should be shaped in connection with the jury
selection procedures used by the particular jurisdiction.

-Conclusion
v
I recommend that the Court reaffirm that portion of Swain
v. Alabama that implicitly holds that the Equal Protection Clause
forbids a prosecutor to strike black jurors solely on the basis
of their race.

z

the TC ~ . . .

I further recommend that the Court overrule that

14.
(

.'
portion of Swain that holds that a defendant cannot establish, on
proof of the facts in the particular case, that a prosecutor has

------------

used peremptory challenges to discriminate
jury venire.

Rather,

blacks on the

the Court should approve use of burden of

proof rules that permit a defendant to rely on the prosecutor's
action

in

his

case

~

to

make

a

prima

facie

showing.

<==

prosecutor will be required to justify his

a~t LQn

,

the

on the basis of

a neutral explanation not rising to the level of cause.

------------------------

Then,
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CHAMI!IERS OF"

JUSTICE

w... J . BRENNAN,

JR.

December 13, 1985

No. 85-6807

/

Lee v. Illinois

Batson v. Kentucky

Dear Chief,
I'm going to try my hand at op1n1ons for the
Court in both of the above cases.
Together with
the two I assigned to myself last week, this
brings my assignments to six, which at least
approaches the total assignments to some of my
colleagues.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

D cernber

9, 1985

84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky

Dear. Chief:
I understan that Batson has now been assigned to
me in place of Thornburg v. G ngles.
My thanks to you and Bill Brenn n. I id not think
I could write Thornburg - an important case - in accord with
the view of a majority of the Court as ex~ressed at Conference.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

•
December 20, 1985

84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky

Dear Byron:
As the Chief h s now asqigned this case to me, I am
particularly interested in your views as the author of Swain
as to how an op nion s ould be written.
I enclose a copy of my Conference notes recording
my understanding of your position. I believe you can read
the noteq despite poor handwriting and bad grammar.
o
these accurately reflect the substance of what you said though t greater lengt ? I appreciate, of course, that how
these views are written out will be what counts.
You may recall that I asked to what extent you
think Swain Jl\USt be overruled. It woul '-) heJ. ful f you
also 1ould share your thinking on this with n~.
I recorded in my own notes the fo .lowing:
"As I understand BRW, I think I could agree."
In short, I was wlth

t

ou.
Sincerelv,

Justice White
lfp/ss

•

•
lfp/ss 01/ll/86

BAT SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM
Jan. 11, 1986

DATE:

TO:

Anne

.FROM:

Lewis .F. Powell, Jr.
84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky
I have read the first draft of our opinion with
and

interest

written, and persuasive.
editing,

It

admiration.

is

organized,

well

well

In addition to my usual language

I make the following points -

some as questions

and others as suggesting additional thoughts.

I make the

points in no particular order.
1.
the

early

Perhaps it should be made more clearly part

recognized

of

that

Part
the

II

rule

-

that

we

requiring

consistently
that

a

in

have

jury

be

representative of the community has been applied uniformly
to the venire rather than the petit jury.
size of petit

juries -

In view of the

particularly now that six member

juries are lawful - it is quite impossible for the concept
of representation to be applied at the trial jury level.
This was explicitly said in Edwards v. Louisiana, as well
as

in

Swain

rely on for

and other
the

cases.

Thus,

relevant principles -

the

authorities

we

and that you have

marshaled extremely well - are cases involving the venire.

2.

Yet,

the principles can be applied,

as you have done,

in

the special circumstances addressed in this case.
2.
opinion
facie

The

requires

showing

structure
is

that

that the

of

a

analysis

that

the

defendant must make

striking of blacks

a

draft
prima

from the

was motivated by purposeful discrimination.

jury

When such a

showing is made, the burden of going forward to rebut the
prima

facie

ultimate
This

case

shifts

burden of

general

to

the

persuasion

procedure

was

prosecution.

But

the

remains

on

the

defendant.

described

in

my

McDonnell-

Douglas decision (1972 Term, as I recall), and in a couple
of

subsequent Title VII cases.

Has

it been followed

any of the discrimination cases involving the venire?
any event,

it seems

to me

to the proper procedure.

may be able, in a footnote,

in
In
You

to cite decisions from CAs or

possibly state courts that have outlined this procedure in
equal protection cases.
3.
specifically

You
the

have

procedure

properly
outlined

avoided
in

detail

Kearse in McCray, or in any other CA case.

approving
by

Judge

I quite agree

that this is prudent.
4.

At

Conference,

Justice

White

acknowledged

that Swain in effect would have to be overruled in part.

3.

It is clear from your draft that, if this becomes a Court
opinion,

Swain

You

properly

have

would

be

made

modified
clear

or

that

overruled

the

equal

in

part.

protection

principles reiterated by the Court in Swain were correct,
and that we extend their application of those principles
to

cases

where

preemptory

challenges

are

used

for

no

reason other than the race of the prospective juror.
5.

Finally,

rebutting

the

heterogeneous
for

our

enhanced

disqualified
her race.

state's

arguments

population of

system of
if

it is important to add - perhaps in

we
from

justice

make

our
and

clear

that

country,
the

that

public

rule of

no

given

the

respect

law will be

citizen

should

be

jury service solely because of his or

Or putting it differently, the race of a juror

is irrelevant to the basic question whether or not he or
she

is

qualified

to

serve

with

objectivity

and

impartiality.

I now suggest that you do a second draft - giving
this priority over bench memos - and that that draft then
be reviewed by Bill.

Of course,

I leave entirely to you

and Bill as to how best to cooperate.
L.F.P., Jr.

ss
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.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

January 21, 1986

/
84-6263 - Batson v. Kentucky

Dear Lewis ,
Your draft

is somewhat harder on Swain

than it need be since it in effect finds that
the decision was indefensible at the time in
light of prior decisions.
is

just

a

matter

of

But perhaps this

style.

You

should

circulate, and I shall at least concur in the
result.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White

01/21

.

Justice Marshall
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Blackmun
Rehnquist
Stevens
O'Connor

From:

Justice Powell

Circulated:

JAN 2 2 l9SG

Recirculated: __________
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-6263

JAMES KIRKLAND BATSON, PETITIONER
v. KENTUCKY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF KENTUCKY
[January - , 1986]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to reexamine that portion of Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), concerning the evidentiary
burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that he has
been denied equal protection through the State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the
petit jury. 1
JUSTICE POWELL

1

Following the lead of a number of state courts construing their state's
constitution, two federal Courts of Appeal recently have accepted the view
that use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors in a particular case
violates the Sixth Amendment. Booker v. J abe, 775 F. 2d 762 (CA6 1985),
cert. pending, No. 85-1028; McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1113 (CA2
1984), cert. pending, No. 84-1426. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,
583 P . 2d 748 (1978); Riley v. State, 496 A. 2d 997, 1009-1013 (Del. 1985);
State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377
Mass. 461, 387 N. E . 2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979). See also
State v. Crespin, 94 N. M. 486, 612 P. 2d 716 (App. 1980). Other Courts
of Appeal have rejected that position, adhering to the requirement that a
defendant must prove systematic exclusion of blacks from the petit jury to
establish a constitutional violation. United States v. Childress, 715 F. 2d
1313 (CA8 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 1063 (1984); United
States v. Whitfield, 715 F . 2d 145, 147 (CA4 1983). See Beed v. State , 271
Ark. 526, 530-531, 609 S. W. 2d 898, 903 (1980); Blackwell v. State, 248
Ga. 138, 281 S. E. 2d 599, 599-600 (1981); Gilliard v. State, 428 So. 2d 576,
579 (Miss.), cert. denied, 464 U.
867 (1983); People v. McCray , 57 N. Y.
2d 542, 546-549, 443 N. E. 2d 915, 916-919 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S.
961 (1983); State v. Lynch, 300 N. C. 534, 546-547, 268 S. E. 2d 161,

s:
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I
Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Kentucky on
charges of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen
goods. On the first day of trial in Jefferson Circuit Court,
the judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire, excused certain jurors for cause, and permitted the parties to
exercise peremptory challenges. 2 The prosecutor used his
peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the
venire, and a jury composed only of white persons was selected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury before
it was sworn on the ground that the prosecutor's removal of
the black veniremen violated petitioner's rights under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a
cross-section of the community, and under the Fourteenth
Amendment to equal protection of the laws. Counsel requested a hearing on his motion. Without expressly ruling
on the request for a hearing, the trial judge observed that the
parties were entitled to use their peremptory challenges to
"strike anybody they want to." The judge then denied petitioner's motion, reasoning that the cross-section requirement
applies only to selection of the venire and not to selection of
the petit jury itself.
168-169 (1980). Federal Courts of Appeal also have held that the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges in a particular case may be scrutinized under supervisory power. United States v. Leslie, 759 F . 2d 366,
370-375, rehearing en bane granted, 761 F. 2d 195 (CA5 1985); United
States v. Jackson, 696 F . 2d 578, 592-593 (CA8 1982), cert. denied, 460
U. S. 1073 (1983). See also United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp.
1243 (ED La. 1974).
2
The Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize the trial court to
permit counsel to conduct voir dire examination or to conduct the examination itself. Ky. Rule Crim. Proc. 9.38. After jurors have been excused ·
for cause, the parties exercise their peremptory challenges simultaneously
by striking names from a list of qualified jurors equal to the number to be
seated plus the number of allowable peremptory challenges. Rule 9.36.
Since the offense charged in this case was a felony , and an alternate juror
was called, the prosecutor was entitled to six peremptory challenges, and
defense counsel to nine. Rule 9.40.
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The jury convicted petitioner on both <;aunts. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner pressed,
among other claims, the argument concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. Conceding that Swain
v. Alabama, supra, apparently foreclosed an equal protection claim based solely on the prosecutor's conduct in this
case, petitioner urged the court to follow decisions of other
states, People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748
(1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N. E.
2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979), and to hold that
such conduct violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment
and Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution to a jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community. Petitioner also contended that the facts showed that the prosecutor had engaged in a "pattern" of discriminatory challenges in this case
and established an equal protection violation under Swain.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed. In a single
paragraph, the court declined petitioner's invitation to adopt
the reasoning of People v. Wheeler, supra, and Commonwealth v. Soares, supra. The court observed that it recently
had reaffirmed its reliance on Swain, and had held that a defendant alleging lack of a fair cross-section must demonstrate
systematic exclusion of a group of jurors from the venire.
See Commonwealth v. McFerron, 680 S. W. 2d 924 (1984).
We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. - - (1985), and now
reverse.
II
In Swain v. Alabama, this Court recognized that a
"State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration
of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause." 380 U. S.,
at 203-204. This principle has been "consistently and repeatedly" reaffirmed, id., at 204, in numerous decisions of
this Court both preceding and following Swain. 3 We rea See,

e. g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880); Neal v.

.

84-6263-0PINION
4

BATSON v. KENTUCKY

affirm the principle today. 4

A

More than a century ago, the Court decided that the State
denies a black defendant equal protection of the laws when it
puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his
race have been purposefully excluded. Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). That decision laid the foundation for the Court's unceasing efforts to eradicate racial
discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire
from which individual jurors are drawn. In Strauder, the
Court explained that the central concern of the recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment was to put an end to governDelaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1881); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935);
Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S. 394 (1935) (per curiam); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947);
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475
(1954); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389
U. S. 24 (1967) (per curiam); Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene
County, 396 U. S. 320 (1970); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977);
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. (1986).
The basic principles prohibiting exclusion of persons from participation
in jury service on account of their race "are essentially the same for grand
juries and for petit juries." Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 626,
n. 3 (1972); see Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587,589 (1935). These principles are reinforced by the criminal laws of the United States. 18
u. s. c. § 243.
'In this Court, petitioner has argued that the prosecutor's conduct violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to an impartial jury and to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. Petitioner has framed his argument in these terms in an apparent effort to
avoid inviting the Court directly to reconsider one of its own precedents.
On the other hand, the State has insisted that petitioner is claiming a denial of equal protection and that we must reconsider Swain to find a constitutional violation on this record. We agree with the State that resolution of petitioner's claim properly turns on application of equal protection
principles and express no view on the merits of any of petitioner's Sixth
Amendment arguments.
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mental discrimination on account of race. Id., at 306-307.
Exclusion of black citizens from service as jurors constitutes
a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment
was designed to cure.
In holding that racial discrimination in jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause, the Court in Strauder
recognized, however, that a defendant has no right to a "petit
jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race."
I d., at 305. 5 "The number of our races and nationalities
stands in the way of evolution of such a conception" of the demand of equal protection. Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398,
403 (1945). 6 But the defendant does have the right to be
tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria. Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 321
(1906); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880). The
Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the
State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, Strauder, supra, at 305, 7 or on the
false assumption that members of his race as a group are not
qualified to serve as jurors, see Norris v. Alabama, 294
U. S. 587, 599 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 397
(1881).

•see Hernandez v. Texas, supra, at 482; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S.
282, 286-287 (1950) (plurality opinion); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403
(1945); Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 321 (1906); Neal v. Delaware,
supra, at 394.
6
Similarly, though the Sixth Amendment guarantees that the petit jury
will be selected from a pool of names representing a cross-section of the
community, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), we have never held
that the Sixth Amendment requires that "petit juries actually chosen must
mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the
population," id., at 538. Indeed, it would be impossible to apply a concept
of proportional representation to the petit jury in view of the heterogeneous nature of our society. Such impossibility is illustrated by the
Court's holding that a jury of six persons is not unconstitutional. Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 102-103 (1970).
7
See Hernandez v. Texas, supra, at 482; Cassell v. Texas, supra, at
287; Akins v. Texas, supra, at 403; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., at 394.
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Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire
violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure. "The very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or
summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as
that which he holds." Strauder, supra, at 308; see Carter v.
Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 U. S. 320, 330
(1970). The petit jury has occupied a central position in our
system of justice by safeguarding a person accused of crime
against the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or
judge. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 156 (1968). 8
Those on the venire must be "indifferently chosen," 9 to secure the defendant's right under the Fourteenth Amendment
to "protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice." Strauder, supra, at 309.
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only
the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try.
8

See Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, at 530; Williams v. Florida, supra,
at 100. See also Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1
(1966).

In Duncan v. Louisiana, decided after Swain, the Court concluded that
the right to trial by jury in criminal cases was such a fundamental feature
of the American system of justice that it was protected against state action
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 391 U. S., at
147-158. The Court emphasized that a defendant's right to be tried by a
jury of his peers is designed "to prevent oppression by the Government."
Id., at 155, 156-157. For a jury to perform its intended function as a
check on official power, it must be a body drawn from the community.
Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, at 156; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S.
60, 86-88 (1942). By compromising the representative quality of the jury,
discriminatory selection procedures make "juries ready weapons for officials to oppress those accused individuals who by chance are numbered
among unpopular or inarticulate minorities." Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S.,
at 408 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
• 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 349 (Cooley ed. 1899) (quoted in Duncan v. Lousiana, supra, at 152).

84-6263--0PINION
BATSON v. KENTUCKY

7

Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to
consider evidence presented at a trial. See Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 223-224 (1946). A person's
race simply "is unrelated to his fitness as a juror." Id., at
227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). As long ago as Strauder,
therefore, the Court recognized that by denying a person
participation in jury service on account of his race, the State
unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror.
100 U. S., at 308; see Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene
County, supra, at 329-330; Neal v. Delaware, supra, at 386.
The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to
touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. See
Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, 195 (1946); McCray
v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, 968 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Discrimination within the
judicial system is most pernicious because it is "a stimulant to
that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to
[black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others." Strauder, supra, at 308.

B
In Strauder, the Court invalidated a state statute that provided that only white men could serve as jurors. 100 U. S.,
at 305. We can be confident that no state now has such a
law. The Constitution requires, however, that we look beyond the face of the statute defining juror qualifications and
also consider challenged selection practices to afford "protection against action of the State through its administrative officers in effecting the prohibited discrimination." Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U. S., at 589; see Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U. S. 475, 478-479 (1954); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., at
346-347. Thus, the Court has found a denial of equal protec-
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tion where the procedures implementing _a neutral statute operated to exclude persons from the venire on racial grounds, 10
and has made clear that the Constitution prohibits all forms
of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of jurors. 11
While decisions of this Court have been concerned largely
with discrimination during selection of the venire, the principles announced there also forbid discrimination on account
of race in selection of the petit jury. Since the Fourteenth
Amendment protects an accused throughout the proceedings
bringing him to justice, Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 406
(1942), the State may not draw up its jury lists pursuant to
neutral procedures but then resort to discrimination at "other
stages in the selection process," Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S.
559, 562 (1953); see McCray v. New York, supra, at 965, 968
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 632 (1972).
Accordingly, the component of the jury selection process at
issue here, the State's privilege to strike individual jurors
through peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands
of the Equal Protection Clause. 12 Although a prosecutor or10
E. g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404, 407 (1967) (per curiam); Whitus
v. Georgia, 385 U. S., at 548-549; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S., at 561.
11
See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S., at 589; Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S.,
at 319; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., at 394, 397.
12
We express no views on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on
the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel.
Nor do we express any views on the techniques used by lawyers who
seek to obtain information about the community in which a case is to be
tried, and about members of the venire from which the jury is likely to be
drawn. See generally J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels, 183-189 (1977). Prior to
voir dire examination, which serves as the basis for exercise of challenges,
lawyers wish to know as much as possible about prospective jurors, including their age, education, employment, and economic status, so that they
can ensure selection of jurors who at least have an open mind about the
case. In some jurisdictions, where a pool of jurors serves for a substantial
period of time, see J. Van Dyke, supra, at 116-118, counsel also may seek
to learn which members of the pool served on juries in other cases and the
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dinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges "for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related
to his view concerning the outcome" of the case to be tried,
United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 473 (Conn.
1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United States v. Newman, 549 F. 2d 240 (CA2 1977), the Equal Protection Clause
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on
account of their race. 13
III
The principles announced in Strauder never have been
questioned in any subsequent decision of this Court.
Rather, the Court has been called upon repeatedly to review
the application of those principles to particular facts. 14 A recurring question in these cases, as in any case alleging a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, was whether the
defendant had met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination on the part of the State. Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U. S., at 550; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., at 478-481;
Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., at 403-404; Martin v. Texas, 200
U. S. 316 (1906). That question also was at the heart of the
outcome of those cases. Counsel even may employ professional investigators to interview persons who have served on a particular petit jury. We
have had no occasion to consider particularly this practice. Of course,
counsel's efforts to obtain possibly relevant information about prospective
jurors is to be distinguised from the practice at issue here.
13
This conclusion is consistent with Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202
(1965). The Court viewed Alabama's peremptory challenge practice,
when properly exercised, as serving to eliminate a potential juror for reasons related to the "context of the case to be tried." !d., at 221; see id., at
224. Moreover, the decision left no doubt that the Equal Protection
Clause forbade a prosecutor to strike black jurors on account of their race.
!d., at 223-224.
1
•See, e. g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.- (1986); Rose v. Mitchell,
443 U. S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U. S. 545, 549-550 (1967); Swain v. Alabama, supra, at 205; Coleman v.
Alabama, 377 U. S. 129 (1964); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 589
(1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., at 394.
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portion of Swain v. Alabama we reexarnip.e today. 15

A

Swain required the Court to decide, among other issues,
whether a black defendant was denied equal protection by
the State's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude
members of his race from the petit jury. 380 U. S., at
209-210. The record in Swain showed that the prosecutor
had used the State's peremptory challenges to strike the six
black persons included on the petit jury venire. I d., at 210.
While rejecting the defendant's claim for failure to prove purposeful discrimination, the Court nonetheless indicated that
the Equal Protection Clause placed some limits on the State's
exercise of peremptory challenges. I d., at 222-224.
The Court sought to accommodate the prosecutor's historical privilege of peremptory challenge free of judicial control,
id., at 214-220, and the constitutional prohibition on exclusion of persons from jury service on account of race, id., at
222-224. While the Constitution does not confer a right to
peremptory challenges, id., at 219 (citing Stilson v. United
15
The decision in Swain has been the subject of extensive commentary.
Some authors have argued that the Court should reconsider the decision.
E. g., J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels 166-167 (1977); Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 247,
268-270 (1973); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 235, 283-303 (1968); Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1357 (1985); Note, Peremptory ChallengeSystematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss.
L. J. 157 (1967); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint
for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1157 (1966).
See also Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
1611 (1985).
On the other hand, some commentators have argued that we should adhere to Swain. See Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the
Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 Md. L. Rev.
337 (1982).
.
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States, 250 U. S. 583, 586 (1919)), those challenges traditionally have been viewed as one means of assuring the selection
of a qualified and unbiased jury, 380 U. S. , at 219. 16 To preserve the peremptory nature of the prosecutor's challenge,
the Court in Swain declined to scrutinize his actions in a particular case by relying on a presumption that he properly exercised the State's challenges. I d., at 221-222.
The Court went on to observe, however, that a state may
not exercise its challenges in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. It was impermissible for a prosecutor to use
his challenges to exclude blacks from the jury "for reasons
wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on
trial" or to deny to blacks "the same right and opportunity to
participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the
white population." Id., at 224. Accordingly, a black defendant could make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination on proof that the peremptory challenge system
was "being perverted" in that manner. Ibid. For example,
an inference of purposeful discrimination would be raised on
evidence that a prosecutor, "in case after case, whatever the
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of
Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the
jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for
cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries." Id., at 223. Evidence offered by the defendant in
Swain was insufficien,t because, though showing that prosecutors in the jurisdiction systematically had exercised their
strikes to exclude blacks from the jury, it did not demonstrate the circumstances under which the prosecutor alone
was responsible for striking black jurors beyond the facts of
the defendant's case. Id., at 224-228.
16

In Swain, the Court reviewed the "very old credentials" of the peremptory challenge system and noted the "long and widely held belief that
peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury." 380 U. S. , at
219; see id., at 212-219.
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A number of lower courts following the teaching of Swain
reasoned that proof of systematic striking of blacks over a
number of cases was necessary to establish a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. 17 Since this interpretation of Swain
has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, 18 prosecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely immune from
constitutional scrutiny. For reasons that follow, we reject
this evidentiary formulation as inconsistent with standards
that have been developed since Swain for assessing a prima
facie case under the Equal Protection Clause.
B

Since the decision in Swain, we have explained that our
cases concerning selection of the venire reflect the general
equal protection principle that the "invidious quality'' of governmental action claimed to be racially discriminatory "must
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 240 (1976). As in any
equal protection case, the "burden is, of course," on the de17 E. g., United States v. Jenkins, 701 F. 2d 850, 859-860 (CAlO 1983);
United States v. Boykin, 679 F. 2d 1240, 1245 (CA8 1982); United States v.
Pearson, 448 F. 2d 1207, 1213-1218 (CA5 1971); Thigpen v. State, 49 Ala.
App. 233, 270 So. 2d 666, 673 (1972); Jackson v. State, 245 Ark. 331, 432
S. W. 2d 876, 878 (1968); Johnson v. Maryland, 9 Md. App. 143, 262 A. 2d
792, 796-797 (1970); State v. Johnson, 125 N. J. Super. 438, 311 A. 2d 389
(1973) (per curiam); State v. Shaw, 284 N. C. 366, 200 S. E. 2d 585 (1973).
18
See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1113, 1120, and n. 2 (CA2 1984),
cert. pending, No. 84-1426. The lower courts have noted the practical difficulties of proving that the State systematically has exercised peremptory
challenges to exclude blacks from the jury on account of race. As the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed, the defendant would have
to investigate, over a number of cases, the race of persons tried in the particular jurisdiction, the racial composition of the venire and petit jury, and
the manner in which both parties exercised their peremptory challenges.
United States v. Pearson, 448 F. 2d 1207, 1217 (CA51971). The court believed this burden to be "most difficult" to meet. Ibid. In jurisdictions
where court records do not reflect the jurors' race and where voir dire proceedings are not transcribed, the burden would be insurmountable. See
.People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748, 767-768 (1978).
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fendant who alleges discriminatory selecti_on of the venire "to
prove the existence of purposeful discrimination." Whitus
v. Georgia, 385 U. S., at 550 (citing Tarrance v. Florida, 188
U. S. 519 (1903)). In deciding if the defendant has carried
his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake "a sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent
as may be available." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266
(1977). Circumstantial evidence of invidious intent may include proof of disproportionate impact. Washington v.
Davis, 426 U. S., at 242. We have observed that under
some circumstances proof of discriminatory impact "may for
all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds." Ibid. For example,
"total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes
from jury venires," ibid., "is itself such an 'unequal application of the law ... as to show intentional discrimination,'"
id., at 241 (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., at 404).
Moreover, since Swain, we have recognized that a black
defendant alleging that members of his race have been impermissibly excluded from the venire may make out a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. Washington v. Davis, supra, at
239-242. Once the defendant makes the. requisite showing,
the burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial
exclusion. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 632. The
State cannot meet this burden on mere general assertions
that its officials did not discriminate or that they properly
performed their official duties. See Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, at 632; Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24, 25 (1967).
Rather, the State must demonstrate that "permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced
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the monochromatic result." Alexander v. Louisiana, supra,
at 632; see Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241. 19
The showing necessary to establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in selection of the venire may be
discerned in this Court's decisions. E. g., Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 494-495 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, at 631-632. The defendant initially must show
that he is a member of a racial group capable of being singled
out for differential treatment. Castaneda v. Partida,
supra, at 494. In combination with that evidence, a defendant may then make a prima facie case by proving that in the
particular jurisdiction members of his race have not been
summoned for jury service over an extended period of time.
I d. , at 494. Proof of systematic exclusion from the venire
raises an inference of purposeful discrimination because the
"result bespeaks discrimination." Hernandez v. Texas,
supra, at 482; see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., supra, at 266.
Since the ultimate issue is whether the State has discriminated in selecting the defendant's venire, however, the defendant may establish a prima facie case "in other ways than
by evidence of long-continued unexplained absence" of members of his race "from many panels." Cassell v. Texas, 339
U. S. 282, 290 (1950) (plurality opinion). In cases involving
the venire, this Court has found a prima facie case on proof
that members of the defendant's race were substantially underrepresented on the venire from which his jury was drawn,
and that the venire was selected under a practice providing
"the opportunity for discrimination." Whitus v. Georgia,
19

Our decisions in the context of Title VII "disparate treatment" have
explained the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules. See M cDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973); Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981); United States Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711 (1983). The party
alleging that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination carries the
ultimate burden of persuasion. Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, supra, at 252-256.
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385 U. S., at 552; see Castaneda v. Partida, supra, at 494;
Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241; Aiexander v. Louisiana, supra, at 629-631. This combination of factors raises
the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination because
the Court has declined to attribute to chance the absence of
black citizens on a particular jury array where the selection
mechanism is subject to abuse. When circumstances suggest the need, the trial court must undertake a "factual inquiry'' that "takes into account all possible explanatory factors" in the particular case. Alexander v. Louisiana, supra,
at 630.
Thus, since the decision in Swain, this Court has recognized that a defendant may make a prima facie showing of
purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by
relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case.
These decisions are in accordance with the proposition, articulated in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.,
that "a consistent pattern of official racial discrimination" is
not "a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection -Clause. A single invidiously discriminatory governmental act" is not "immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions."
429 U. S., at 266, n. 14. For evidentiary requirements to
dictate that "several must suffer discrimination" before one
could object, McCray v. New York, 461 U. S., at 965 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all. 20

c
The standards for assessing a prima facie case in the context of discriminatory selection of the venire have been fully
articulated since Swain. See Castaneda v. Partida, supra,
20
Decisions under Title VII also recognize that a person claiming that he
has been the victim of intentional discrimination may make out a prima
facie case by relying solely on the facts concerning the alleged discrimination against him. See cases at supra, n. 19.
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at 494-495; Washington v. Davis supra, at 241-242; Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, at 629-631. These principles fully
support our conclusion that a defendant may establish a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of
the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's
exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial.
To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that
he is a member of a cognizable racial group, Castaneda v.
Partida, supra, at 494, and that the prosecutor has exercised
peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members
of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to
rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that
permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. " Avery v. Georgia, supra, at 562. Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used
that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on
account of their race. This combination of factors in the
empanelling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire,
raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.
In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite
showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. For example, a "pattern" of strikes against black
jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an
inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's
questions and statements during voir dire examination and in
exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference
of discriminatory purpose. These examples are merely illustrative. We have confidence that trial judges, experienced
in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against
black jurors.
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral

84-6263-0PINION
BATSON v. KENTUCKY

17

explanation for challenging black jurors. Though this requirement imposes a limitation in some cases on the full peremptory character of the historic challenge, we emphasize
that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level
justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. See McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F. 2d, at 1132; Booker v. Jabe, 775 F. 2d 762,
773 (CA6 1985), cert. pending 85-1028. But the prosecutor
may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to the defendant. Cf.
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S., at 598-599; see Thompson v.
United States,-- U.S.--,-- (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Nor may the prosecutor rebut
the defendant's case by simply denying that he had a discriminatory motive or "affirming his good faith in individual
selections." Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 632. If
mere "general assertions" were accepted as rebutting a defendant's prima facie case, the Equal Protection Clause
"would be but a vain and illusory requirement." Norris v.
Alabama, supra, at 598. The prosecutor therefore must
articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case
to be tried. 21 The trial court then will have the duty to
determine if the defendant has established purposeful
discrimination. 22
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F . 2d, at 1132, that "[t]here are any number of bases" on
which a prosecutor reasonably may believe that it is desirable to strike a
juror who is not excusable for cause. As we explained in another context,
however, the prosecutor must give a "clear and reasonably specific" explanation of his "legitimate reasons" for exercising the challenges. Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 258 (1981).
22
In a recent Title VII sex discrimination case, we stated that "a finding
of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact" entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. (1985). Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration
21

•
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IV
The State contends that our holding will eviscerate the fair
trial values served by the peremptory challenge. Conceding
that the Constitution does not guarantee a right to peremptory challenges and that Swain did state that their use ultimately is subject to the strictures of equal protection, the
State argues that the privilege of unfettered exercise of the
challenge is of vital importance to the criminal justice
system.
While we recognize, of course, that the peremptory challenge occupies an important position in our trial procedures,
we do not agree that our decision today will undermine the
contribution the challenge generally makes to the administration of justice. The reality of practice, amply reflected in
many state and federal court opinions, shows that the challenge may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to
discriminate against black jurors. By requiring trial courts
to be sensitive to the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the mandate of equal
protection and furthers the ends of justice. In view of the
heterogeneous population of our nation, public respect for our
criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury
service because of his race.
Nor are we persuaded by the State's suggestion that our
holding will create serious administrative difficulties. In
those states applying a version of the evidentiary standard
we recognize today, courts have not experienced serious administrative burdens,23 and the peremptory challenge system
has survived. We decline, however, to formulate particular
here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference. !d., a t -.
28
For example, in People v. Hall , 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P. 2d 854 (1983),
the California Supreme Court found that there was no evidence to show
that procedures implementing its version of this standard, imposed five
years earlier, were burdensome for trial judges.

•
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procedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection
to a prosecutor's challenges. 24

v
In this case, petitioner made a timely objection to the prosecutor's removal of all black persons on the venire. Because
the trial court flatly rejected the objection without requiring
the prosecutor to give an explanation for his action, we remand this case for further proceedings. If the trial court decides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a
neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require
that petitioner's conviction be reversed. E. g., Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U. S., at 549-550; Hernandez v. Texas, supra,
at 482; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S., at 469.

It is so ordered.

24

In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our state
and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how
best to implement our holding today. For the same reason, we express no
view on whether it is more appropriate in a particular case, upon a finding
of discrimination against black jurors, for the trial court to discharge the
venire and select a new jury from a panel not previously associated with
the case, see Booker v. Jabe, 775 F. 2d, at 773, or to disallow the discriminatory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the venire, see United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp.
467, 474 (Conn. 1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United States v. Newman, 549 F. 2d 240 (CA2 1977).
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Dear Lewis,
I was pleased this case was assigned to you.
You
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a question and a suggestion that I would appreciate your
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(1) The opinion leaves somwhat uncertain whether a
race-based peremptory would violate the Fourteenth Amendment
even if the defendant and the racially excluded jurors were
of different races.
On page 14 (first full paragraph) the
opin1~s that in that circumstance a defendant could
not make out a prima facie case of discrimination. On page
7, the opinion suggests that a juror excluded on the basis
of race has suffered unconstitutional disrimination
regardless of the race of the defendant.
I realize that the
Court's cases are less than crystal clear on this point.
But I incline towards the position that any race-based
effort to cull certain jurors from the venire represents
unlawful discrimination.
If the opinion is saying that only/
excluded jurors and defendants of the same race as the
excluded juror have standing to object to the
unconstitutional act1on, perhaps that could be clarified
with a brief footnote.
(2) The principal error of Swain, in my view, was
that it left prosecutors with the impression that racially
motivated peremptories were permissible as long as the
motivation was to improve the chances of obtaining a
favorable verdict.
In other words, Swain drew a distinction
between striking blacks because the prosecutor believed that
they had no place in the judicial system and striking blacks
because they were thought to be acquittal-prone. The
opinion seemed to suggest that the latter was permissible,
while the former was not.
As your opinion correctly holds on pag~ 17, a
peremptory challenge motivated solely by the v1ew that
blacks, as a race, are acquittal-prone violates the Equal

2.

Protection Clause. The carr ~o~~ aph on pages 7-8,
however, could be read ~he dichotomy
seemingly rel~Swain. The sentence~ now reads, with
internal quC>tations and c1tations omitted:
"Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled
to exercise permitted peremptory challenges
for any reason at all@ as long as that reason
is related to his view concerning the outcome
of the case to be tried, the Equal Protection
Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge
potential jurors solely on account of their
race."

~ U?-<t~.c.c- ~

Perhaps something along the f~lowing lines could be
added to the end of the sentence: "or <>th:&oeeot~n t of general
assumptions about the attitudes towar s the criminal justice
system held by members of a given race."
I assume that peremptory strikes would still be
allowed if, for example, voir dire questioning reve ~ a
basis for the prosecutor to bel1eve a particula r-JU ror would
be-acquittal-prone.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
q / Justice Blackmun
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Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell
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JAMES KIRKLAND BATSON, PETITIONER
v. KENTUCKY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF KENTUCKY
[January-, 1986]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to reexamine that portion of Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), concerning the evidentiary
burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that he has
been denied equal protection through the State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the
petit jury. 1
JUSTICE POWELL

1

Following the lead of a number of state courts construing their state's
constitution, two federal Courts of Appeal recently have accepted the view
that use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors in a particular case
violates the Sixth Amendment. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F. 2d 762 (CA6 1985),
cert. pending, No. 85-1028; McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1113 (CA2
1984), cert. pending, No. 84-1426. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,
583 P. 2d 748 (1978); Riley v. State, 496 A. 2d 997, 1009-1013 (Del. 1985);
State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377
Mass. 461, 387 N. E. 2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979). See also
State v. Crespin, 94 N. M. 486, 612 P. 2d 716 (App. 1980). Other Courts
of Appeal have rejected that position, adhering to the requirement that a
defendant must prove systematic exclusion of blacks from the petit jury to
establish a constitutional violation. United States v. Childress, 715 F. 2d
1313 (CA8 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 1063 (1984); United
States v. Whitfield, 715 F. 2d 145, 147 (CA4 1983). See Beed v. State, 271
Ark. 526, 530-531, 609 S. W. 2d 898, 903 (1980); Blackwell v. State, 248
Ga. 138, 281 S. E. 2d 599, 599-600 (1981); Gilliard v. State, 428 So. 2d 576,
579 (Miss.), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 867 (1983); People v. McCray, 57 N. Y.
2d 542, 546-549, 443 N. E. 2d 915, 916-919 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S.
961 (1983); State v. Lynch, 300 N. C. 534, 546-547, 268 S. E. 2d 161,
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I
Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Kentucky on
charges of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen
goods. On the first day of trial in Jefferson Circuit Court,
the judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire, excused certain jurors for cause, and permitted the parties to
exercise peremptory challenges. 2 The prosecutor used his
peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the
venire, and a jury composed only_of white persons was selected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury before
it was sworn on the ground that the prosecutor's removal of
the black veniremen violated petitioner's rights under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a
cross-section of the community, and under the Fourteenth
Amendment to equal protection of the laws. Counsel requested a hearing on his motion. Without expressly ruling
on the request for a hearing, the trial judge observed that the
parties were entitled to use their peremptory challenges to
"strike anybody they want to." The judge then denied petitioner's motion, reasoning that the cross-section requirement
applies only to selection of the venire and not to selection of
the petit jury itself.
168-169 (1980). Federal Courts of Appeal also have held that the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges in a particular case may be scrutinized under supervisory power. United States v. Leslie, 759 F. 2d 366,
370-375, rehearing en bane granted, 761 F . 2d 195 (CA5 1985); United
States v. Jackson, 696 F. 2d 578, 592-593 (CA8 1982), cert. denied, 460
U. S. 1073 (1983). See also United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp.
1243 (ED La. 1974).
2
The Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize the trial court to
permit counsel to conduct voir dire examination or to conduct the eiamination itself. Ky. Rule Crim. Proc. 9.38. After jurors have been excused
for cause, the parties exercise their peremptory challenges simultaneously
by striking names from a list of qualified jurors equal to the number to be
seated plus the number of allowable peremptory challenges. Rule 9.36.
Since the offense charged in this case was a felony, and an alternate juror
was called, the prosecutor was entitled to six peremptory challenges, and
defense counsel to nine. Rule 9.40.
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The jury convicted petitioner on both counts. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner pressed,
among other claims, the argument concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. Conceding that Swain
v. Alabama, supra, apparently foreclosed an equal protection claim based solely on the prosecutor's conduct in this
case, petitioner urged the court to follow decisions of other
states, People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748
(1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N. E.
2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979), and to hold that
such conduct violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment
and Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution to a jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community. Petitioner also contended that the facts showed that the prosecutor had engaged in a "pattern" of discriminatory challenges in this case
and established an equal protection violation under Swain.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed. In a single
paragraph, the court declined petitioner's invitation to adopt
the reasoning of People v. Wheeler, supra, and Commonwealth v. Soares, supra. The court observed that it recently
had reaffirmed its reliance on Swain, and had held that a defendant alleging lack of a fair cross-section must demonstrate
systematic exclusion of a group of jurors from the venire.
See Commonwealth v. McFerron, 680 S. W. 2d 924 (1984).
We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. - - (1985), and now
reverse.
II
In Swain v. Alabama, this Court recognized that a
"State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration
of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause." 380 U. S.,
at 203-204. This principle has been "consistently and repeatedly" reaffirmed, id., at 204, in numerous decisions of
this Court both preceding and following Swain. 3 We re3

See, e. g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880); Neal v.

•
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affirm the principle today. 4

A
More than a century ago, the Court decided that the State
denies a black defendant equal protection of the laws when it
puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his
race have been purposefully excluded. Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). That decision laid the foundation for the Court's unceasing efforts to eradicate racial
discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire
from which individual jurors are drawn. In Strauder, the
Court explained that the central concern of the recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment was to put an end to governDelaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1881); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935);
Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S. 394 (1935) (per curiam); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947);
A very v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475
(1954); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389
U. S. 24 (1967) (per curiam); Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene
County , 396 U. S. 320 (1970); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977);
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. (1986).
The basic principles prohibiting exclusion of persons from participation
in jury service on account of their race "are essentially the same for grand
juries and for petit juries." Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 626,
n. 3 (1972); see Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 589 (1935). These principles are reinforced by the criminal laws of the United States. 18
u. s. c. § 243.
• In this Court, petitioner has argued that the prosecutor's conduct violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to an impartial jury and to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. Petitioner has framed his argument ·in these terms in an apparent effort to
avoid inviting the Court directly to reconsider one of its own precedents.
On the other hand, the State has insisted that petitioner is claiming a denial of equal protection and that we must reconsider Swain to find a constitutional violation on this record. We agree with the State that resolution of petitioner's claim properly turns on application of equal protection
principles and express no view on the merits of any of petitioner's Sixth
Amendment arguments.
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mental discrimination on account of race. Id., at 306-307.
Exclusion of black citizens from service as jurors constitutes
a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment
was designed to cure.
In holding that racial discrimination in jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause, the Court in Strauder
recognized, however, that a defendant has no right to a "petit
jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race."
I d., at 305. 5 "The number of our races and nationalities
stands in the way of evolution of such a conception" of the demand of equal protection. Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398,
403 (1945). 6 But the defendant does have the right to be
tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria. Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 321
(1906); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880). The
Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the
State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, Strauder, supra, at 305, 7 or on the
false assumption that members of his race as a group are not
qualified to serve as jurors, see Norris v. Alabama, 294
U. S. 587, 599 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 397
(1881).
5

See Hernandez v. Texas , supra, at 482; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S.
282, 286-287 (1950) (plurality opinion); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403
(1945); Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 321 (1906); Neal v. Delaware,
supra, at 394.
6
Similarly, though the Sixth Amendment guarantees that the petit jury
will be selected from a pool of names representing a cross-section of the
community, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), we have never held
that the Sixth Amendment requires that "petit juries actually chosen must
mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the
population," id., at 538. Indeed, it would be impossible to apply a concept
of proportional representation to the petit jury in view of the heterogeneous nature of our society. Such impossibility is illustrated by the
Court's holding that a jury of six persons is not unconstitutional. Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 102-103 (1970).
7
See Hernandez v. Texas, supra, at 482; Cassell v. Texas, supra, at
287; Akins v. Texas , supra, at 403; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., at 394.

•
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Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire
violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure. "The very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or
summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as
that which he holds." Strauder, supra, at 308; see Carter v.
Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 U. S. 320, 330
(1970). The petit jury has occupied a central position in our
system of justice by safeguarding a person accused of crime
against the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or
judge. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 156 (1968). 8
Those on the venire must be "indifferently chosen," 9 to secure the defendant's right under the Fourteenth Amendment
to "protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice." Strauder, supra, at 309.
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only
the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try.
8
See Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, at 530; Williams v. Florida, supra,
at 100. See also Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1
(1966).
In Duncan v. Louisiana, decided after Swain, the Court concluded that
the right to trial by jury in criminal cases was such a fundamental feature
of the American system of justice that it was protected against state action
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 391 U. S., at
147-158. The Court emphasized that a defendant's right to be tried by a
jury of his peers is designed "to prevent oppression by the Government."
!d., at 155, 156-157. For a jury to perform its intended function as a
check on official power, it must be a body drawn from the community.
·Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, at 156; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S.
60, 86-88 (1942). By compromising the representative quality of the jury,
discriminatory selection procedures make "juries ready weapons for officials to oppress those accused individuals who by chance are numbered
among unpopular or inarticulate minorities." Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S.,
at 408 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
9
4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 349 (Cooley ed. 1899) (quoted in Duncan v. Lousiana, supra, at 152).
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Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to
consider evidence presented at a trial. See Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 223-224 (1946). A person's
race simply "is unrelated to his fitness as a juror." I d., at
227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). As long ago as Strauder,
therefore, the Court recognized that by denying a person
participation in jury service on account of his race, the State
unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror.
100 U. S., at 308; see Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene
County, supra, at 329-330; Neal v. Delaware, supra, at 386.
The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to
touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. See
Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, 195 (1946); McCray
v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, 968 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Discrimination within the
judicial system is most pernicious because it is "a stimulant to
that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to
[black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others." Strauder, supra, at 308.
B

In Strauder, the Court invalidated a state statute that provided that only white men could serve as jurors. 100 U. S.,
at 305. We can be confident that no state now has such a
law. The Constitution requires, however, that we look beyond the face of the statute defining juror qualifications and
also consider challenged selection practices to afford "protection against action of the State through its administrative officers in effecting the prohibited discrimination." Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U. S., at 589; see Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U. S. 475, 478-479 (1954); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., at
346-347. Thus, the Court has found a denial of equal protec-
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tion where the procedures implementing a neutral statute operated to exclude persons from the venire on racial grounds, 10
and has made clear that the Constitution prohibits all forms
of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of jurors. 11
While decisions of this Court have been concerned largely
with discrimination during selection of the venire, the principles announced there also forbid discrimination on account
of race in selection of the petit jury. Since the Fourteenth
Amendment protects an accused throughout the proceedings
bringing him to justice, Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 406
(1942), the State may not draw up its jury lists pursuant to
neutral procedures but then resort to discrimination at "other
stages in the selection process," Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S.
559, 562 (1953); see McCray v. New York, supra, at 965, 968
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 632 (1972).
Accordingly, the component of the jury selection process at
issue here, the State's privilege to strike individual jurors
through peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands
of the Equal Protection Clause. 12 Although a prosecutor orE. g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404, 407 (1967) (per curiam); Whitus
v. Georgia, 385 U. S., at 548-549; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S., at 561.
11
See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S., at 589; Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S.,
at 319; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., at 394, 397.
12
We express no views on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on
the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel.
Nor do we express any views on the techniques used by lawyers who
seek to obtain information about the community in which a case is to be
tried, and about members of the venire from which the jury is likely to be
drawn. See generally J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels, 183-189 (1977). Prior to
voir dire examination, which serves as the basis for exercise of challenges,
lawyers wish to know as much as possible about prospective jurors, including their age, education, employment, and economic status, so that they
can ensure selection of jurors who at least have an open mind about the
case. In some jurisdictions, where a pool of jurors serves for a substantial
period of time, see J. Van Dyke, supra, at 116-118, counsel also may seek
to learn which members of the pool served on juries in other cases and the
10
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dinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges "for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related
to his view concerning the outcome" of the case to be tried,
United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 473 (Conn.
1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United States v. Newman, 549 F. 2d 240 (CA2 1977), the Equal Protection Clause
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on
account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as \
a group will be unable impartially to consider the state's case
against a black defendant. 13

III
The principles announced in Strauder never have been
questioned in any subsequent decision of this Court.
Rather, the Court has been called upon repeatedly to review
the application of those principles to particular facts. 14 A recurring question in these cases, as in any case alleging a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, was whether the
defendant had met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination on the part of the State. Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U. 8., at 550; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. 8., at 478-481;
outcome of those cases. Counsel even may employ professional investigators to interview persons who have served on a particular petit jury. We
have had no occasion to consider particularly this practice. Of course,
counsel's efforts to obtain possibly relevant information about prospective
jurors is to be distinguised from the practice at issue here.
3
' We note that, in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), the Court
viewed Alabama's peremptory challenge practice, when properly exercised, as serving to eliminate a potential juror for reasons related to the
"context of the case to be tried." I d., at 221; see id., at 224. Moreover,
the decision left no doubt that the Equal Protection Clause forbade a prosecutor to strike black jurors on account of their race. I d., at 223-224.
"See, e. g., Vasquez v. Hillery , 474 U. S. - - (1986); Rose v. Mitchell,
443 U. S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U. S. 545, 549-550 (1967); Swain v. Alabama, supra, at 205; Coleman v.
Alabama, 377 U. S. 129 (1964); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 589
(1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., at 394.

tr/(
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Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., at 403-404; Martin v. Texas, 200
U. S. 316 (1906). That question also was at the heart of the
portion of Swain v. Alabama we reexamine today. 15
A
Swain required the Court to decide, among other issues,
whether a black defendant was denied equal protection by
the State's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude
members of his race from the petit jury. 380 U. S., at
209-210. The record in Swain showed that the prosecutor
had used the State's peremptory challenges to strike the six
black persons included on the petit jury venire. I d., at 210.
While rejecting the defendant's claim for failure to prove purposeful discrimination, the Court nonetheless indicated that
the Equal Protection Clause placed some limits on the State's
exercise of peremptory challenges. I d., at 222-224.
The Court sought to accommodate the prosecutor's historical privilege of peremptory challenge free of judicial control,
id., at 214-220, and the constitutional prohibition on exclusion of persons from jury service on account of race, id., at
222-224. While the Constitution does not confer a right to
15
The decision in Swain has been the subject of extensive commentary.
Some authors have argued that the Court should reconsider the decision.
E. g., J . Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels 166-167 (1977); Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 247,
268-270 (1973); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 235, 283-303 (1968); Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1357 (1985); Note, Peremptory ChallengeSystematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss.
L. J. 157 (1967); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint
for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1157 (1966).
See also Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
1611 (1985).
On the other hand, some commentators have argued that we should adhere to Swain. See Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the
Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 Md. L. Rev.
337 (1982).
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peremptory challenges, id., at 219 (citing Stilson v. United
States, 250 U. S. 583, 586 (1919)), those challenges traditionally have been viewed as one means of assuring the selection
of a qualified and unbiased jury, 380 U.S., at 219. 16 To preserve the peremptory nature of the prosecutor's challenge,
the Court in Swain declined to scrutinize his actions in a particular case by relying on a presumption that he properly exercised the State's challenges. I d., at 221-222.
The Court went on to observe, however, that a state may
not exercise its challenges in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. It was impermissible for a prosecutor to use
his challenges to exclude blacks from the jury "for reasons
wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on
trial" or to deny to blacks "the same right and opportunity to
participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the
white population." Id. , at 224. Accordingly, a black defendant could make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination on proof that the peremptory challenge system
was "being perverted" in that manner. Ibid. For example,
an inference of purposeful discrimination would be raised on
evidence that a prosecutor, "in case after case, whatever the
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of
Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the
jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for
cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries." Id., at 223. Evidence offered by the defendant in
Swain was insufficient because, though showing that prosecutors in the jurisdiction had exercised their strikes to exelude blacks from the jury, it did not demonstrate the circumstances under which prosecutors were responsible for
16
In Swain, the Court reviewed the "very old credentials" of the peremptory challenge system and noted the "long and widely held belief that
peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury." 380 U. S. , at
219; see id., at 212-219.

I

()

1'-u
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striking black jurors beyond the facts of the defendant's case.
!d. , at 224-228.
A number of lower courts following the teaching of Swain
reasoned that proof of repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases was necessary to establish a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. 17 Since this interpretation of Swain
has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, 18 prosecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely immune from
constitutional scrutiny. For reasons that follow, we reject
this evidentiary formulation as inconsistent with standards
that have been developed since Swain for assessing a prima
facie case under the Equal Protection Clause.
B

Since the decision in Swain, we have explained that our
cases concerning selection of the venire reflect the general
equal protection principle that the "invidious quality" of governmental action claimed to be racially discriminatory "must
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."
17
E . g., United States v. Jenkins , 701 F. 2d 850, 859-860 (CAlO 1983);
United States v. Boykin, 679 F. 2d 1240, 1245 (CA8 1982); United States v.
Pearson, 448 F. 2d 1207, 1213-1218 (CA5 1971); Thigpen v. State , 49 Ala.
App. 233, 270 So. 2d 666, 673 (1972); Jackson v. State, 245 Ark. 331, 432
S. W. 2d 876, 878 (1968); Johnson v. Maryland, 9 Md. App. 143, 262 A. 2d
792, 796-797 (1970); State v. Johnson, 125 N. J. Super. 438, 311 A. 2d 389
(1973) (per curiam); State v. Shaw, 284 N. C. 366, 200 S. E. 2d 585 (1973).
18
See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F . 2d 1113, 1120, and n. 2 (CA2 1984),
cert. pending, No. 84-1426. The lower courts have noted the practical difficulties of proving that the State systematically has exercised peremptory
challenges to exclude blacks from the jury on account of race. As the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed, the defendant would have
to investigate, over a number of cases, the race of persons tried in the particular jurisdiction, the racial composition of the venire and petit jury, and
the manner in which both parties exercised their peremptory challenges.
United States v. Pearson , 448 F. 2d 1207, 1217 (CA51971). The court believed this burden to be "most difficult" to meet. Ibid. In jurisdictions
where court records do not reflect the jurors' race and where voir dire proceedings are not transcribed, the burden would be insurmountable. See
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748, 767-768 (1978).

.I
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Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 240 (1976). As in any
equal protection case, the "burden is, of course," on the defendant who alleges discriminatory selection of the venire "to
prove the existence of purposeful discrimination." Whitus
v. Georgia, 385 U. S., at 550 (citing Tarrance v. Florida, 188
U. S. 519 (1903)). In deciding if the defendant has carried
his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake "a sensitive
inqui..!"Y into such circumstantial and direct evidehce of intent
as may be available." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266
(1977). Circumstantial evidence of invidious intent may include proof of disproportionate impact. Washington v.
Davis, 426 U. S., at 242. We have observed that under
some circumstances proof of discriminatory impact "may for
all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds." Ibid. For example,
"total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes
from jury venires," ibid., "is itself such an 'unequal application of the law ... as to show intentional discrimination,'"
id., at 241 (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., at 404).
Moreover, since Swain, we have recognized that a black
defendant alleging that members of his race have been impermissibly excluded from the venire may make out a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. Washington v. Davis, supra, at
239-242. Once the defendant makes the requisite showing,
the burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial
exclusion. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 632. The
State cannot meet this burden on mere general assertions
that its officials did not discriminate or that they properly
performed their official duties. See Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, at 632; Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24, 25 (1967).
Rather, the State must demonstrate that "permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced
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the monochromatic result." Alexander v. Louisiana, supra,
at 632; see Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241. 19
The showing necessary to establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in selection of the venire may be
discerned in this Court's decisions. E. g., Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 494-495 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, at 631-632. The defendant initially must show
that he is a member of a racial group capable of being singled
out for differential treatment. Castaneda v. Partida,
supra, at 494. In combination with that evidence, a defendant may then make a prima facie case by proving that in the
particular jurisdiction members of his race have not been
summoned for jury service over an extended period of time.
I d., at 494. Proof of systematic exclusion from the venire
raises an inference of purposeful discrimination because the
"result bespeaks discrimination." Hernandez v. Texas,
supra, at 482; see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., supra, at 266.
Since the ultimate issue is whether the State has discriminated in selecting the defendant's venire, however, the defendant may establish a prima facie case "in other ways than
by evidence of long-continued unexplained absence" of members of his race "from many panels." Cassell v. Texas, 339
U. S. 282, 290 (1950) (plurality opinion). In cases involving
the venire, this Court has found a prima facie case on proof
that members of the defendant's race were substantially underrepresented on the venire from which his jury was drawn,
and that the venire was selected under a practice providing
"the opportunity for discrimination." Whitus v. Georgia,
Our decisions in the context of Title VII "disparate treatment" have
explained tpe operation of prima facie burden of proof rules. See M cDonnell Douglas Corp. v. GTeen , 411 U. S. 792 (1973); Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981); United States Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711 (1983). The party
alleging that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination carries the
ultimate burden of persuasion. Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, supra, at 252-256.
'

9
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385 U. S., at 552; see Castaneda v. Partida, supra, at 494;
Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241; Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, at 629-631. This combination of factors raises

the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination because
the Court has declined to attribute to chance the absence of
black citizens on a particular jury array where the selection
mechanism is subject to abuse. When circumstances suggest the need, the trial court must undertake a "factual inquiry'' that "takes into account all possible explanatory factors" in the particular case. Alexander v. Louisiana, supra,
at 630.
Thus, since the decision in Swain, this Court has recognized that a defendant may make a prima facie showing of
purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by
relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case.
These decisions are in accordance with the proposition, articulated in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.,
that "a consistent pattern of official racial discrimination" is
not "a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. A single invidiously discriminatory governmental act" is not "immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions."
429 U. S., at 266, n. 14. For evidentiary requirements to
dictate that "several must suffer discrimination" before one
could object, McCray v. New York, 461 U. S., at 965 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all. 2Q

c
The standards for _assessing a prima facie case in the context of discriminatory selection of the venire have been fully
articulated since Swain. See Castaneda v. Partida, supra,
20

Decisions under Title VII also recognize that a person claiming that he
has been the victim of intentional discrimination may make out a prima
facie case by relying 'solely on the facts concerning the alleged discrimination against him. See cases at supra, n. 19.
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at 494-495; Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241-242; Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, at 629-631. These principles support our conclusion that a defendant may establish a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit
jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise
of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a
member of a cognizable racial group, Castaneda v. Partida,
supra, at 494, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the
defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely
on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." Avery v. Georgia, supra, at 562. Finally, the
defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used
that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on
account of their race. This combination of factors in the
em panelling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire,
raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.
In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite
showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. For example, a "pattern" of strikes against black
jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an
inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's
questions and statements during voir dire examination and in
exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference
of discriminatory purpose. These examples are merely illustrative. We have confidence that trial judges, experienced
in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against
black jurors.
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral

;../ •

•
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explanation for challenging black jurors. Though this requirement imposes a limitation in some cases on the full peremptory character of the historic challenge, we emphasize
that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level
justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. See McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F. 2d, at 1132; Booker v. Jabe, 775 F. 2d 762,
773 (CA6 1985), cert. pending 85-1028. But the prosecutor
may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to the defendant simply
because of their shared race. Cf. Norris v. Alabama, 294
U. S., at 598-599; see Thompson v. United States, - U. S. - - , - - (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's case
by simply denying that he had a discriminatory motive or "affirming his good faith in individual selections." Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 632. If these general assertions \
were accepted as rebutting a defendant's prima facie case,
the Equal Protection Clause "would be but a vain and illusory
requirement." Norris v. Alabama, supra, at 598. The
prosecutor therefore must articulate a neutral explanation
related to the particular case to be tried. 21 The trial court
then
will
have
the
duty
to
determine if the defendant has established purposeful
discrimination. 22

I

21

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F. 2d, at 1132, that "[t]here are any number of bases" on
which a prosecutor reasonably may believe that it is desirable to strike a
juror who is not excusable for cause. As we explained in another context,
however, the prosecutor must give a "clear and reasonably specific" explanation of his "legitimate reasons" for exercising the challenges. Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 258 (1981).
22
In a recent Title VII sex discrimination case, we stated that "a finding
of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact" entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S . (1985). Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration

..
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IV
The State contends that our holding will eviscerate the fair
trial values served by the peremptory challenge. Conce mg
that the Constitution does not guarantee a right to peremptory challenges and that Swain did state that their use ultimately is subject to the strictures of equal protection, the
State argues that the privilege of unfettered exercise of the
challenge is of vital importance to the criminal justice
system.
While we recognize, of course, that the peremptory cha~

lenge occupies an important position in our trial procedures
we do not agree tnat Oti?clec 1 to a Will unaermine t
contribution the challenge generally makes to the administration of justice. The reality of practice, amply reflected in
many state and federal court opinions, shows that the challenge may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to
discriminate against black jurors. By requiring trial courts
to be sensitive to the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the mandate of equal
protection and furthers the ends of justice. In view of the
heterogeneous population of our nation, public respect for our
criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury
service because of his race.
Nor are we persuaded by the State's suggestion that our
holding will create serious administrative difficulties. In
those states applying a version of the evidentiary standard
we recognize today, courts have not experienced serious administrative burdens,23 and the peremptory challenge system
has survived. We decline, however, to formulate particular
here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference. ld., a t -.
23
For example, in People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P. 2d 854 (1983),
the California Supreme Court found that there was no evidence to show
that procedures implementing its version of this standard, imposed five
years earlier, were burdensome for trial judges.
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procedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection
to a prosecutor's challenges. 24

v
In this case, petitioner made a timely objection to the prosecutor's removal of all black persons on the venire. Because
the trial court flatly rejected the objection without requiring
the prosecutor to give an explanation for his action, we remand this case for further proceedings. If the trial court decides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a
neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require
that petitioner's conviction be reversed. E. g., Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U. S., at 549-550; Hernandez v. Texas, supra,
at 482; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S., at 469. 25

It is so ordered.

zc In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our state
and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how
best to implement our holding today. For the same reason, we express no
view on whether it is more appropriate in a particular case, upon a finding
of discrimination against black jurors, for the trial court to discharge the
venire and select a new jury from a panel not previously associated with
the case, see Booker v. Jabe, 775 F . 2d, at 773, or to disallow the discriminatory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the venire, see United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp.
467, 474 (Conn. 1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United States v. Newman, 549 F. 2d 240 (CA2 1977).
25
To the extent that anything in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202
(1965), is contrary to the principles we articulate today, that decision is
overruled.
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pect to join my opinion.
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In the draft I have circulated today, I have made
some textual changes that make explicitly clear that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to strike
black jurors simply because he believes that blacks as a
group are biased.
I have revised the sentence that caused
you concern that carries over from page 8 to page 9. Similarly, I have revised a sentence on page 17 to emphasize
that the prosecutor may not rebut a prima facie case by
stating that he struck the jur.ors because he assumed they
shared a group bias. Althouqh I have used language somewhat
different from what you proposed, I have made the same
point.
The question of standing to raise a claim of this
kind is one that has occurred to me. But I am inclined not
to mention it, as standing is not a problem in this case.
I add that I fully agree that the prosecutor would
be entitled to strike a juror where the voir dire indicated
that the juror was acquittal prone.
Sincerely,
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RSHALL, concurring in part.
I join~ rts I and II of JusTICE PowELL's eloquent opinion
·n agreement with all but the "bottom
for the C rt, and
line." The ourt's opinion cogently explains the pernicious
nature of the growing use of peremptory challenges to
achieve racially discriminatory jury selection, and the repugnancy of such discrimination to the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court's opinion also ably demonstrates the inadequacy of
any burden of proof for racially discriminatory use of
peremptories that requires that "justice ... sit supinely by
and be flaunted in case after case before a remedy is available." 1 I nonetheless write separately, because the Court's
opinion will not end the racial discrimination that
peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That
goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory
challenges entirely.
I
A little over a century ago, this Court invalidated a state
statute providing that black citizens could not serve as jurors. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880).
State officials then turned to somewhat more subtle ways of
'Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289, 299, 336 A. 2d 290, 295 (1975)
(Nix, J., dissenting), quoted in McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, 965,
n. 2 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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keeping blacks off jury venires. See Swain v. Alabama, 380
U. S. 202, 231-238 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Kuhn,
Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L. Rev. 235
(1968); see also J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures
155-157 (1977). Although the means used to exclude blacks
have changed, the same pernicious consequence has
continued.
Misuse of the peremptory challenge to exclude black jurors
has become both common and flagrant. Black defendants
rarely have been able to compile statistics showing the extent
of that practice, but the few cases setting out such figures are
instructive. See United States v. Carter, 528 F. 2d 844, 848
(CA8 1975) (in 15 criminal cases in 1974 in the Western District of Missouri involving black defendants, prosecutors peremptorily challenged 81% of bla~k jurors), cert. denied, 425
U. S. 961 (1976); United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp.
1243 (ED La. 1974) (in 53 criminal cases in 1972-1974 in Eastern District of Louisiana involving black defendants, federal
prosecutors used 68.9% of their peremptory challenges
against black jurors, who made up less than one quarter of
the venire); McKinney v. Walker, 394 F. Supp. 1015,
1017-1018 (D. S. C. 1974) (in 13 criminal trials in 1970-1971
in Spartansburg County, South Carolina involving black defendants, prosecutors peremptorily challenged 82% of black
jurors), aff'd mem., 529 F. 2d 516 (CA4 1975). 2 Prosecutors
have explained to courts that they routinely strike black jurors, see State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162, 1163-1164
(La. 1979). An instruction book used by the prosecutor's office in Dallas County, Texas, explicitly advised prosecutors
that they conduct jury selection so as to eliminate "any mem2

See also Harris v. Texas,- U.S.- (1984) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Williams v. Illinois, 466 U. S. 981 (1984)
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Comment, A Case
Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protection
and Due Process, 18 St. Louis Univ. L. J. 662 (1974).
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her of a minority group." Van Dyke, supra, at 152, quoting
Texas Observer, May 11, 1973, at 9.
The Court's discussion of the utter unconstitutionality of
that practice needs no amplification. This Court explained
more than a century ago that "in the selection of jurors to
pass upon [a defendant's] life, liberty or property, there shall
be no exclusion of his race and no discrimination against
them, because of their color." Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S.
370, 394 (1881), quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 323
(1880). Exclusion of blacks from a jury, solely because of
their race, can no more be justified by a belief that blacks are
less likely than whites to consider fairly or sympathetically
the State's case against a black defendant than it can be justified by a belief that blacks lack the "intelligence, experience,
or moral integrity," Neal, supra, at 397, to be entrusted with
that role.
II
I wholeheartedly concur in the Court's conclusion that use
of the peremptory challenge to remove blacks from juries, on
the basis of their race, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I would go further, however, in fashioning a rem~de
quat~t discrimination. Merely alfowing defen ants the opportunity to challenge the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in individual cases will not
end the illegitimate use of the peremptory challenge.
The evidentiary analysis set out by the Court, ante, at 17,
has been adopted as a matter of state law in States including
Massachusetts and California. Cases from those jurisdictions illustrate the limitations of the approach. ~t, defendants cannot attack the discriminato use of eremptory
challenges at all unless the c allenges are so flagrant as to establis a r1 a
1e cas .
1 m ans, or example, that
where on y o or o ack jurors survive the challenges for
cause, the prosecutor need have no compunction about striking them from the jury because of their race. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 415 N. E. 2d 805, 809-810 (Mass. 1981)

. ---·-- ·--- ·- ··- ·-·---------
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(no prima facie case of discrimination where defendant is
black, prospective jurors include three blacks and one Puerto
Rican, and prosecutor excludes one for cause and strikes the
remainder peremptorily, producing all-white jury); People v.
Rousseau, 129 Cal. App. 3d 526, 536-537, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (no prima facie case where prosecutor
peremptorily strikes only two blacks on jury panel). Prosecutors are left free to discriminate against blacks in jury
selection provided that t~ey hold !hat di~rimination..1Q_an
"acceptable" level.
~a defendant can establish a prima facie case,
the Court's approach places on trial courts the difficult burden of assessing prosecutors' motives. See King v. County
of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 501-02 (ED NY 1984). Any
prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill-equipped to second-guess
those reasons. How is the court to treat a prosecutor's
statement that he struck a juror because the juror had a son
about the same age as defendant, see People v. Hall, 35
Cal.3d 161, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 672 P. 2d 854 (1983), or seemed
"uncommunicative," King, supra, at 498, or "never cracked a
smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitivities necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide the facts in
this case," Hall, 672 P. 2d, at 856. If such easily generated
explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's obligation to justify his strikes on non-racial grounds, then the
protection erected by the Court today may be illusory.
anNor is
· ht revarication by rosec tors
ger he,re. "[l]t is even possi e that an attorney mcur lie to
himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives are
legal." King, supra, at 502. A prosecutor's own conscious
or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion
that a prospective black juror is "sullen," or "distant," a
characterization that wuld not have come to his mind if a
white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious
or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an ex-

/'f1
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planation as well-supported. Even if all parties approach
the Court's mandate with the best of conscious intentions,
that maiidatei="eciUire; them to confront and overcome their
own racism on alll evelS--"aCi1a!Ienge I 00u.6t airof t hem can
me~emembering that "114 years after the
close of the War Between the States and nearly 100 years
after Strauder, racial and otherforms of discrimination still
remain a fact of life, in the administration of justice as in our
society as a whole." Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545,
558-559 (1979), quoted in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. - - ,
-

(1986).

III
The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort
the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should lead the Court to ban them entirely from
the criminal justice system. See Van Dyke, supra, at
167-169; Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 247, 269-270 (1973).
Justice Goldberg, dissenting in Swain, emphasized that
"[w]ere it necessary to make an absolute choice between the
right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a
choice of the former." 380 U. S., at 244. · I believe that this
case presents just such a choice, and I would resolve that
choice by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely in criminal cases.
Some authors have suggested that the courts might ban
prosecutors' peremptories entirely, while zealously guarding
the defendant's peremptory as "essential to the fairness of
trial by jury," Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370, 376
(1892), and "one of the most important of the rights secured
to the accused," Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 396, 408
(1894). See Van Dyke, supra, at 167; Brown, McGuire, &
Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 New

I

, --

,----
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Eng. L. Rev. 192 (1978). I would not find that an acceptable
answer. Our criminal justice system "requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any
prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the
State the scales are to be evenly held." Hayes v. Missouri,
120 U. S. 68, 70 d 887). Respondent argues that the need to
maintain that balance counsels against any limitation on prosecutors' use of the peremptory challenge. We should maintain that balance, however, not by permitting both prosecutor and defendant to engage in racial discrimination in jury
selection, but by banning the use of peremptory challenges
by prosecutors and by allowing the States to eliminate the
defendant's peremptory as well.
Much ink has been spilled regarding the historic importance of defendants' peremptory challenges. The approving
comments of the Lewis and Pointer Courts are noted above;
the Swain Court emphasized the "very old credentials" of the
peremptory challenge, 380 U. S. at 212, and cited the "long
and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury." !d., at 219. But this Court has
also repeatedly stated that the right of peremptory challenge
is not of Constitutional magnitude, and may be withheld altogether without impairing the Constitutional guarantee of impartial jury and fair trial. Frazier v. United States, 335
U. S. 497, 505, n. 11 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U. S.
123, 145 (1936); Stilson v. United States, 250 U. S. 583, 586
(1919); see also Swain, supra, at 219. If the prosecutor's
peremptory challenge can be eliminated only at the cost of
eliminating the defendant's challenge as well, I do not think
that is too great a price to pay.
I applaud the Court's holding that the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause. However, only by banning peremptories entirely can such discrimination be ended. Accordingly, I
concur in only part of the opinion of the Court.

Supreme Court of the United States
Memorandum

tall's concurring opinion in this
hat most of his opinion merits no
This reaction is based largely on my belief
that the concurring opinion depends on Justice Marshall's partieular view of the world, namely, that people cannot overcome their
own racism.
of

human

With respect,

nature,

but
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I

I disagree with that pessimistic view

think

that
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be gained

from

Moreover, Justice Marshall's remedy is so ex-

treme and so out of line with the case law (namely, by in effect
presuming that prosecutors are racially biased)
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But I think that Part Il of Justice Marshall's opinion may
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With your permission, 1 would like to call the clerk

who worked on Justice Marshall's opinion, point out the mischief
that the concurring opinion may work in the lower courts, and ask
him to consider some changes.

If they refuse to make changes, it

may be worthwhile for you to drop a footnote, perhaps not referring directly to the concurrence, that makes plain that prosecutors cannot avoid
discrimination at
it.

the mandate of your opinion by keeping their
"acceptable

levels," as Justice Marshall puts

lfp/ss 02j20j86

Rider A, p.

(Batson)

BATB SALLY-POW
Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion,
agrees with much that we have said.

He would go further,

however, and "eliminat[e] peremptory challenges entirely
in criminal cases".

As this Court has held that the

Constitution does not grant the right of peremptory
challenge (see,

~cite

cases), presumably Justice

Marshall would have this Court exercise its supervisory
power to end such challenges in federal courts.

We

decline to disapprove the use of peremptory challenges
that since colonial times(?) have been a feature of our
jury trial system.

It has been recognized generally that

the right to challenge peremptorily has contributed to the
selection of fair and impartial juries.

(citation)

2.

Nor do we agree with the view of Justice Marshall
that trial judges, in light of today's decision, will not
be able to exercise oversight of the use of challenges to
assure that they are not racially motivated.

The fact

that motivation often is subjective is not a reason for
abolishing the use of a procedure that have well served
our system of criminal justice.

We certainly do not share

the view that prosecutors, in order to circumvent this
Court's decision will engage in covert discrimination
J

including "outright prevarication".

Infra, at p. 4.

Finally, the procedures outlined above have not been found
to impose responsibilities on trial judges that they
cannot reasonably discharge.

See People v. Hall, 35

Calif. 3rd 162, 672 P.2d 854 (1983).
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February 21, 1986
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky
My tentative view of how best to respond to Justice Mar-

shall's concurring opinion would be to insert a footnote in your
opinion

(in

the

section

describing

the

evidentiary

standard),

along the lines of the second page of the footnote that you propose and

to add one sentence concluding that there is no basis

for rejecting perernptories altogether.

Justice Marshall's views

are so extreme that 1 feel that we need spend few words defending
your opinion from them.

1 also feel strongly that the language

we use should not sound defensive.

Please consider the following

language:

"We

• <
firmly

/
believe

that

trial

judges,

complying

with

today's decision, will be able to exercise reasonable oversight
of the exercise of challenges to assure that prosecutors do not
strike jurors on account of race.
inquiry turns

The fact that the appropriate

in some sense on the prosecutor's rnoti vat ion pro-

vides no support for abolishing a trial practice that has served
well

our

system of

cr irninal

justice.

Trial
~

judges
/.

t

frequently

page 2 .

.
must
gives

evaluate
rise

8i!'Jj e: e tz ive

to an

evidence

inference

of

in

order

to determine

invidious purpose.

if

it

We also are

confident that prosecutors will fulfill their constitutional duty
as described ig th's
based

o

1'1'-k't~

eutral

pinion to ensure that their challenges are

reasons

related

to the case

to be tried.

In

this way, consistently with the requirements of the Constitution,
challenges will continue to serve their purpose in the selection
of an impartial jury."
As 1 mentioned in my previous memo regarding Justice Marshall's opinion, Justice Brennan's law clerk is hopeful that Justice Marshall can be persuaded to add language showing that your
opinion should not be
tion by prosecutors.
vise your opinion.

interpreted as permitting easy circumvenIf he does, maybe you will not need to re-

•
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Anne

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 26, 1986

84-6263 Batson
Although

your

draft

of

a

possible

footnote

in

response to Justice Marshall's opinion is quite good, I am
inclined to be somewhat more conclusory.

His views are so

extreme that I prefer not to dignify them by an elaborate
response.

Bill

Brennan,

in

view

of

his

Justice Marshall on criminal law matters,

closeness

to

may well write

anyway.
will

I

now

dictate

a

rough

draft

that you

can

improve:

"We do not share the views expressed in Justice

prosecutorial
The

today.

concurring

opinion,

Marshall's

and

judicial

standard

we

in

enforcement
adopt

part,

as

of

our

holding

the

federal

under

to

Constitution is designed to ensure that a state does not
use peremptory challenges for the purpose of striking any
black

juror

believe,

as

because
the

of

his

race.

concurring

We

have

opinion

no reason

suggests,

to

that

/

2.

prosecutors will not fulfill

their duty touse peremptory

challenges only for legitimate purposes.

Certainly,

Court

supervising

may

assume

that

trial

judges,

in

this
the

voir dire in light of our decision today, will identify a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.

Peremptory

challenges have long served their purpose of facilitating
the
that

selection of an
the

because

of

use
an

of

impartial
such

jury.

challenges

apprehension

that

We

reject

should

be

prosecutors

judges will not conscientiously perform their
duties under the Constitution."

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

the view
abolished
and

trial

respective
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CHAMBERS OF
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JUSTICE SANDR A D AY O'CO NNO R

March 3, 1986

No. 84-6263

Batson v. Kentucky

Dear Lewis,
I have decided not to write separately by
way of a concurring opinion in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

March 6, 1986
Dear Mr. Lind,
Thank you for sendin me the draft syllabus in No. 846263, Batson v. Kentucky. I have marked on t;e draft several changes. I al o am sending you two copies of the third
draft of the opinion so t at you can decide if the syllabus
requires further revision .
Sincere y,

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Rehnquist

Circulated: ------==----,----- - -

MAR

7 1986
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2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No.

84-6263

JAMES KIRKLAND BATSON, PETITIONER
v. KENTUCKY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF KENTUCKY
[March - ,

1986]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
The Court states, in the opening line of its opinion, that
this case involves only a reexamination of that portion of
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), concerning "the evidentiary burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims
that he has been denied equal protection through the State's
use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of his race
from the petit jury." Ante, at 1 (footnote omitted). But in
reality the majority opinion deals with much more than "evidentiary burden[s]." With little discussion and less analysis, /
the Court also overrules one of the fundamental substantive
holdings of Swain, namely, that the State may use its peremptory challenges to remove from the jury, on a case-specific basis, prospective jurors of the same race as the defendant. Because I find the Court's rejection of this holding both
ill-considered and unjustifiable under established principles
of equal protection, I dissent.
In Swain, this Court carefully distinguished two possible
scenarios involving the State's use of its peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from juries in criminal cases. In
part III of the majority opinion, the Swain Court concluded
that the first of these scenarios, namely, the exclusion of
blacks "for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the
particular case on trial ... to deny Negroes the same right ·
and opportunity to participate in the adminstration of justice
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enjoyed by the white population," id., at 224, might violate
the guarantees of equal protection. See id., at 222-228.
The Court felt that the important and historic purposes of the
peremptory challenge were not furthered by the exclusion of
blacks "in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may
be." !d., at 223 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the Court
ultimately held that "the record in this case is not sufficient to
demonstrate that th[is] rule has been violated ....
Petitioner has the burden of proof and he has failed to carry
it." I d., at 224, 226. Three Justices dissented, arguing that
the petitioner's evidentiary burden was satisfied by testimony that no black had ever served on a petit jury in the relevant county. See id., at 228-247 (Goldberg, J., joined by
Warren, C. J., and Douglas, J., dissenting).
Significantly, the Swain Court reached a very different
conclusion with respect to the second kind of peremptorychallenge scenario. In part II of its opinion, the Court held
that the State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude
blacks from a particular jury based the assumption or belief
that they would be more likely to favor a black defendant
does not violate equal protection. I d., at 209-222. JUSTICE
WHITE, writing for the Court, explained:
"While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on
a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable
basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for
a real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S.
68, 70 [xxxx]. It is often exercised upon the 'sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to
conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another,'
Lewis [v. United States, 146 U. S. 370,] 376 [xxxx], upon
a juror's 'habits and associations,' Hayes v. Missouri,
supra, at 70, or upon the feeling that 'the bare questioning [a juror's] indifference may sometimes provoke a re-
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sentment,' Lewis, supra, at 376. It is no less frequently
exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to
legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people
summoned for jury duty. For the question a prosecutor
or defense counsel must decide is not whether a juror of
a particular race or nationality is in fact partial, but
whether one from a different group is less likely to be.
Hence veniremen are not always judged solely as
individuals for the purpose of exercising peremptory
challenges. Rather they are challenged in light of the
limited knowledge counsel has of them, which may include their group affiliations, in the context of the case
to be tried.
With these considerations in mind, we cannot hold that
the striking of Negroes in a particular case is a denial of
equal protection of the laws. In the quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant and
Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without
cause. To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands and traditional standards of
the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical
change in the nature and operation of the challenge.
The challenge, pro tanto, would no longer be peremptory
" ld., at 220-222 (emphasis added; footnotes
omitted).
At the beginning of part III of the opinion, the Swain Court
reiterated: "We have decided that it is permissible to insulate
from inquiry the removal of Negroes from a particular jury
on the assumption that the prosecutor is acting on ·acceptable
considerations related to the case he is trying, the particular
defendant involved and the particular crime charged." I d.,
at 223 (emphasis added).
Even the Swain dissenters did not take issue with the majority's position that the Equal Protection Clause does not
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prohibit the State from using its peremptory challenges to
exclude blacks based on the assumption or belief that they
would be partial to a black defendant. The dissenters emphasized that their view concerning the evidentiary burden
facing a defendant who alleges an equal protection claim
based on the State's use of peremptory challenges "would
[not] mean that where systematic exclusion of Negroes from
jury service has not been shown, a prosecutor's motives are
subject to question or judicial inquiry when he excludes Negroes or any other group from sitting on a jury in a particular case." ld., at 245 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
The Court today asserts, however, that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely . . . on the assumption that black jurors as a group
will be unable impartially to consider the state's case against
a black defendant." Ante, at 9. Later, in discussing the
State's need to establish a nondiscriminatory basis for striking blacks from the jury, the Court states that "the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the
defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to the defendant simply because of their shared race." Ante, at 17. Neither of these
statements has anything to do with the "evidentiary burden"
necessary to establish an equal protection claim in this context, and both statements are directly contrary to the view of
the Equal Protection Clause shared by the majority and the
dissenters in Swain. Yet the Court in the instant case offers
absolutely no analysis in support of its decision to overrule
Swain in this regard, and in fact does not discuss part II of
the Swain opinion at all.
I cannot subscribe to the Court's unprecedented use of the
Equal Protection Clause to restrict the historic scope of the
peremptory challenge, which has been described as "a neces-

/CJ

'

84-6263-DISSENT
BATSON v. KENTUCKY

5

sary part of trial by jury." Swain, supra, at 219. In my
view, there is simply nothing "unequal" about the State using
its peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury in
cases involving black defendants, so long as such challenges
are also used to exclude whites in cases involving white defendants, Hispanics in cases involving Hispanic defendants,
Asians in cases involving Asian defendants, and so on. This
case-specific use of peremptory challenges by the State does
not single out blacks, or members of any other race for that
matter, for discriminatory treatment. 1 Such use of
peremptories is at best based upon seat-of-the-pants instincts, which are undoubtedly crudely stereotypical and may
in many cases be hopelessly mistaken. But as long as they
are applied across the board to jurors of all races and nationalities, I do not see-and the Court most certainly has not explained-how their use violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Nor does such use of peremptory challenges by the State
infringe upon any other constitutional interests. The Court
does not suggest that exclusion of blacks from the jury
through the State's use of peremptory challenges results in a
violation of either the fair cross-section or impartiality component of the Sixth Amendment. See ante, at 4, n. 4. And
because the case-specific use of peremptory challenges by the
State does not deny blacks the right to serve as jurors in
cases involving non-black defendants, it harms neither the
excluded jurors nor the remainder of the community. See
ante, at 6-7.
The use of group affiliations, such as age, race, or occupation, as a "proxy" for potential juror partiality, based on the
1
I note that the Court does not rely on the argument that, because there
ru:e fewer "minorities" in a given population than there are "majorities,"
the equal use of peremptory challenges against members of "majority" and
"minority" racial groups has an unequal impact. The flaws in this argument are demonstrated in Judge Garwood's thoughtful opinion for the en
bane Fifth Circuit in United States v. Leslie,- F. 2d ,(CA5

1986).

\
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assumption or belief that members of one group are more
likely to favor defendants who belong to the same group, has
long been accepted as a legitimate basis for the State's exercise of peremptory challenges. See Swain, supra; United
States v. Leslie,-- F. 2d - - (CA5 1986) (en bane); United
States v. Carter, 528 F. 2d 844 (CA 8 1975), cert. denied, 425
U. S. 961 (1976). Indeed, given the need for reasonable
limitations on the time devoted to voir dire, the use of such
"proxies" by both the State and the defendant 2 may be extremely useful in eliminating from the jury persons who
might be biased in one way or another. The Court today
holds that the State may not use its peremptory challenges to
strike black prospective jurors on this basis without violating
the Constitution. But I do not believe there is anything in
the Equal Protection Clause, or any other constitutional provision, that justifies such a departure from the substantive
holding contained in part II of Swain. Petitioner in the instant case failed to make a sufficient showing to overcome the
presumption announced in Swain that the State's use of peremptory challenges was related to the context of the case.
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the court below.

2

See, e. g., Commonwealth v. DiMatteo , 12 Mass. App. 547, 427 N. E.
2d 754 (1982) (under State constitution, trial judge properly rejected white
defendant's attempted peremptory challenge of black prospective juror).

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan

Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice White

Circulated: __
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-6263
JAMES KIRKLAND BATSON, PETITIONER
v. KENTUCKY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF KENTUCKY
[March - , 1986]

JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.
The Court overturns the principal holding in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), that the Constitution does notrequire in any given case an inquiry into the prosecutor's reasons for using his peremptory challenges to strike blacks
from the petit jury panel in the criminal trial of a black defendant _fojld that in such a case it will be presumed that the
prosecutor is acting for legitimate trial-related reasons. The
Court now rules that such use of peremptory challenges in a
given case may, but does not necessarily, raise an inference,
which the prosecutor carries the burden of refuting, that his
strikes were based on the belief that no black citizen could be
a satisfactory juror or fairly try a black defendant.
I agree that, to this extent, Swain should be overruled. I
do so because Swain itself indicated that the presumption of
legitimacy with respect to the striking of black venire persons could be overcome by evidence that over a period of time
the prosecution had consistently excluded blacks from petit
juries.* This should have warned prosecutors that using
peremptories to exclude blacks on the assumption that no
*Nor would it have been inconsistent with Swain for the trial judge to
invalidate peremptory challenges of blacks if the prosecutor, in response to
an objection to his strikes, stated that he struck blacks because he believed
they were not qualified to serve as jurors, especially in the trial of a black
defendant.
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black juror could fairly judge a black defendant would violate
the Equal Protection Clause.
It appears, however, that the practice of peremptorily
eliminating blacks from petit juries in cases with black defendant remains widespread, so much so that I agree that an
opportunity to inquire should be afforded when this occurs.
If the defendant objects, the judge, in whom the Court puts
considerable trust, may determine that the prosecution must
respond. If not persuaded otherwise, the judge may conclude that the challenges rest on the belief that blacks could
not fairly try a black defendant. This, in effect, attributes to
the prosecutor the view that all blacks should be eliminated
from the entire venire. Hence, the Court's prior cases dealing with jury venires rather than petit juries are not without
relevance in this case.
The Court emphasizes that using peremptory challenges to
strike blacks does not end the inquiry; it is not unconstitutional, without more, to strike one or more blacks from the
jury. The judge may not require the prosecutor to respond
at all. If he does, the prosecutor, who in most cases has had
a chance to voir dire the prospective jurors, will have an
opportunity to give trial-related reasons for his strikessome satisfactory ground other than the belief that black jurors should not be allowed to judge a black defendant.
Much litigation will be required to spell out the contours of
the Court's Equal Protection holding today, and the significant effect it will have on the conduct of criminal trials cannot ~
be gainsaid. But I agree with the Court that the time has
come to rule as it has, and I join its opinion and judgment.
I would, however, adhere to the rule announced in
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 (1968), that Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), which held that the States
cannot deny jury trials in serious criminal cases, did not require reversal of a state conviction for failure to grant a jury
trial where the trial began prior to the date of the announcement in the Duncan decision. The same result was reached

.
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in DeStefano with respect to the retroactivity of Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194 (1968), as it was in Daniel v. Louisiana,
420 U. S. 31 (1975)(per curiam), with respect to the decision
in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), holding that the
systematic exclusion of women from jury panels violated the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan

Justice White
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens
O'Connor

From:

Justice Marshall

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __
Recirculated:
3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-6263

JAMES KIRKLAND BATSON, PETITIONER
v. KENTUCKY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF KENTUCKY
[March - , 1986]

JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring in part.
I join Parts I and II of JUSTICE POWELL's eloquent opinion
for the Court, and am in agreement with all but the "bottom
line." The Court's opinion cogently explains the pernicious
nature of the growing use of peremptory challenges to
achieve racially discriminatory jury selection, and the repugnancy of such discrimination to the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court's opinion also ably demonstrates the inadequacy of
any burden of proof for racially discriminatory use of
peremptories that requires that "justice ... sit supinely by"
and be flouted in case after case before a remedy is
available. 1 I nonetheless write separately, because the
Court's opinion will not end the racial discrimination that
peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That
goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory
challenges entirely.
I
A little over a century ago, this Court invalidated a state
statute providing that black citizens could not serve as jurors. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880).
State officials then turned to somewhat more subtle ways of
' Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289, 299, 336 A. 2d 290, 295 (1975)
(Nix, J. , dissenting), quoted in McCray v. N ew York, 461 U. S. 961, 965,
n. 2 (1983) (MARSHALL, J. , dissenting from denial of certiorari).

/v
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keeping blacks off jury venires. See Swain v. Alabama, 380
U. S. 202, 231-238 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Kuhn,
Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L. Rev. 235
(1968); see also J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures
155-157 (1977) (hereinafter Van Dyke). Although the means
used to exclude blacks have changed, the same pernicious
consequence has continued.
Misuse of the peremptory challenge to exclude black jurors
has become both common and flagrant. Black defendants
rarely have been able to compile statistics showing the extent
of that practice, but the few cases setting out such figures are
instructive. See United States v. Carter, 528 F. 2d 844, 848
(CAS 1975) (in 15 criminal cases in 1974 in the Western District of Missouri involving black defendants, prosecutors peremptorily challenged 81% of black jurors), cert. denied, 425
U. S. 961 (1976); United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp.
1243 (ED La. 1974) (in 53 criminal cases in 1972-1974 in Eastern District of Louisiana involving black defendants, federal
prosecutors used 68.9% of their peremptory challenges
against black jurors, who made up less than one quarter of
the venire); McKinney v. Walker, 394 F. Supp. 1015,
1017-1018 (SC 1974) (in 13 criminal trials in 1970-1971 in
Spartansburg County, South Carolina, involving black defendants, prosecutors peremptorily challenged 82% of black
jurors), affirmance order, .529 F. 2d 516 (CA4 1975). 2 Prosecutors have explained to courts that they routinely strike
black jurors, see State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162,
1163-1164 (La. 1979). An instruction book used by the prosecutor's office in Dallas County, Texas, explicitly advised
prosecutors that they conduct jury selection so as to eliminate "'any member of a minority group."' 3 In 100 felony
' See also Harris v. Texas, 467 U. S. 1261 (1984) (MARSHALL, J ., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Williams v. Illinois , 466 U. S. 981 (1984)
(MARSHALL, J ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
' Van Dyke, supra, at 152, quoting Texas Observer, May 11, 1973, p. 9,
col. - . An earlier jury-selection treaties circulated in the same county

,~,
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trials in Dallas County in 1983-1984, prosecutors peremptoJj j.
rily struck 405 out of 467 eligibl~urors; the chance of a quali- 1 b .-.c.- c:.
fied black sitting on a jury was' 6ne-in-ten, compared to onein-two for a white. 4
The Court's discussion of the utter unconstitutionality of
that practice needs no amplification. This Court explained
more than a century ago that "'in the selection of jurors to
pass upon [a defendant's] life, liberty, or property, there
shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against
them, because of their color."' Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S.
370, 394 (1881), quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 323
(1880). Exclusion of blacks from a jury, solely because of
their race, can no more be justified by a belief that blacks are
less likely than whites to consider fairly or sympathetically
the State's case against a black defendant than it can be justified by a belief that blacks lack the "intelligence, experience,
or moral integrity," Neal, supra, at 397, to be entrusted with
that role.
II
I wholeheartedly concur in the Court's conclusion that use
of the peremptory challenge to remove blacks from juries, on
the basis of their race, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I would go further, however, in fashioning a remedy adequate to eliminate that discrimination. Merely allowing defendants the opportunity to challenge the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in individual cases will not
end the illegitimate use of the peremptory challenge.
Evidentiary analysis similar to that set out by the Court, {
ante, at 17, has been adopted as a matter of state law in
States including Massachusetts and California. Cases from
instructed prosecutors: "Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a
member of any minority race on a jury, no matter how rich or how well
educated." Quoted in Dallas Morning News, March 9, 1986, p. 29, col. 1.
' Dallas Morning News, March 9, 1986, p. 1, col. 1; see also Comment, A
Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 St. Louis U. L. J. 662 (1974).

I
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those jurisdictions illustrate the limitations of the approach.
First, defendants cannot attack the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges at all unless the challenges are so flagrant as to establish a prima facie case. This means, in those
States, that where only one or two black jurors survive the I
challenges for cause, the prosecutor need have no compunction about striking them from the jury because of their race.
See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382 Mass. 189, 195, 415
N. E. 2d 805, 809-810 (1981) (no prima facie case of discrimination where defendant is black, prospective jurors include three blacks and one Puerto Rican, and prosecutor excludes one for cause and strikes the remainder peremptorily,
producing all-white jury); People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App.
3d 526, 536-537, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892, 897-898 (1982) (no prima
facie case where prosecutor peremptorily strikes only two
blacks on jury panel). Prosecutors are left free to discriminate against blacks in jury selection provided that they hold
that discrimination to an "acceptable" level.
Second, when a defendant can establish a prima facie case,
trial courts face the difficult burden of assessing prosecutors' /
motives. See King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493,
501-502 (EDNY 1984). Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are
ill-equipped to second-guess those reasons. How is the court
to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror because the juror had a son about the same age as defendant,
see People v. Hall, 35 Cal.3d 161, 672 P. 2d 854 (1983), or
seemed "uncommunicative," King, supra, at 498, or "never
cracked a smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitivities necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide
the facts in this case," Hall, supra, at 165, 672 P. 2d, at 856?
If such easily generated explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's obligation to justify his strikes on
nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court
today may be illusory.
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Nor is outright prevarication by prosecutors the only danger here. "[I]t is even possible that an attorney may lie to
himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives are
legal." King, supra, at 502. A prosecutor's own conscious
or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion
that a prospective black juror is "sullen," or "distant," a
characterization that would not have come to his mind if a
white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious
or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an explanation as well supported. Even if all parties approach the
Court's mandate with the best of conscious intentions, that
mandate requires them to confront and overcome their own
racism on all levels-a challenge I doubt all of them can meet.
It is worth remembering that "114 years after the close of the
War Between the States and nearly 100 years after Strauder,
racial and other forms of discrimination still remain a fact of
life, in the administration of justice as in our society as a
whole." Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 558-559 (1979),
quoted in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. - - , - - (1986).

III
The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort
the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should lead the Court to ban them entirely from
the criminal justice system. See Van Dyke, at 167-169;
Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 247, 269-270 (1973). Justice
Goldberg, dissenting in Swain, emphasized that "[w]ere it
necessary to make an absolute choice between the right of a
defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to
challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a choice of
the former." 380 U. S., at 244. I believe that this case
presents just such a choice, and I would resolve that choice
by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely in criminal
cases.
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Some authors have suggested that the courts might ban
prosecutors' peremptories entirely, while zealously guarding
the defendant's peremptory as "essential to the fairness of
trial by jury," Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370, 376
(1892), and "one of the most important of the rights secured .
to the accused," Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 396, 408
(1894). See Van Dyke, at 167; Brown, McGuire, & Winters,
The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 New England L.
Rev. 192 (1978). I would not find that an acceptable answer.
Our criminal justice system "requires not only freedom from
any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice
against his prosecution. Between him and the state the
scales are to be evenly held." Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S.
68, 70 (1887). Respondent argues that the need to maintain
that balance counsels against any limitation on prosecutors'
use of the peremptory challenge. We should maintain that
balance, however, not by permitting both prosecutor and defendant to engage in racial discrimination in jury selection,
but by banning the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors and by allowing the States to eliminate the defendant's
peremptory as well.
Much ink has been spilled regarding the historic importance of defendants' peremptory challenges. The approving
comments of the Lewis and Pointer Courts are noted above;
the Swain Court emphasized the "very old credentials" of the
peremptory challenge, 380 U. S., at 212, and cited the "long
and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury." !d., at 219. But this Court has
also repeatedly stated that the right of peremptory challenge
is not of constitutional magnitude, and may be withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of impartial jury and fair trial. Frazier v. United States, 335
U. S. 497, 505, n. 11 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U. S.
123, 145 (1936); Stilson v. United States, 250 U. S. 583, 586
(1919); see also Swain, supra, at 219. If the prosecutor's

\

84-6263---CONCUR
BATSON v. KENTUCKY

7

peremptory challenge can be eliminated only at the cost of
eliminating the defendant's challenge as well, I do not think
that is too great a price to pay.
I applaud the Court's holding that the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause. However, only by banning peremptories entirely can such discrimination be ended. Accordingly, I
concur in only part of the opinion of the Court.
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.
Today the Court sets aside the peremptory challenge; a
procedure which has been part of the common law for many
centuries and part of our jury system for nearly 200 years.
It does so on the basis of a constitutional argument that was
rejected, without a single dissent, in Swain v. Alabama, 380
U. S. 2(J2 (1965). Reversal of such settled principles would
be unusual enough on its own terms, for we have recognized
that "stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive
on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law." Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U. S. 416, 420
(1983). What makes today's holding truly extraordinary is
that it is based on a constitutional argument that the petitioner expressly declared he was not relying on, both in his
brief to this Court and in oral argument. The Court blithely
ignores this factor as well as history.
I

We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioner was
tried "in violation of constitutional provisions guaranteeing
the defendant an impartial jury and a jury composed of persons representing a fair cross section of the community."
Pet. for Cert. i. The "constitutional provisions" petitioner
relied upon are found in the Sixth Amendment, not the Equal

)
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment relied upon
by the majority. In his brief on the merits, under a heading
distinguishing equal protection cases, petitioner noted "the
irrelevance of the Swain analysis to the present case," Brief
for Petitioner 11, and relied instead solely on Sixth Amendment analysis of cases such as Taylor v. Louisiana, 391 U. S.
522 (1975), and other cases. During oral argument, counsel
for petitioner was pointedly asked:
"QUESTION: Mr. Niehaus, Swain was an equal protection challenge, was it not?
MR. NIEHAUS: Yes.
QUESTION: Your claim here is based solely on the
Sixth Amendment?
MR. NIEHAUS: Yes.
QUESTION: Is that correct?
MR. NIEHAUS: That is what we are arguing, yes.
QUESTION: You are not asking for a reconsideration
of Swain, and you are making no equal protection claim
here. Is that correct?
MR. NIEHAUS: We have not made an equal protection claim. I think that Swain will have to be reconsidered to a certain extent if only to consider the arguments
that are made on behalf of affirmance by the respondent
and the solicitor general. . . . We have not made a spe- ·
cific argument in the briefs that have been filed either in
the Supreme Court or Kentucky or in this Court saying
that we are attacking Swain as such .... " Tr. of Oral
Arg. 5-6.
A short time later, after discussing the difficulties attendant
with a Sixth Amendment claim, the following colloquy
occurred:
"QUESTION: So I come back again to my question
why you didn't attack Swain head on, but I take it if the
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Court were to overrule Swain, you wouldn't like that
result.
.
MR. NIEHAUS: Simply overrule Swain without
adopting the remedy?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. NIEHAUS: I do not think that would give us
much comfort, Your Honor, no.
QUESTION: That is a concession." Tr. of Oral Arg.
10.
Later, petitioner's counsel refused to answer the Court's
questions concerning the ·implications of a holding based on
equal protection ·concerns:
"MR. NIEHAUS: . . . there is no state action involved where the defendant is exercising his peremptory
challenge.
QUESTION: But there might be under an equal protection challenge if it is the state system that allows that
kind of a strike.
MR. NIEHAUS: I believe that is possible. I am
really not prepared to answer that specific question
.... " Tr. of Oral Arg. 20.
In reaching this issue despite petitioner's clear refusal to
present it, the Court departs dramatically from its normal
procedure without any explanation. When we granted certiorari, we could have directed the parties to brief the equal
protection question in addition to the Sixth Amendment
question. See, e. g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 408
U. S. 921 (1972); Colorado v. Connelly, 474 U. S. - (1986). 1 Even following oral argument, we could have di' In Colorado v. Connelly, JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE STEfiled a memorandum objecting to this briefing of an additional question , explaining that "it is hardly for this Court to 'second chair' the prosecutor to alter his strategy or guard him from mistakes. Under our Rule
2l.l(a), '[o]nly the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included
therein will be considered by the Court.' Given petitioner's express disclaimer that [this] issue is not presented, that question obviously is not
VENS,
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rected reargument on this particular question. See, e. g.,
Brown v. Board of Education, 345 U. S. 972 (1953); Illinois
v. Gates, 459 U. S. 1028 (1982); New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 468
U. S. 1214 (1984). 2 This step is particularly appropriate
where reversal of a prior decision is under consideration.
See, e. g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority,
468 U. S. 1213 (1984) (directing reargument and briefing on
issue of whether National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U. S. 833 (1976) should be reconsidered); Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 422 U. S. 1005 (1975) (directing reargument -and briefing on issue of whether the holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398
(1964) should be reconsidered). Alternatively, we could
have simply dismissed this petition as improvidently granted.
The Court decides today to depart from these accepted
courses of action, choosing instead to reverse a 21-year-old
'fairly included' in the question submitted. The Court's direction that the
parties address it anyway makes meaningless in this case the provisions of
this rule and is plainly cause for concern, particularly since it is clear that a
similar dispensation would not be granted a criminal defendant, however
strong his claim." 474 U. S., at-- (memorandum of BRENNAN, J .). If
the Court's limited step of directing briefing on an additional point at the
time certiorari was granted was "cause .for concern," I would think a
fortiorari that the far more expansive action the Court takes today would
warrant similar concern.
2
JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissented from the order directing reargument in New Jersey v.
T. L. 0. They explained:
"The single question presented to the Court has now been briefed and
argued. Evidently unable or unwilling to decide the question presented
by the parties, the Court, instead of dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, orders reargument directed to the questions that [petitioner] decided not to bring here .. ·.. Volunteering unwanted advice is
rarely a wise course of action ....
"I believe that the adversary process functions most effectively when we
rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than the activism of judges, to fashion the questions for review." 468 U. S. 1214, - - (1984).
I am at a loss to discern how one can consistently hold these views and
still reach the question the Court reaches today.
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unanimous constitutional holding of this Court on the basis of
constitutional arguments expressly disclaimed by petitioner.
This is not a case warranting precipitate disposition. It cannot be doubted that the Court's decision will have "a significant effect ... on the conduct of criminal trials," ante, at 2
(WHITE, J., concurring), because it "entail[s] a radical change
in the nature and operation of the peremptory challenge."
Swain, supra, at 221-222. Before considering such a holding, I would at least direct reargument and briefing on the
issue of whether Swain should be reconsidered.
II

Because the Court nonetheless chooses to decide this case
on the equal protection grounds not presented, I believe it
proper to discuss this issue as well. The Court acknowledges, albeit in a footnote, the "'very old credentials'" of the
peremptory challenge and "'the widely held belief that the
peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury."'
Ante, at 10 n. 15 (quoting Swain, supra, at 219). But proper
resolution of this case requires more than a nodding reference to the purpose of the challenge. It is of critical importance to recognize that "[t]he right of challenge is almost essential for the purpose of securing perfect fairness and
impartiality in a trial." W. Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury
175 (1852). Accordingly, the peremptory challenge has been
in use without scrutiny into its basis for nearly as long as juries have existed. "It was in use amongst the Romans in
criminal cases, and the Lex Servilia (B.C. 104) enacted that
the accuser and the accused should severally propose one
hundred judices, and that each might reject fifty from the list
of the other, so that one hundred would remain to try the alleged crime." Ibid.
Swain traced the development of the peremptory challenge
from the early days of the jury trial in England:
"In all trials for felonies at common law, the defendant
was allowed to challenge peremptorily 35 jurors, and the
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prosecutor originally had a right to challenge any number of jurors without cause, a right which was said to
tend to 'infinite delayes and danger.' Coke on Littleton
156 (14th ed. 1791). Thus The Ordinance of Inquests, 33
Edw. 1, Stat. 4 (1305), provided that if 'they that sue for
the King will challenge any . . . Jurors, they shall assign
... a Cause certain.' So persistent was the view that a
proper jury trial required peremptories on both sides,
however, that the statute was construed to allow the
prosecution to direct any juror after examination to
'stand aside' until the entire panel was gone over and the
defendant had exercised his challenges; only if there was
a deficiency of jurors in the box at that point did the
Crown have to show cause in respect to jurors recalled to
make up the settled number. Peremptories on both
sides became the settled law of England, continuing in
the above form until after the separation of the Colonies." 380 U. S. , at 201-202.
Peremptory challenges have a venerable tradition in this
country as well:
"In the federal system, Congress early took a part of
the subject in hand in establishing that the defendant
was entitled to 35 peremptories in trials for treason and
20 in trials for other felonies specified in the 1790 Act as
punishable by death, 1 Stat. 119 (1790). In regard to
trials for other offenses without the 1790 statute, both
the defendant and the Government were thought to have
a right of peremptory challenge, although the source of
this right was not wholly clear . ...
"The course in the States apparently paralleled that in
· the federal system. The defendant's right of challenge
was early conferred by statute, the number often corresponding to the English practice, the prosecution was
thought to have retained the Crown's common-law right
to stand aside, and by 1870, most if not all, States had
enacted statutes conferring on the prosecution a sub-
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stantial number of peremptory challenges, the number
generally being at least half, but often equal to, the number had by the defendant." ld., at 214-216.
The Court's opinion, in addition to neglecting the teachings
of history, also contrasts with Swain in its failure to even discuss the rationale of the peremptory challenge. Swain observed that
"[t]he function of the challenge is not only to eliminate
extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the
parties that the jurors before whom they try the cases
will decide on the basis of the evidence placed for them,
and not otherwise. In this way the peremptory satisfied the rule that 'to perform its high function in the best
way, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."'
!d., at 219 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136
(internal quotation omitted)).
Permitting unexplained peremptories strengthens our jury
system in other ways as well. One commentator has recognized that:
"[t]he peremptory, made without giving any reason,
avoids trafficking in the core of truth in most common
stereotypes. . .. Common human experience, common
sense, psychosociological studies, and public opinion
polls tell us that it is likely that certain classes of people
statistically have predispositions that would make them
inappropriate jurors for particular kinds of cases. But
to allow this knowledge to be expressed in the evaluative
terms necessary for challenges for cause would undercut
our desire for a society in which all people are judged as
individuals and in which each is held reasonable and open
to compromise. . . . [For example,] [a]lthough experience reveals that black males as a class can be biased
against young alienated blacks who have not tried to join
the middle class, to enunciate this in the concrete expression required of a challenge for cause is societally

84-6263-DISSENT

8

BATSON v. KENTUCKY

divisive. Instead we have evolved in the peremptory
challenge a system that allows the covert expression of
what we dare not say but know is true more often than
not." Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful
Power," 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545, 553-554.
For reasons such as these, "the challenge is 'one of the most
important of the rights'" in our justice system. Swain,
supra, at 219 (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S.
396, 408 (1893)). "The denial or impairment of the right is
reversible error without a showing of prejudice." Swain,
supra, at 219. Because of the importance of the peremptory
challenge, "any system that prevents or embarrasses the full,
unrestricted exercise of that right of challenge must be condemned." Pointer v. United States, supra, at 408.
Instead of even considering the history or function of the
peremptory challenge, the bulk of the Court's opinion is
spent recounting the well-established principle that intentional exclusion of racial groups from jury venires is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. I too reaffirm that principle, which has been well established since at least Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). But if today's decision is nothing more than mere "application" of the "principles announced in Strauder," as the Court maintains, ante, at
9, it seems curious that the application went unrecognized for
over a century. The Court in Swain had no difficulty in
unanimously concluding that cases such as Strauder did not
require inquiry into the basis for a peremptory challenge.
See post at 2-4 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). More recently
we held that "[d]efendants are not entitled to a jury of any
particular composition .... " Taylor v. Louisiana, 419

u. s. 522, 538 (1979).

A moment's reflection quickly reveals the vast differences
between the racial exclusions involved in Strauder and the
allegations before us today:
"Exclusion from the venire summons process implies
that the government (usually the legislative or judicial
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branch) . . . has made the general determination that
those excluded are unfit to try any case. Exercise of
the peremptory challenge, by contrast, represents the
discrete decision, made by one of two or more opposed
litigants in the trial phase of our adversary system of
justice, that the challenged venireperson will likely be
more unfavorable to that litigant in that particular case
than others on the same venire.
"Thus, excluding a particular cognizable group from all
venire pools is stigmatizing and discriminatory in several
interrelated ways that the peremptory challenge is not.
The former singles out the excluded group, while individuals of all groups are equally subject to peremptory
challenge on any basis, including their group affiliation.
Further, venire-pool exclusion bespeaks a priori acrossthe-board total unfitness, while peremptory-strike exclusion merely suggests potential partiality in a particular
isolated case. Exclusion from venires focuses on the inherent attributes of the excluded group and infers its inferiority, but the peremptory does not. To suggest that
a particular race is unfit to judge in any case necessarily
is racially insulting. To suggest that each race may
have its own special concerns, or even may tend to favor
its own, is not." United States v. Leslie, 783 F. 2d. 541,
554 (CA5 1986) (en bane).
Unwilling to rest solely on jury venire cases such as
Strauder, the Court also invokes general equal protection
principles in support of its holding. But peremptory challenges are often lodged, of necessity, for reasons "normally
though to be irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action,
namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty." Swain, supra, at
220. Moreover, in making peremptory challenges, both the
prosecutor and defense attorney necessarily act on only limited information or hunch. It is no indictment of the process
that such decisions are made on the basis of "assumption" or
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"intuitive judgment."
Ante, at 17.
As a result,
unadulterated equal protection analysis is simply inapplicable
to peremptory challenges exercised in any single case. A
clause that requires a minimum "rationality" in government
actions has no application to "'an arbitrary and capricious
right,"' Swain, supra, at 219 (quoting Lewis v. United
States, 146 U. S. 370, 378 (1892)); a constitutional principle
that may invalidate state action on the basis of "stereotypic
notions," Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458
U . S. 718, 725 (1982), does not explain the breadth of a procedure exercised on the "'sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks
and gestures of another."' Lewis, supra, at 376 (quoting 4
W. Blackstone, Commentaries *353).
That the Court is not applying conventional equal protection analysis is shown by its limitation of its new rule to allegations of impermissible selection on the basis of race. The
Court's opinion clearly contains such a limitation. See ante,
at 16 (emphasis added) (to establish a prima facie case, "the
defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable
racial group"); id. (emphasis added) ("[f]inally, the defendant
must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account
of their race"). But if conventional equal protection principles apply, then presumably defendants could o~t to exclusions on the basis of not only ~e, but also sex, Craig v.
Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976); ~e, MassachuyJ!_s Ed. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307 (1976); political preference, Davis v.~andemer, - - U. S. - - (1986) (opinion of
WHITE, J.); 'fllental capacity, City of Clebu~: Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. - - (1985); number of children, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970); living arrangements, U. ~Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S.
528 (1973); andl-Efmployment in a particular industry, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456 (1981), or

84-6263---DISSENT
BATSONuKENTUCKY

11

profession, Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483
(1955). 3 In short, it is quite probable that every peremptory
challenge could be objected to on the basis that, because it
excluded a venireman who had some characteristic not
shared by the remaining members of the venire, it constituted a "classification" subject to equal protection scrutiny.
See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1113, 1139 (CA2 1984)
(Meskill, J., dissenting). Compounding the difficulties,
under conventional equal protection principles some uses of
peremptories would be reviewed under "strict scrutiny and
... sustained only if .. ·. suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest," City of Cleburne, supra, at--; others
would be reviewed to determined if "they were substantially
related to a sufficiently important government interest," id.;
and still others would be reviewed to determine whether
they were "a rational means to serve a legitimate end." I d.
The Court never applies this conventional equal protection
framework to the claims at hand, perhaps to avoid acknowledging that the State interest involved here is substantial, if
not compelling. Peremptory challenges are exercised to
achieve an impartial jury that will be sympathetic toward
neither an accused nor witnesses for the State because of
some shared factor of race, religion, occupation, or other
characteristics. This Court has long recognized that the peremptory challenge is "essential to the fairness of trial by
jury." Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370, 376 (1892).
Under conventional equal protection principles, a state interest of this ancient lineage and great magnitude might well
overcome an equal protection objection to the application of
peremptory challenges. The Court, however, is silent on
the strength of the state's interest, apparently leaving this
issue, among many others, to the further "litigation [that]
3
While all these distinctions might support a claim under conventional
equal protection principles, a defendant would also have to establish standing to raise them before obtaining any relief. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 633 (1975).
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will be required to spell out the contours of the Court's Equal
Protection holding today .... " Ante, at 2 (WHITE, J.,
concurring). 4
The Court also purports to express "no views on whether
the Constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel." Ante, at 8. But the
clear and inescapable import of this novel holding will be to
limit the use of this valuable tool to both prosecutors and
defense attorneys alike. Could anyone rationally say that
prosecutors are limited in their use of peremptory challenges
but defendants are not? 5 "Our criminal justice system 'requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused,
but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the State the scales are to be evenly held.'"
Ante, at 6 (MARSHALL, J., concurring) (quoting Hayes v.
Missouri 120 U. S. 68, 70 (1887)).
Rather than applying straightforward equal protection
analysis, the Court substitutes for Swain a curious hybrid.
The defendant must first establish a "prima facie case," ante,
at 13, of invidious discrimination, then the "burden shifts to
the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors." I d., at 16. The Court explains that
"the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules" is established in "[o]ur decisions in the context of Title VII 'disparate
treatment' .... " !d., at 13. The Court then adds, borrow• The Court is also silent on whether a State may demonstrate that its
use ofperemptories rests not merely on "assumptions," ante, at 17, but on
sociological studies or other similar foundations. See Saltzburg & Powers,
Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group
Representation, 41 Md. L. Rev. 337, 365 & n. 124 (1982). For "[i]f the
assessment of a juror's prejudices based on group affiliation is accurate,
.. . then counsel has exercised the challenge as it was intended-to remove the most partial jurors." Id., at 365.
5
"[E]very jurisdiction which has spoken to the matter, and prohibited
prosecution case-specific peremptory challenges on the basis of cognizable
group affiliation, has held that the defense must likewise be so prohibited. "
United States v. Leslie, 783 F . 2d 541, 565 (CA5 1986) (en bane).
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ing again from a Title VII case, that "the prosecutor must
give a 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges." Ante, at 17
n. 20 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 258 (1981)). 6
While undoubtedly these rules are well suited to other contexts, particularly where (as with Title VII) they are required by an act of Congress, 7 they seem out of place when
applied to peremptory challenges. Our system permits two
types of challenges: challenges for cause and peremptory
challenges. Challenges for cause obviously have to be explained; by definition, peremptory challenges do not. "It is
called a peremptory challenge, because the prisoner may
challenge peremptorily, on his own dislike, without showing
of any cause." H. Joy, On Peremptory Challenge of Jurors
1 (1844) (emphasis added). Analytically, there is no middle
ground: A challenge either has to be explained or its does not.
It is readily apparent, then, that to permit inquiry into the
basis for a peremptory challenge would force "the peremptory challenge [to] collapse into the challenge for cause."
Clark v. United States, 737 F. 2d 679, 682 (CA7 1984). Indeed, the Court recognized without dissent in Swain that, if
'One court has warned that overturning Swain has "[t]he potential for
stretching out criminal trials that are already too long, by making the voir
dire a Title VII proceeding in miniature." United States v. Clark, 737 F.
2d 679, 682 (CA7 1984). That "potential" is clearly about to be realized.
'It is worth observing that Congress has been unable to locate the Constitutional deficiencies in the peremptory challenge system that the Court
discerns today. As the Solicitor General explains in urging a rejection of
the Sixth Amendment issue presented by this petition and an affirmance of
the decision below, "[i]n reconciling the traditional peremptory challenge
system with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment it is instructive to
consider the accommodation made by Congress in the Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968, 28 U. S. C. 1861 et seq . ... [T]he House Report
makes clear that ... 'the bill leaves undisturbed the right of a litigant to
exercise his peremptory challenges to eliminate jurors for purely subjective reasons.'" Brief for the United States at 20 n. 11 (quoting H. R.
Rep. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1968)).
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scrutiny were permitted, "[t]he challenge, pro tanto, would
no longer be peremptory, each and every challenge being
open to examination, either at the time of the challenge or at
a hearing afterwards." Swain, supra, at 222.
The Court today attempts to decree a middle ground. To
rebut a prima facie case, the Court requires a "neutral explanation" for the challenge, but is at pains to "emphasize"
that the "explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." Ante, at 16-17. I am at a
loss to discern the governing principles here. A "clear and
reasonably specific" explanation of "legitimate reasons" for
exercising the challenge will be difficult to distinguish from a
challenge for cause. Anything short of a challenge for cause
may well be seen as an "arbitrary and capricious" challenge,
to use Blackstone's characterization of the peremptory. See
4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *353. Apparently the
Court envisions permissible challenges short of a challenge
for cause that are just a little bit arbitrary-but not too
much. While our trial judges are "experienced in supervising voir dire," ante, at 16, they have no experience in administering rules like this.
An example will quickly demonstrate how today's holding,
while purporting to "further the ends of justice," ante, at 18,
encourages nothing of the sort. Assume an Asian defendant, on trial for the capital murder of a white victim, asks
prospective jury members, most of whom are white, whether
they harbor racial prejudice against Asians. See Turner v.
Murray,-- U. S. - - , - - (1986). The basis for such a
question is to flush out any "juror who believes that [Asians]
are violence-prone or morally inferior .... " I d., at - - . 8
Assume further that all white jurors deny harboring racial
8
This question, required by Turner in certain capital cases, demonstrates the inapplicability of traditional equal protection analysis to a jury
voir dire seeking an impartial jury. Surely the question rests on generalized, stereotypic racial notions that would be condemned on equal protection grounds in other contexts.
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prejudice but that the defendant, on trial for his life, remains
unconvinced by these protestations. Instead, he continues
to harbor a hunch, an "assumption" or "intuitive judgment,"
ante, at 17, that these white jurors will be prejudiced against
him, no doubt based in part on their race. The time honored
rule before today was that peremptory challenges could be
exercised on such a basis. The Court explained in Lewis v.
United States,
"how necessary it is that a prisoner (when put to defend
his life) should have good opinion of his jury, the want of
which might totally disconcert him; the law wills not that
he should be tried by any one man against whom he has
conceived a prejudice even without being able to assign a
reason for such his dislike." 146 U. S. 370, 376 (1892).
The effect of the Court's decision, however, will be to force
the defendant to come forward and "articulate a neutral explanation," ante, at 17, for his peremptory, a burden he probably cannot meet. This example demonstrates that today's
holding will produce juries that the parties do not believe are
truly impartial. This will surely do more than "disconcert"
litigants; it will undoubtedly diminish confidence in the jury
system.
A further painful paradox of the Court's decision is that it
is likely to interject racial matters back into the jury selection
process, contrary to the general thrust of a long line of Court
decisions and the notion of our country as a racial "melting
pot." In Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953), for instance, the Court confronted a situation where the selection
of the venire was done through the selection of tickets from a
box; the names of whites were printed on white tickets and
the names of blacks were printed on different color tickets.
The Court had no difficulty in striking down such a scheme.
Justice Frankfurter observed that "opportunity for working
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of a discriminatory system exists whenever the mechanism
for jury selection has a component part, such as the slips
here, that differentiates between white and colored .... "
Id., at 564 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Today marks the
return of racial differentiation to our jury selection process.
Prosecutors and defense attorney's alike will build records in
support of their claims that peremptory challenges have been
exercised in a racially discriminatory fashion by asking jurors
to state their racial background and national origin for the
record, despite 'the fact that "such questions may be offensive
to some jurors and thus are not ordinarily asked on voir
dire." California v. Matton, 39 Cal. 3d 596, 604, 704 P. 2d
176, 180, 217 Cal. Rptr. 416, 420 (1985). 9 This process is
sure to tax even the most capable counsel and judges since
determining whether a prima facie case has been established
will "require a continued monitoring and recording of the
'group' composition of the panel present and prospective
.... " People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 294, 583 P. 2d 748,
773, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 914 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
Even after a "record" on this issue has been created, disputes will inevitably arise. In one case, for instance, a
conviction was reversed based on the assumption that no
blacks were on the jury that convicted a defendant. See
California v. Motten, supra. However, after the court's decision was announced, Carolyn Pritchett, who had served on
the jury, called the press to state that the court was in error
and that she was black. Did You Miss Me? Black was on
"All-White" Jury, 71 A.B.A.J. 22 (November, 1985). The
• The California Supreme Court has attempted to finesse this problem
by asserting that "discrimination is more often based on appearances than
verified racial descent, and a showing that the prosecution was systematically excusing persons who appear to be Black would establish a prima
facie case" of racial discrimination. California v. Motton, 39 Cal. 3d 596,
604 (1985). This suggests, however, that proper inquiry here concerns not
the actual race of the jurors who are excluded, but rather counsel's subjective impressions as to what race they spring from. It is unclear how a
"record" of such impressions is to made.
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court nonetheless denied a rehearing petition and did not
comment on this apparent error. 10
The Court does not tarry long over any of these difficult
problems, preferring instead to gloss over them as swiftly as
it slides over centurie$ of history: "[W]e make no attempt to
instruct [trial] courts on how best to implement our holding
today." Ante, at 19 n. 24. That leaves roughly 7,000 state
trial judges and 500 federal trial judges at large to find their
way through the morass the Court creates today. In so
doing, the Court simply wishes these judges well as they
begin the difficult enterprise of sorting out the implications of
the Court's newly created "right." I join my colleagues in
wishing the nation's judges well as they struggle to implement today's holding. To my mind, however, attention to
these "implementation" questions leads quickly to the conclusion that there is no "best" way to implement the holding, let
alone a good way. As one apparently frustrated judge explained after reviewing a case under a rule like that promulgated by the Court today, judicial inquiry into peremptory
challenges
"from case to case will take the courts into the quagmire
of quotas for groups that are difficult to define and even
more difficult to quantify in the courtroom. The pursuit
of judicial perfection will require both trial and appellate
courts to provide speculative and impractical answers to
artificial questions." Holley v. J & S Sweeping Co., 143
Cal. App. 3d 588, 595-596, 192 Cal. Rptr. 74, 79 (1983).
10
Similar difficulties may lurk in this case on remand. The Court states
as fact that "a jury composed only of white persons was selected." A n te ,
at 2. The only basis for the Court's finding is the prosecutor's statement,
. in response to a question from defense counsel, that "(i]n looking at them,
yes; it's an all-white jury." Tr. >;; 8.
It should also be underscored that the Court today does not hold that
petitioner has established a "prima facie case" entitling him to any form of
relief. Ante, at 19-20.
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The Court's effort to "further the ends of justice," ante, at 18,
and achieve utopian bliss may be admired, but it is far more
likely to enlarge the evil "sporting contest" theory of criminal
justice condemned by Roscoe Pound almost 80 years ago to
the day. See Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice, 40 American L. Rev. 729
(1906). Pound warned then that "too much of the current
dissatisfaction has a just origin in our judicial organization
and procedure." I d., at 749. I am afraid that today's newly
created constitutional right will justly give rise to similar
disapproval.
III
I also add my assent to JUSTICE WHITE's conclusion that
today's decision does not apply retroactively. Ante, at 2-3
(WHITE, J., concurring). We held in Solem v. Stumes, 465
U. S. 638, 643 (1984), that

'"[t]he criteria guiding resolution of the [retroactivity]
question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the
new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the
effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards.' Stovall v. Denno,
388 u. s. 293, 297 (1967)."
All three of these factors point conclusively to a nonretroactive holding. With respect to the first factor, the new rule
the Court announces today is not designed to avert "the clear
danger of convicting the innocent." Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U. S. 618, 639 (1965). Second, it readily apparent that
"law enforcement authorities and state courts have justifiably relied on a prior rule of law .... " Solem, 465 U. S., at
645-646. Today's holding clearly "overrule[s] [a] prior decision" and drastically "transform[s] standard practice." Id .,
at 647. This fact alone "virtually compel[s]" the conclusion
of nonretroactivity. United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S.
537, 549-550 (1982). "[W]here the Court has expressly de-
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clared a rule of criminal procedure to be 'a clear break with
the past,' it almost invariably has gone on to find such a
newly minted principle nonretroactive." I d., at 549 (internal
citation omitted). Third, applying today's decision retroactively obviously would lead to a whole host of problems, if not
chaos. Determining whether a defendant has made a "prima
facie showing" of invidious intent, ante, at 16, and, if so,
whether the State has a sufficient "neutral explanation" for
its actions, ibid., essentially requires reconstructing the entire voir dire, something that will be extremely difficult even
if undertaken soon after the close of the trial. 11 In most
cases, therefore, retroactive application of today's decision
will be "a virtual impossibility." State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d
481, 488 (Fla. 1984).
In sum, under our prior holdings it is impossible to construct even a colorable argument for retroactive application.
The few states that have adopted judicially-created rules similar to that announced by the Court today have all refused full
retroactive application. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d
258, 283 n. 31, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 907 n. 31, 583 P. 2d 748,
766 n. 31 (1978); State v. Neil, supra, at 488; Commonwealth
v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 493 n. 38; 387 N. E. 2d 499, 518
n. 38, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979). 12 I therefore am
persuaded by JuSTICE WHITE's position, ante, at 2-3
(WHITE, J., concurring), that today's novel decision is not to
be given retroactive effect.

IV
The Court today works a dramatic change in peremptory
challenges with uncertain implications. An institution that
Petitioner concedes that it would be virtually impossible for the prosecutor in this case to recall why he used his peremptory challenges in the
fashion he did . Brief for Petitioner 35.
12
Although Delaware has suggested that it might follow a rule like that
adopted by the Court today, see R iley v. State, 496 A. 2d 997 (Del. 1985),
the issue of retroactive application of the rule does not appear to have been
litigated in a published decision.
11
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is nearly as old as the jury system itself should not be casually cast aside on a basis not raised or argued by the petitioner. As one commentator aptly observed,
"the real question is whether to tinker with a system·, be
it of jury selection or anything else, that has done the job
for centuries. We stand on the shoulders of our ancestors, as Burke said. It is not so much that the past is
always worth preserving, he argued, but rather that 'it
is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture
upon pulling down an edifice, which has answered in any
tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society
.. . . "' Younger, Unlawful Peremptory Challenges, 7
Litigation 23 (Fall 1980).
At the very least this case ought to be set for reargument
next October.
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JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
In his dissenting opinion, THE CHIEF JUSTICE correctly
identifies an apparent inconsistency between my criticism of
the Court's action in Colorado v. Connelly, 474 U. S. - (1986) (Memorandum of BRENNAN, J., joined by STEVENS,
J.) and New Jersey v. TLO, 468 U. S. 1214 (1984) (STEVENS,
J ., dissenting)-cases in which the Court directed the State
to brief and argue questions not presented in its petition for
certiorari-and our action today in finding a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause despite the failure of petitioner's
counsel to rely on that ground of decision. Post at 3-4, nn. 1
& 2. In this case, however-unlike Connelly and TLO-the
party defending the judgment has explicitly rested on the
issue in question as a controlling basis for affirmance. In defending the Kentucky Supreme Court's judgment, Kentucky's Assistant Attorney General emphasized the State's
position on the centrality of the Equal Protection issue:
"Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the
issue before this Court today is whether Swain versus
Alabama should be reaffirmed. . ..
"We believe that it is the Fourteenth Amendment that
is the item that should be challenged, and presents perhaps an address to the problem. Swain dealt primarily
with the use of peremptory challenges to strike individuals who were of a cognizable or identifiable group.

.
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~
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"Petitioners show no case other than the State of California's case dealing with the use of peremptories
wherein the Sixth Amendment was cited as authority for
resolving the problem. So, we believe that the Fourteenth Amendment is indeed the issue. That was the
guts and primarily the basic concern of Swain.
"In closing, we believe that the trial court of Kentucky
and the Supreme Court of Kentucky have firmly embraced Swain, and we respectfully request that this
Court affirm the opinion of the Kentucky court as well as
to reaffirm Swain versus Alabama." 1
In addition to the party's reliance on the Equal Protection
argument in defense of the judgment, several amici curiae
also addressed that argument. For instance, the argument
in the brief filed by the Solicitor General of the United States
begins:
"PETITIONER DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT HE
WAS DEPRIVED OF A PROPERLY CONSTITUTED
PETIT JURY OR DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAWS
"A. Under Swain v. Alabama A Defendant Cannot Establish An Equal Protection Violation By Showing
Only That Black "Veniremen Were Subjected To Peremptory challenge By The Prosecution In His
Case" 2
Several other amici similarly emphasized this issue. 3
1

2

Tr. of oral arg., 27-28, 43.
Brief for the United States as amicus curiae Supporting Affirmance,

p. 7.

' The argument section of the brief of the National District Attorneys
Association, Inc. as amicus curiae in support of respondent begins as
follows:
"This Court should conclude that the prosecutorial peremptory challenges
exercised in this case were proper under the fourteenth amendment equal
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In these circumstances, although I suppose it is possible
that reargument might enable some of us to have a better informed view of a problem that has been percolating in the
courts for several years, 4 I believe the Court acts wisely in
resolving the issue now on the basis of the arguments that
have already been fully presented without any special invitation from this Court. 5

protection clause and the sixth amendment. This Court should further determine that there is no constitutional need to change or otherwise modify
this Court's decision in Swain v. Alabama." !d., at p. 5.
Amici supporting the petitioner also emphasized the importance of the
equal protection issue. See, e. g., Amicus Brief of NAACP Defense and
Educational Fund, American Jewish Committee, and American Jewish
Congress, 24-36; Amicus Brief of Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, 11-17; Amicus Brief for Elizabeth Holtzman, 13.
•see McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961 (opinion of STEVENS, J., respecting the denial of certiorari); id. at 963 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
5
Although I disagree with his criticism of the Court in this case, I fully
subscribe to THE CHIEF JUSTICE's view, expressed today, that the Court
should only address issues necessary to the disposition of the case or petition. For contrasting views, see, e. g., Bender v. Williamsport School
Dist., - - U. S. - - , - - (1986) (BURGER, C. J., dissenting) (addressing
merits even though majority of the Court has concluded that petitioner
lacks standing); Colorado v. Nunez, 465 U. S. 324 (1984) (concurring opinion, joined by BURGER, C. J.) (expressing view on merits even though writ
is dismissed as improvidently granted because state court judgment rested
on adequate and independent state grounds); Florida v. Casal, 462 U. S.
637, 639 (1983) (BURGER, C. J., concurring) (1983) (agreeing with Court
that writ should be ·dismissed as improvidently granted because judgment
rests on adequate and independent state grounds, but noting that "the citizens of the state must be aware that they have the power to amend state
law to ensure rational law enforcement"). See also Colorado v. Connelly,
- - U. S. - - (1986) (ordering parties to address issues that neither
party raised); New Jersey v. TLO, 468 U. S. 1214 (1984) (same).
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JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurrin .
I join JUSTICE POWELL' e oquent pinion for the Court,
w 1c ta es a 1s onc s ep
e
·
1
practice of racial discrimination in the selection of juries."
The Court's opinion cogently explains the pernicious nature
of the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges,
and the repugnancy of such discrimination to the Equal Protection Clause. The Court's opinion also ably demonstrates
the inadequacy of any burden of proof for racially discriminatory use of peremptories that requires that "justice . . . sit
supinely by" and be flouted in case after case before a remedy
is available. 1 I nonetheless write separately, to express my
views. The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process.
That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.
I
A little over a century ago, this Court invalidated a state
statute providing that black citizens could not serve as jurors. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880).
State officials then turned to somewhat more subtle ways of
1
Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289, 299, 336 A. 2d 290, 295 (1975)
(Nix, J., dissenting), quoted in McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, 965,
n. 2 (1983) (MARSHALL, J ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

\
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keeping blacks off jury venires. See Swain v. Alabama, 380
U. S. 202, 231-238 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Kuhn,
Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L. Rev. 235
(1968); see also J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures
155-157 (1977) (hereinafter Van Dyke). Although the means
used to exclude blacks have changed, the same pernicious
consequence has continued.
Misuse of the peremptory challenge to exclude black jurors
has become both common and flagrant. Black defendants
rarely have been able to compile statistics showing the extent
of that practice, but the few cases setting out such figures are
instructive. See United States v. Carter, 528 F. 2d 844, 848
(CAS 1975) (in 15 criminal cases in 1974 in the Western District of Missouri involving black defendants, prosecutors peremptorily challenged 81% of black jurors), cert. denied, 425
U. S. 961 (1976); United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp.
1243 (ED La. 1974) (in 53 criminal cases in 1972-1974 in Eastern District of Louisiana involving black defendants, federal
prosecutors used 68.9% of their peremptory challenges
against black jurors, who made up less than one quarter of
the venire); McKinney v. Walker, 394 F. Supp. 1015,
1017-1018 (SC 1974) (in 13 criminal trials in 1970-1971 in
Spartansburg County, South Carolina, involving black defendants, prosecutors peremptorily challenged 82% of black
jurors), affirmance order, 529 F. 2d 516 (CA4 1975). 2 Prosecutors have explained to courts that they routinely strike
black jurors, see State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162,
1163-1164 (La. 1979). An instruction book used by the prosecutor's office in Dallas County, Texas, explicitly advised
prosecutors that they conduct jury selection so as to eliminate "'any member of a minority group.'" 3 In 100 felony
' See also Harris v. Texas, 467 U. S. 1261 (1984) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Williams v. Illinois, 466 U. S. 981 (1984)
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
3
Van Dyke, supra, at 152, quoting Texas Observer, May 11, 1973, p. 9,
col. 2. An earlier jury-selection treatise circulated in the same county in-
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trials in Dallas County in 1983-1984, prosecutors peremptorily struck 405 out of 467 eligible black jurors; the chance of a
qualified black sitting on a jury was one-in-ten, compared to
one-in-two for a white. 4 ·
The Court's discussion of the utter unconstitutionality of
that practice needs no amplification. This Court explained
more than a century ago that "'in the selection of jurors to
pass upon [a defendant's] life, liberty, or property, there
shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against
them, because of their color."' Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S.
370, 394 (1881), quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 323
(1880). JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting, concedes that exclusion of blacks from a jury, solely because they are black, is
at best based upon "crudely stereotypical and . . . in many
cases hopelessly mistaken" notions. Post, at 5. Yet the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits a State from taking any action based on crude, inaccurate racial stereotypes-even an
action that does not serve the State's interests. Exclusion of
blacks from a jury, solely because of race, can no more be justified by a belief that blacks are less likely than whites to consider fairly or sympathetically the State's case against a black
defendant than it can be justified by the notion that blacks
lack the "intelligence, experience, or moral integrity," Neal ,
supra, at 397, to be entrusted with that role.
II
I wholeheartedly concur in the Court's conclusion that use
of the peremptory challenge to remove blacks from juries, on
the basis of their race, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I would go further, however, in fashioning a remedy adequate to eliminate that discrimination. Merely allowing destructed prosecutors: "Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a
member of any minority race on a jury, no matter how rich or how well
educated." Quoted in Dallas Morning News, March 9, 1986, p. 29, col. 1.
' Dallas Morning News, March 9, 1986, p. 1, col. 1; see also Comment, A
Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 St. Louis U. L. J. 662 (1974).
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fendants the opportunity to challenge the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in individual cases will not
end the illegitimate use of the peremptory challenge.
Evidentiary analysis similar to that set out by the Court,
ante, at 17, has been adopted as a matter of state law in
States including Massachusetts and California. Cases from
those jurisdictions illustrate the limitations of the approach.
First, defendants cannot attack the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges at all unless the challenges are so flagrant as to establish a prima facie case. This means, in those
States, that where only one or two black jurors survive the
challenges for cause, the prosecutor need have no compunction about striking them from the jury because of their race.
See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382 Mass. 189, 195, 415
N. E. 2d 805, 809-810 (1981) (no prima facie case of discrimination where defendant is black, prospective jurors include three blacks and one Puerto Rican, and prosecutor excludes one for cause and strikes the remainder peremptorily,
producing all-white jury); People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App.
3d 526, 536-537, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892, 897-898 (1982) (no prima
facie case where prosecutor peremptorily strikes only two
blacks on jury panel). Prosecutors are left free to discriminate against blacks in jury selection provided that they hold
that discrimination to an "acceptable" level.
Second, when a defendant can establish a prima facie case,
trial courts face the difficult burden of assessing prosecutors'
motives. See King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493,
501-502 (EDNY 1984). Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are
ill-equipped to second-guess those reasons. How is the court
to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror because the juror had a son about the same age as defendant, ·
see People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P. 2d 854 (1983), or
seemed "uncommunicative," King, supra, at 498, or "never
cracked a smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitivities necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide
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the facts in this case," Hall, supra, at 165, 672 P. 2d, at 856?
If such easily generated explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's obligation to justify his strikes on
nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court
today may be illusory.
Nor is outright prevarication by prosecutors the only danger here. "(I]t is even possible that an attorney may lie to
himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives are
legal." King, supra, at 502. A prosecutor's own conscious
or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion
that a prospective black juror is "sullen," or "distant," a
characterization that would not have come to his mind if a
white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious
or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an explanation as well supported. As JusTICE REHNQUIST concedes, prosecutor's peremptories are based on their "seat-ofthe-pants instincts" as to how particular jurors will vote.
Post, at 5; see also the CHIEF JUSTICE's dissenting opinion,
post, at 9-10. Yet "seat-of-the-pants instincts" may often be
just another term for racial prejudice. Even if all parties approach the Court's mandate with the best of conscious intentions, that mandate requires them to confront and overcome
their own racism on all levels-a challenge I doubt all of them
can meet. It is worth remembering that "114 years after the
close of the War Between the States and nearly 100 years
after Strauder, racial and other forms of discrimination still
remain a fact of life, in the administration of justice as in our
society as a whole." Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545,
558-559 (1979), quoted in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. - - ,
(1986).
III
The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort
the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban them entirely from the criminal justice system. See Van Dyke, at
167-169; Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Demo-
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cratic Institution, 6 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 247, 269-270 (1973).
Justice Goldberg, dissenting in Swain, emphasized that
"[w]ere it necessary to make an absolute choice between the
right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a
choice of the former." 380 U.S., at 244. I believe that this
case presents just such a choice, and I would resolve that
choice by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely in criminal cases.
Some authors have suggested that the courts should ban
prosecutors' peremptories entirely, but should zealously
guard the defendant's peremptory as "essential to the fairness of trial by jury," Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370,
376 (1892), and "one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused," Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S.
396, 408 (1894). See Van Dyke, at 167; Brown, McGuire, &
Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 New
England L. Rev. 192 (1978). I would not find that an acceptable solution. Our criminal justice system "requires not only
freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any
prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the
state the scales are to be evenly held." Hayes v. Missouri,
120 U. S. 68, 70 (1887). We can maintain that balance, not
by permitting both prosecutor and defendant to engage in racial discrimination in jury selection, but by banning the use of
peremptory challenges by prosecutors and by allowing the
States to eliminate the defendant's peremptory as well.
Much ink has been spilled regarding the historic importance of defendants' peremptory challenges. The approving
comments of the Lewis and Pointer Courts are noted above;
the Swain Court emphasized the "very old credentials" of the.
peremptory challenge, 380 U. S., at 212, and cited the "long
and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury." !d., at 219. But this Court has

•
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also repeatedly stated that the right of peremptory challenge
is not of constitutional magnitude, and may be withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of impartial jury and fair trial. Frazier v. United States, 335
U. S. 497, 505, n. 11 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U. S.
123, 145 (1936); Stilson v. United States, 250 U. S. 583, 586
(1919); see also Swain, supra, at 219. The potential for racial prejudice, further, inheres in the defendants challenge as
well. If the prosecutor's peremptory challenge could be
eliminated only at the cost of eliminating the defendant's
challenge as well, I do not think that would be too great a
price to pay.
I applaud the Court's holding that the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause, and I join the Court's opinion. However, only
by banning peremptories entirely can such discrimination be
ended.

I
j

C .J

April 17, 1986
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
The opinions of the Chief Justice, Justice hite,
and Justice O'Connor state that the Court's decision in this
case should not be pplied retroact'vely. 1 agree with this
view.
Reliance on Swain has been extensive for many
years, and the effect on the administration of ;ustice of a
retroactive application of the Court's decision in this case
would be significant.
If this view is shared by a majority of the Justices, 1 will add a footnote making clear that our decision
is prospective.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

\

•

arne 04/17/86

------April 17, 1986
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

Retroactivity
The retroactivity analysis that you have endorsed is "Jus-

tice Harlan's suggestion that a new rule of constitutional law
should be applied only to review of criminal convictions not yet
final
638,

when

the

652-653

rule

(1984)

is announced."

Solem v.

Stumes,

u.s.

465

(POWELL, J., concurring in judgment).

This

approach "follows directly from a proper conception of the scope
of the writ of habeas corpus,
Id., at 653.

as contrasted to direct review."

Since I believe it is clear that Batson announces a

new rule, I would recommend that you hold that the rule apply to
cases pending on direct appeal when Batson is announced, but not
to collateral review of final convictions.
While I hope that a majority of the Justices joining your
opinion go along with our suggestion that we add a footnote along
these lines, we could encounter a fight with respect to the appropriate analysis
~umes,

to use.

Writing

the Court

in Solem v.

supra, Justice White followed an approach that turns on

application of

the so-called Linkletter /Stovall

criteria guiding resolution of the
plicate

for

(a)

factors:

[retroactivity]

"'the

question im-

the purpose to be served by the new standards,

(b)

page 2.
·,

the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the
old standards, and

(c)

the effect on the administration of jus-

tice of a retroactive application of the new standards."'
at 643.

Id.,

You explained that it was unnecessary to consider these

factors because the "costs imposed upon the State by retroactive
application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus •
far
654.

outweighs

the

In this case,

benefits of

this application."

Id.,

at

I assume that we could follow the approach

taken by the Court in Stumes, particularly since it would obtain
the same result as that under your approach.
I am doing further research into the various retroactivity
approaches used in recent precedents of this Court--my impression
is that Justice Blackmun has taken yet another approach, Shea v.
Louisiana, 105 S.Ct. 1065, and I would not be at all surprised to
learn that Justices Brennan and Marshall have their own views of
this issue.
In

the

event

that our majority divides over

either

the

result concerning or the approach to retroactivity, may I make a
suggestion?

We could propose to Grant the next case coming here

en habeas raising a
question
'lhere

there.

is one

~ejean

Batson claim,

(I

have

federal

gone

habeas

and decide the retroactivity

through

case

v. Blackburn, No. 85-5609.

that

the

holds

raises

a

for

Batson.

Batson claim.

The case is not a good candi-

date because it raises a number of questions including whether it
is constitutional to sentence a minor to death (the defendant was
17

when

he

McCleskey v.

committed

the

Kemp,

84-6811, concerning racially discrimina-

No.

murder)

and

the

issue

pending

in

•

page 3.

tory application of capital punishment.

If the Court ultimately

denies McCleskey, it might consider granting cert. in No. 85-5609
limited to the Batson claim.)

If we could decide the retroactiv-

ity issue soon, but in another case, you could hand down Batson
without fracturing your majority over the issue, while still aiding the lower courts by resolving retroactivity.

After the foot-

note in your dissent in Vasquez v. Hillery concerning the precedential value of portions of opinions not joined by Justices who
also joined the judgment, it seems preferable not to add anything
about

retroactivity

along.

Moreover,

unless

five

of

the

concurring

Justices

go

we took pains to be kind to Justice White in

our draft and thus wrote the opinion to suggest that we were not
saying anything "new."

It might seem odd for us then to hold in

the same opinion that the rule is nonretroactive because the rule
is new.

Finally,

since four Justices have indicated separately

that the Batson holding is nonretroactive, there is little danger
that the lower courts will err when faced with the issue.

arne 04/18/86

April 18, 1986
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky

The two cases cited

in the Chief Justice's dissent that

have not yet been handed down are Davis v. Bandemer, No. 84-1244
~age

10 of dissent), and Turner v. Murray, No. 84-6646 (page 14

of dissent).

His citation of Turner may not be much of a prob-

lem, since I assume that the decision will be handed down fairly
soon.
have

(My review of the file indicates that all of the Justices
circulated memos

Turner).

joining

the

various opinions written

in

On the other hand, Davis will not come down for a long

time since Justice O'Connor has not yet circulated her opinion.
I am sure that the Chief Justice's law clerk could come up with
another citation to substitute for Davis, since he uses it merely
to illustrate that the Equal Protection Clause protects political
groups.

•
April 18, 1986
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
On second thought, 1 think it best not to address
the retroactiv issue in my op nion for the Court.
~hen we have the oppo tun'ty we can grant a case
for th·s purpose.

L.F.P., Jr .
ss

'
April

8, 1986

84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky

Dear Chief:
At Conference this morning Harry noted that your
dissent cites Davis v. Bandemer, 84-1244 (p. 10 of dissent),
and Turner v. Murray, 84-6646 (p. 14), neither of which has
been han ed down.
1 believe all of the writing is nin" on Turner, and
so it may come down fairly soon. Bandemer (the Indiana reapportionment case) may well be held up for some time. Sandra is writing - according to the "clerk grapevine" - a long
opinion on the justiciability issue.
lt occurs to me that probably you could cite other
cases for the points you make. Of course, however, 1 am
entirely willing to hold Batson for young convenience.
1 am making a minor chanqe in Batson in view of
Thurgood's recent changes in his opinion. Thus, Batson will
not be ready until next week's Conference in any event.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

•

~tntt <!fcttrl cf tlft 'Jihtittb ~taft.s

~uftinghttt. ~. <!J. 211~~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w .. .

J . BRENNAN, JR.

April 18, 1986

No. 84-6263
Batson v. Kentucky

Dear Lewis;
Although I
Batson should
believe that
question until
Consequently, I
footnote.

am inclined to agree with you that
not be applied retroactively, I
we should wait to decide that
it is properly presented to us.
hope you will not add the proposed
Sincerely,

~
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

•
,jltJTrttttt ~onrt of tlft 'J!lnittb ,jtatts
'JiasJringhm. ~ . ~· 2llgiJ.l.$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

April 18, 1986

/
Re: No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky
Dear Lewis:
I agree with Bill Brennan.
It seems to me, however,
that you already have a majority for the retroactivity
observation, namely, the Chief, Byron, yourself, Bill
Rehnquist, and Sandra. I include Bill Rehnquist because my
notes indicate that he has joined the Chief in dissent.

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.

To: The Chief Justice

04/18

Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

..

StlU* ChaRges Throughoul
~

n . d()-..

From:

Justice Powell

4th DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-6263

JAMES KIRKLAND BATSON, PETITIONER
v. KENTUCKY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF KENTUCKY
[April - , 1986]

delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to reexamine that portion of Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), concerning the evidentiary
burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that he has
been denied equal protection through the State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the
petit jury.'
JusTICE POWELL

'Following the lead of a number of state courts construing their state's
constitution, two federal Courts of Appeals recently have accepted the
view that peremptory challenges used to strike black jurors in a particular
case may violate the Sixth Amendment. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F. 2d 762
(CA6 1985), cert. pending, No. 85-1028; McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d
1113 (CA2 1984), cert. pending, No. 84-1426. See People v. Wheeler, 22
Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978); Riley v. State, 496 A. 2d 997, 1009-1013
(Del. 1985); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v.
Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N. E. 2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979).
See also State v. Crespin, 94 N. M. 486, 612 P. 2d 716 (App. 1980). Other
Courts of Appeals have rejected that position, adhering to the requirement
that a defendant must prove systematic exclusion of blacks from the petit
jury to establish a constitutional violation. United States v. Childress,
715 F. 2d 1313 (CA8 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 1063 (1984);
United States v. Whitfield, 715 F. 2d 145, 147 (CA4 1983). See Beed v.
State, 271 Ark. 526, 530-531, 609 S. W. 2d 898, 903 (1980); Blackwell v.
State, 248 Ga. 138, 281 S. E. 2d 599, 599-600 (1981); Gilliard v. State, 428
So. 2d 576, 579 (Miss.), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 867 (1983); People v.
McCray, 57 N. Y. 2d 542, 546-549, 443 N. E. 2d 915, 916-919 (1982), cert.
denied, 461 U. S. 961 (1983); State v. Lynch, 300 N. C. 534, 546-547, 268
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I
Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Kentucky on
charges of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen
goods. On the first day of trial in Jefferson Circuit Court,
the judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire, excused certain jurors for cause, and permitted the parties to
exercise peremptory challenges. 2 The prosecutor used his
peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the
venire, and a jury composed only of white persons was selected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury before
it was sworn on the ground that the prosecutor's removal of
the black veniremen violated petitioner's rights under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a
cross-section of the community, and under the Fourteenth
Amendment to equal protection of the laws. Counsel requested a hearing on his motion. Without expressly ruling
on the request for a hearing, the trial judge observed that the
parties were entitled to use their peremptory challenges to
"strike anybody they want to." The judge then denied petitioner's motion, reasoning that the cross-section requirement
applies only to selection of the venire and not to selection of
the petit jury itself.
S. E . 2d 161, 168-169 (1980). Federal Courts of Appeals also have disagreed over the circumstances under which supervisory power may be
used to scrutinize the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to
strike blacks from the venire. Compare United States v. Leslie, --F.
2d - - (CA5 1986) (en bane), with United States v. Jackson, 696 F. 2d
578, 592-593 (CA8 1982), cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1073 (1983). See also
United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (ED La. 1974).
2
The Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize the trial court to
permit counsel to conduct voir dire examination or to conduct the examination itself. Ky. Rule Crim. Proc. 9.38. After jurors have been excused
for cause, the parties exercise their peremptory challenges simultaneously
by striking names from a list of qualified jurors equal to the number to be
seated plus the number of allowable peremptory challenges. Rule 9.36.
Since the offense charged in this case was a felony, and an alternate juror
was called, the prosecutor was entitled to six peremptory challenges, and
defense counsel to nine. Rule 9.40.
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The jury convicted petitioner on both counts. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner pressed,
among other claims, the argument concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. Conceding that Swain
v. Alabama, supra, apparently foreclosed an equal protection claim based solely on the prosecutor's conduct in this
case, petitioner urged the court to follow decisions of other
states, People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748
(1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461 , 387 N. E.
2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979), and to hold that
such conduct violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment
and Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution to a jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community. Petitioner also contended that the facts showed that the prosecutor had engaged in a "pattern" of discriminatory challenges in this case
and established an equal protection violation under Swain.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed. In a single
paragraph, the court declined petitioner's invitation to adopt
the reasoning of People v. Wheeler, supra, and Commonwealth v. Soares, supra. The court observed that it recently
had reaffirmed its reliance on Swain, and had held that a defendant alleging lack of a fair cross-section must demonstrate
systematic exclusion of a group of jurors from the venire.
See Commonwealth v. McFerron, 680 S. W. 2d 924 (1984).
We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. - - (1985), and now
reverse.
II
In Swain v. Alabama, this Court recognized that a
"State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration
of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause." 380 U. S. ,
at 203-204. This principle has been "consistently and repeatedly" reaffirmed, id., at 204, in numerous decisions of
this Court both preceding and following Swain. 3 We re' See, e. g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880); N eal v.
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affirm the principle today. 4
A

More than a century ago, the Court decided that the State
denies a black defendant equal protection of the laws when it
puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his
race have been purposefully excluded. Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). That decision laid the foundation for the Court's unceasing efforts to eradicate racial
discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire
from which individual jurors are drawn. In Strauder, the
Court explained that the central concern of the recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment was to put an end to governDelaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1881); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935);
Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S. 394 (1935) (per curiam); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947);
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475
(1954); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389
U. S. 24 (1967) (per curiam); Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene
County , 396 U. S. 320 (1970); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977);
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. - (1986).
The basic principles prohibiting exclusion of persons from participation
in jury service on account of their race "are essentially the same for grand
juries and for petit juries." Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 626,
n. 3 (1972); see Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 589 (1935). These principles are reinforced by the criminal laws of the United States. 18
u. s. c. § 243.
' In this Court, petitioner has argued that the prosecutor's conduct violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to an impartial jury and to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. Petitioner has framed his argument in these terms in an apparent effort to
avoid inviting the Court directly to reconsider one of its own precedents.
On the other hand, the State has insisted that petitioner is claiming a denial of equal protection and that we must reconsider Swain to find a constitutional violation on this record. We agree with the State that resolution of petitioner's claim properly turns on application of equal protection
principles and express no view on the merits of any of petitioner's Sixth
Amendment arguments.

84-6263-0PINION
BATSON v. KENTUCKY

5

mental discrimination on account of race. I d., at 306-307.
Exclusion of black citizens from service as jurors constitutes
a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment
was designed to cure.
In holding that racial discrimination in jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause, the Court in Strauder
recognized, however, that a defendant has no right to a "petit
jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race."
I d., at 305. 5 "The number of our races and nationalities
stands in the way of evolution of such a conception" of the demand of equal protection. Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398,
403 (1945). 6 But the defendant does have the right to be
tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria. Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 321
(1906); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880). The
Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the
State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, Strauder, supra, at 305, 7 or on the
false assumption that members of his race as a group are not
qualified to serve as jurors, see Norris v. Alabama, 294
U. S. 587, 599 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 397
(1881).
5
See Hernandez v. Texas, supra, at 482; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S.
282, 286-287 (1950) (plurality opinion); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403
(1945); Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 321 (1906); Neal v. Delaware ,
supra, at 394.
• Similarly, though the Sixth Amendment guarantees that the petit jury
will be selected from a pool of names representing a cross-section of the
community, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), we have never held
that the Sixth Amendment requires that "petit juries actually chosen must
mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the
population," id., at 538. Indeed, it would be impossible to apply a concept
of proportional representation to the petit jury in view of the heterogeneous nature of our society. Such impossibility is illustrated by the
Court's holding that a jury of six persons is not unconstitutional. Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 102-103 (1970).
' See Hernandez v. Texas, supra, at 482; Cassell v. Texas, supra, at
287; Akins v. Texas, supra, at 403; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. , at 394.
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Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire
violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure. "The very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or
summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as
that which he holds." Strauder, supra, at 308; see Carter v.
Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 U. S. 320, 330
(1970). The petit jury has occupied a central position in our
system of justice by safeguarding a person accused of crime
against the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or
judge. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 156 (1968). 8
Those on the venire must be "indifferently chosen," 9 to secure the defendant's right under the Fourteenth Amendment
to "protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice." Strauder, supra, at 309.
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only
the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try.
8

See Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, at 530; Williams v. Florida, supra,
at 100. See also Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1
(1966).

In Duncan v. Louisiana, decided after Swain, the Court concluded that
the right to trial by jury in criminal cases was such a fundamental feature
of the American system of justice that it was protected against state action
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 391 U. S., at
147-158. The Court emphasized that a defendant's right to be tried by a
jury of his peers is designed "to prevent oppression by the Government."
!d., at 155, 156-157. For a jury to perform its intended function as a
check on official power, it must be a body drawn from the community.
Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, at 156; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S.
60, 86-88 (1942). By compromising the representative quality of the jury,
discriminatory selection procedures make "juries ready weapons for officials to oppress those accused individuals who by chance are numbered
among unpopular or inarticulate minorities." Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S.,
at 408 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
• 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 349 (Cooley ed. 1899) (quoted in Duncan v. Lousiana, supra, at 152).

84-6263-0PINION
BATSON v. KENTUCKY

7

Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to
consider evidence presented at a trial. See Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 223-224 (1946). A person's
race simply "is unrelated to his fitness as a juror." Id., at
227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). As long ago as Strauder,
therefore, the Court recognized that by denying a person
participation in jury service on account of his race, the State
unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror.
100 U. S., at 308; see Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene
County, supra, at 329-330; Neal v. Delaware, supra, at 386.
The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to
touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. See
Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, 195 (1946); McCray
v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, 968 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Discrimination within the
judicial system is most pernicious because it is "a stimulant to
that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to
[black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others." Strauder, supra, at 308.
B

In Strauder, the Court invalidated a state statute that provided that only white men could serve as jurors. 100 U. S.,
at 305. We can be confident that no state now has such a
law. The Constitution requires, however, that we look beyond the face of the statute defining juror qualifications and
also consider challenged selection practices to afford "protection against action of the State through its administrative officers in effecting the prohibited discrimination." Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U. S., at 589; see Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U. S. 475, 478-479 (1954); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., at
346-347. Thus, the Court has found a denial of equal protec-
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tion where the procedures implementing a neutral statute operated to exclude persons from the venire on racial grounds, 10
and has made clear that the Constitution prohibits all forms
of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of jurors. 11
While decisions of this Court have been concerned largely
with discrimination during selection of the venire, the principles announced there also forbid discrimination on account
of race in selection of the petit jury. Since the Fourteenth
Amendment protects an accused throughout the proceedings
bringing him to justice, Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 406
(1942), the State may not draw up its jury lists pursuant to
neutral procedures but then resort to discrimination at "other
stages in the selection process," Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S.
559, 562 (1953); see McCray v. New York, supra, at 965, 968
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 632 (1972).
Accordingly, the component of the jury selection process at
issue here, the State's privilege to strike individual jurors
through peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands
of the Equal Protection Clause. 12 Although a prosecutor or10
E . g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404, 407 (1967) (per curiam); Whitus
v. Georgia, 385 U. S., at 548-549; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S., at 561.
11
See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S., at 589; Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S.,
at 319; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., at 394, 397.
12
We express no views on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on
the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel.
Nor do we express any views on the techniques used by lawyers who
seek to obtain information about the community in which a case is to be
tried, and about members of the venire from which the jury is likely to be
drawn. See generally J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels, 183-189 (1977). Prior to
voir dire examination, which serves as the basis for exercise of challenges,
lawyers wish to know as much as possible about prospective jurors, including their age, education, employment, and economic status, so that they
can ensure selection of jurors who at least have an open mind about the
case. In some jurisdictions, where a pool of jurors serves for a substantial
period of time, see J. Van Dyke, supra, at 116-118, counsel also may seek
to learn which members of the pool served on juries in other cases and the
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dinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges "for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related
to his view concerning the outcome" of the case to be tried,
United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 473 (Conn.
1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United States v. Newman, 549 F. 2d 240 (CA2 1977), the Equal Protection Clause
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on
account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as
a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case
against a black defendant.

III
The principles announced in Strauder never have been
questioned in any subsequent decision of this Court.
Rather, the Court has been called upon repeatedly to review
the application of those principles to particular facts. 13 A recurring question in these cases, as in any case alleging a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, was whether the
defendant had met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination on the part of the State. Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U. S., at 550; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., at 478-481;
Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., at 403-404; Martin v. Texas, 200
U. S. 316 (1906). That question also was at the heart of the
portion of Swain v. Alabama we reexamine today. 14
outcome of those cases. Counsel even may employ professional investigators to interview persons who have served on a particular petit jury. We
have had no occasion to consider particularly this practice. Of course,
counsel's efforts to obtain possibly relevant information about prospective
jurors is to be distinguised from the practice at issue here.
3
' See, e. g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.-- (1986); Rose v. Mitchell,
443 U. S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U. S. 545, 549-550 (1967); Swain v. Alabama, supra, at 205; Coleman v.
Alabama, 377 U. S. 129 (1964); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 589
(1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. , at 394.
14
The decision in Swain has been the subject of extensive commentary.
Some authors have argued that the Court should reconsider the decision.
E . g., J . Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commit-
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A

Swain required the Court to decide, among other issues,
whether a black defendant was denied equal protection by
the State's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude
members of his race from the petit jury. 380 U. S., at
209-210. The record in Swain showed that the prosecutor
had used the State's peremptory challenges to strike the six
black persons included on the petit jury venire. !d., at 210.
While rejecting the defendant's claim for failure to prove purposeful discrimination, the Court nonetheless indicated that
the Equal Protection Clause placed some limits on the State's
exercise of peremptory challenges. I d., at 222-224.
The Court sought to accommodate the prosecutor's historical privilege of peremptory challenge free of judicial control,
id., at 214-220, and the constitutional prohibition on exclusion of persons from jury service on account of race, id., at
222-224. While the Constitution does not confer a right to
peremptory challenges, id., at 219 (citing Stilson v. United
States, 250 U. S. 583, 586 (1919)), those challenges traditionally have been viewed as one means of assuring the selection
of a qualified and unbiased jury, 380 U. S., at 219. 15 To prement to Representative Panels 166-167 (1977); Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 247,
268-270 (1973); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 235, 283-303 (1968); Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1357 (1985); Note, Peremptory ChallengeSystematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss.
L. J. 157 (1967); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint
for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1157 (1966).
See also Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
1611 (1985).
On the other hand, some commentators have argued that we should adhere to Swain. See Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the
Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 Md. L. Rev.
337 (1982).
15
In Swain, the Court reviewed the "very old credentials" of the peremptory challenge system and noted the "long and widely held belief that

-
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serve the peremptory nature of the prosecutor's challenge,
the Court in Swain declined to scrutinize his actions in a particular case by relying on a presumption that he properly exercised the State's challenges. I d., at 221-222.
The Court went on to observe, however, that a state may
not exercise its challenges in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. It was impermissible for a prosecutor to use
his challenges to exclude blacks from the jury "for reasons
wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on
trial" or to deny to blacks "the same right and opportunity to
participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the
white population." Id., at 224. Accordingly, a black defendant could make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination on proof that the peremptory challenge system
was "being perverted" in that manner. Ibid. For example,
an inference of purposeful discrimination would be raised on
evidence that a prosecutor, "in case after case, whatever the
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of
Negroes who "have been selected as qualified jurors by the
jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for
cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries." Id., at 223. Evidence offered by the defendant in
Swain did not meet that standard. While the defendant
showed that prosecutors in the jurisdiction had exercised
their strikes to exclude blacks from the jury, he offered no
proof of the circumstances under which prosecutors were responsible for striking black jurors beyond the facts of his own
case. I d. , at 224-228.
A number of lower courts following the teaching of Swain
reasoned that proof of repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases was necessary to establish a violation of the
peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury." 380 U. S. , at
219; see id., at 212-219.
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Equal Protection Clause. 16 Since this interpretation of Swain
has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, 17 prosecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely immune from
constitutional scrutiny. For reasons that follow, we reject
this evidentiary formulation as inconsistent with standards
that have been developed since Swain for assessing a prima
facie case under the Equal Protection Clause.
B

Since the decision in Swain, we have explained that our
cases concerning selection of the venire reflect the general
equal protection principle that the "invidious quality" of governmental action claimed to be racially discriminatory "must
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 240 (1976). As in any
equal protection case, the "burden is, of course," on the defendant who alleges discriminatory selection of the venire "to
prove the existence of purposeful discrimination." Whitus
v. Georgia, 385 U. S., at 550 (citing Tarrance v. Florida, 188
E. g., United States v. Jenkins, 701 F. 2d 850, 859-860 (CAlO 1983);
United States v. Boykin, 679 F. 2d 1240, 1245 (CA8 1982); United States v.
Pearson, 448 F. 2d 1207, 1213-1218 (CA5 1971); Thigpen v. State, 49 Ala.
App. 233, 270 So. 2d 666, 673 (1972); Jackson v. State , 245 Ark. 331, 432
S. W. 2d 876, 878 (1968); Johnson v. Maryland, 9 Md. App. 143, 262 A. 2d
792, 796-797 (1970); State v. Johnson, 125 N. J. Super. 438, 311 A. 2d 389
(1973) (per curiam); State v. Shaw, 284 N. C. 366, 200 S. E. 2d 585 (1973).
7
' See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1113, 1120, and n. 2 (CA2 1984),
cert. pending, No. 84-1426. The lower courts have noted the practical difficulties of proving that the State systematically has exercised peremptory
challenges to exclude blacks from the jury on account of race. As the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed, the defendant would have
to investigate, over a number of cases, the race of persons tried in the particular jurisdiction, the racial composition of the venire and petit jury, and
the manner in which both parties exercised their peremptory challenges.
United States v. Pearson , 448 F. 2d 1207, 1217 (CA5 1971). The court believed this burden to be "most difficult" to meet. Ibid. In jurisdictions
where court records do not reflect the jurors' race and where voir dire proceedings are not transcribed, the burden would be insurmountable. See
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748, 767-768 (1978).
'

6
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U. S. 519 (1903)). In deciding if the defendant has carried
his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake "a sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent
as may be available." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266
(1977). Circumstantial evidence of invidious intent may include proof of disproportionate impact. Washington v.
Davis, 426 U. S., at 242. We have observed that under
some circumstances proof of discriminatory impact "may for
all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds." Ibid. For example,
"total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes
from jury venires," ibid., "is itself such an 'unequal application of the law ... as to show intentional discrimination,'"
id., at 241 (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., at 404).
Moreover, since Swain, we have recognized that a black
defendant alleging that members of his race have been impermissibly excluded from the venire may make out a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. Washington v. Davis, supra, at
239-242. Once the defendant makes the requisite showing,
the burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial
exclusion. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 632. The
State cannot meet this burden on mere general assertions
that its officials did not discriminate or that they properly
performed their official duties. See Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, at 632; Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24, 25 (1967).
Rather, the State must demonstrate that "permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced
the monochromatic result." Alexander v. Louisiana, supra,
at 632; see Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241. 18
Our decisions in the context of Title VII "disparate treatment" have
explained the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules. See M cDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973); Texas Department of
18
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The showing necessary to establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in selection of the venire may be
discerned in this Court's decisions. E. g., Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 494-495 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, at 631-632. The defendant initially must show
that he is a member of a racial group capable of being singled
out for differential treatment. Castaneda v. Partida,
supra, at 494. In combination with that evidence, a defendant may then make a prima facie case by proving that in the
particular jurisdiction members of his race have not been
summoned for jury service over an extended period of time.
I d., at 494. Proof of systematic exclusion from the venire
raises an inference of purposeful discrimination because the
"result bespeaks discrimination." Hernandez v. Texas,
supra, at 482; see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., supra, at 266.
Since the ultimate issue is whether the State has discriminated in selecting the defendant's venire, however, the defendant may establish a prima facie case "in other ways than
by evidence of long-continued unexplained absence" of members of his race "from many panels." Cassell v. Texas, 339
U. S. 282, 290 (1950) (plurality opinion). In cases involving
the venire, this Court has found a prima facie case on proof
that members of the defendant's race were substantially underrepresented on the venire from which his jury was drawn,
and that the venire was selected under a practice providing
"the opportunity for discrimination." Whitus v. Georgia,
385 U. S., at 552; see Castaneda v. Partida, supra, at 494;
Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241; Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, at 629-631. This combination of factors raises
the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination because
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981); United States Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711 (1983). The party
alleging that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination carries the
ultimate burden of persuasion. Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, supra, at 252-256.
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the Court has declined to attribute to chance the absence of
black citizens on a particular jury array where the selection
mechanism is subject to abuse. When circumstances suggest the need, the trial court must undertake a "factual inquiry" that "takes into account all possible explanatory factors" in the particular case. Alexander v. Louisiana, supra,
at 630.
Thus, since the decision in Swain, this Court has recognized that a defendant may make a prima facie showing of
purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by
relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case.
These decisions are in accordance with the proposition, articulated in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.,
that "a consistent pattern of official racial discrimination" is
not "a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. A single invidiously discriminatory governmental act" is not "immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions."
429 U. S., at 266, n. 14. For evidentiary requirements to
dictate that "several must suffer discrimination" before one
could object, McCray v. New York, 461 U. S., at 965 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all. 19

c
The standards for assessing a prima facie case in the context of discriminatory selection of the venire have been fully
articulated since Swain. See Castaneda v. Partida, supra,
at 494-495; Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241-242; Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, at 629-631. These principles support our conclusion that a defendant may establish a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit
Decisions under Title VII also recognize that a person claiming that he
has been the victim of intentional discrimination may make out a prima
facie case by relying solely on the facts concerning the alleged discrimination against him. See cases at supra, n. 19.
'

9
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jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise
of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a
member of a cognizable racial group, Castaneda v. Partida,
supra, at 494, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the
defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely
on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." Avery v. Georgia, supra, at 562. Finally, the
defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used
that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on
account of their race. This combination of factors in the
em panelling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire,
raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.
In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite
showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. For example, a "pattern" of strikes against black
jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an
inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's
questions and statements during voir dire examination and in
exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference
of discriminatory purpose. These examples are merely illustrative. We have confidence that trial judges, experienced
in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against
black jurors.
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral
explanation for challenging black jurors. Though this requirement imposes a limitation in some cases on the full peremptory character of the historic challenge, we emphasize
that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level
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justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. See McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F. 2d, at 1132; Booker v. Jabe, 775 F. 2d 762,
773 (CA6 1985), cert. pending 85-1028. But the prosecutor
may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to the defendant because of
their shared race. Cf. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S., at
598-599; see Thompson v. United States, --U.S. - - ,
- - (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to exclude black persons from the venire on the assumption that
blacks as a group are unqualified to serve as jurors, supra, at
5, so it forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the
assumption that they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black. The core guarantee of
equal protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not
discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were
we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions, which arise solely from the jurors' race. Nor
may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive or "affirming his
good faith in individual selections." Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 632. If these general assertions were accepted as rebutting a defendant's prima facie case, the Equal
Protection Clause "would be but a vain and illusory requirement." Norris v. Alabama, supra, at 598. The prosecutor
therefore must articulate a neutral explanation related to the
particular case to be tried. 20 The trial court then will have
00

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F. 2d, at 1132, that "[t]here are any number of bases" on
which a prosecutor reasonably may believe that it is desirable to strike a
juror who is not excusable for cause. As we explained in another context,
however, the prosecutor must give a "clear and reasonably specific" explanation of his "legitimate reasons" for exercising the challenges. Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 258 (1981).
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the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. 21
IV
The State contends that our holding will eviscerate the fair
trial values served by the peremptory challenge. Conceding
that the Constitution does not guarantee a right to peremptory challenges and that Swain did state that their use ultimately is subject to the strictures of equal protection, the
State argues that the privilege of unfettered exercise of the
challenge is of vital importance to the criminal justice
system.
While we recognize, of course, that the peremptory challenge occupies an important position in our trial procedures,
we do not agree that our decision today will undermine the
contribution the challenge generally makes to the administration of justice. The reality of practice, amply reflected in
many state and federal court opinions, shows that the challenge may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to
discriminate against black jurors. By requiring trial courts
to be sensitive to the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the mandate of equal
protection and furthers the ends of justice. 22 In view of the
In a recent Title VII sex discrimination case, we stated that "a finding
of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact" entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. - (1985). Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration
here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference. ld., at--.
22
While we respect the views expressed in JUSTICE MARSHALL's concurring opinion, concerning prosecutorial and judicial enforcement of our holding today, we do not share them. The standard we adopt under the federal Constitution is designed to ensure that a State does not use
peremptory challenges to strike any black juror because of his race. We
have no reason to believe that prosecutors will not fulfill their duty to exercise their challenges only for legitimate purposes. Certainly, this Court
may assume that trial judges, in supervising voir dire in light of our decision today, will be alert to identify a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Nor do we think that this historic trial practice, which long
21
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heterogeneous population of our nation, public respect for our
criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury
service because of his race.
Nor are we persuaded by the State's suggestion that our
holding will create serious administrative difficulties. In
those states applying a version of the evidentiary standard
we recognize today, courts have not experienced serious administrative burdens, 23 and the peremptory challenge system
has survived. We decline, however, to formulate particular
procedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection
to a prosecutor's challenges. 24

v
In this case, petitioner made a timely objection to the prosecutor's removal of all black persons on the venire. Because
the trial court flatly rejected the objection without requiring
the prosecutor to give an explanation for his action, we remand this case for further proceedings. If the trial court decides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a
has served the selection of an impartial jury, should be abolished because of
an apprehension that prosecutors and trial judges will not perform conscientiously their respective duties under the Constitution.
23
For example, in People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P. 2d 854 (1983),
the California Supreme Court found that there was no evidence to show
that procedures implementing its version of this standard, imposed five
years earlier, were burdensome for trial judges.
24
In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our state
and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how
best to implement our holding today. For the same reason, we express no
view on whether it is more appropriate in a particular case, upon a finding
of discrimination against black jurors, for the trial court to discharge the
venire and select a new jury from a panel not previously associated with
the case, see Booker v. Jabe, 775 F. 2d, at 773, or to disallow the discriminatory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the venire, see United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp.
467, 474 (Conn. 1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United States v. N ewman, 549 F. 2d 240 (CA2 1977).
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neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require
that petitioner's conviction be reversed. E. g., Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U. S., at 549-550; Hernandez v. Texas, supra,
at 482; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S., at 469. 25

It is so ordered.

25
To the extent that anything in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202
(1965), is contrary to the principles we articulate today, that decision is
overruled.
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Rights of Minorities May Be Violated
By Juror Exclusion, High Court Rules
By STEI'HE:\
S!aff R1·por1er of TH>:

WER~IEL

WALL STRt:t:T Jo uR,.A I

WASHINGTON - The Supreme Court
ruled that the constitutional rights of crim·
ina! defendants may be violated when
prosecutors exclude blacks and other mi·
norities from juries.
In a 7-2 ruling. the high court reversed
its own 196S decision and made it signifi cantly easier for a defendant to prove that
a prosecu tor. while picking a jury. violated
the 14th Amendment guarantee of "equal
protection of the laws ."
The ruling involved the stage in a criminal trial in which a panel of potential ju rors has been selected after those with conflicts of interest have been eliminated. In
most states. prosecutors and defense lawyers are then allowed peremptory challenges in which they may exclude jurors
without giving their reasons. until a six person or 12-person JUry has been chosen.
In several states. civil-rights groups
have complained that prosecutors regu larly use their challenges to exclude all
blacks from juries when the defendant is
black . on the theory that black jurors
would be more sympathetic to black defen dant~ .

v

tor must try to prove that there was some
valid reason for th e ex• ~usions that relates
to the case .
Thr court's ruling left an important
questiOn unanswerea. Four justices. two in
th r majority and two in dissent. said in
separate statements that the ruling
shouldn't be applied retroactively. But the
other five, a majority of the court. didn't
say whether they intended the decision to
apply to concluded cases or only to future
cases . If applied retroactively, "hundreds"
of appeals may result, said Steve Ralston.
a civfl-rights lawyer with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund Inc .
Chief Justice Warren Burger and .Justice William Rrhnquist dissented.
The ruling came in an appeal by James
Batson . a black man who was convicted of
burglary by an all-white jury from which
the prosecutor had exrlurled :1!! four h!:J ck
potential jurors. Mr. Batson now will have ,
a chance to prove that his rights were vio- '
Ia ted.

Illinois Abortion Law
The justices unanimously dismissed an
appeal by an Illinois doctor defending the
state's Jaw that regulates abortions. A federal appeals court in Chicago struck down
several sections of the law. Illinois decided
to accept the ruling and didn 't appeal to
the Supreme Court. but an Illinois pediatrician did .
In an opinion written hy Justice Harry
Blarkmun. the court said the doctor
doesn 't have a sufficient legal interest to
file the appeal or to defend the state
law .

In 196~. in an Alabama case. the Su - 1
preme Court ruled that the practice of
challenging blacks or other minorities on
juries only violated a person's rights if th e
defendant showed that prosecutors did it
"in case after case ...
Yesterday. in an opinion written bv Jus tice Lewis Powell. the high court said subsequent state and federal court interpretations of the 196~ ruling have "placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof. ..
. making prosecutors· jury challenges
The ruling is a victory for those favor"largely immune" from court revi ew.
I
ing
the freedom of women to have aborAs a result. the court took the unusual
tions. Women 's groups feared the court
step of explicitly o\·erruling. rather than
might curtail the right to an abortion. or as
trying to differentiate. parts of th e 196 ~
the Reagan administration has urged.
decision. Ironically. the decision yesteroverrulr the right altogether.
day, by a court often described as conserHowever. the justices still have under
\'ative, is considerably more liberal than
the Pennsylvania Jaw that,
consideration
the 196~ ruli ng. which was issued by a
similar to the Illinois Jaw.· regulates aborcourt that is viewed as the most liberal in
tions hy requiring doctors , to inform pahistory.
tiPnts about the risks of abortion and to seJustice Powell said a defendant no
lect methods most· likely to preserve a
longer needs to prove a pattern of excludfetus outside the mother's womb. A federal
ing minority jurors in a string of cases.
appeals court in Philadelphia struck down
Rather . a defendant may show that a
parts of the Pennsylvania Jaw.
" combination of factors" in his own case
prove that the prosecutor discriminated
against minority jurors. Then the prosecu- .

May 9, 1986

84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I am now working on the "holds" for Batson, and the
Clerk plans to place on next Thursday's discuss list about
half of the approximately 20 cases being held. The question
of the retroactivity of Batson is an important one, as suggested by the views expre sed by several members of the
Court. It is clear, I assume beyond dispute, that Batson
enunci tes a ne\ constitutional rule. On the critical
point, our decision overru es Swa'n.

lf the case were accorded retroactivity courts
would be reexamining on habeas corpus hundreds of final convictions. 1 think that t~e only serious question is whether
Batson should b applied to cases pend ng on direct appeal
or prospectively only.
l circulate this
emorandum at this time because
until this issue is resolved, I cannot recommend dispositions of the cases being held. 1 am inclined to grant a
case that was pending here on direct appeal when Batson was
announced, and resolve in that context the extent to which
our decision should be applied retroact'vely.

If we do grant one or more cases to enable us to
resolve this question, one option would be to hold all of
the presently pending ca es until next Term when this issue
c n be decide • It also may be possible to resolve the
issue summarily this Term, though we already are behind in
th Court's work.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

May

0,

986

84 - 626 3 Batson v . Kentucky

MEMORA DUM TO THE CONFERNCE :
In response to my inquiry of May 9 , as to "Holds",
I h ve only heard from the Chief and John Stevens . Severa
Justices have been away , and both Byron and 1 now will be
away until next ~ednesday, 1 suggest that ~e delay acting on
the "Holds" unti our ay 22 Conference .
lt may be desir ble to have a preliminary discussion at our Conference on Thur, ay , May 15 . I am requesting
the Clerk, by a copy of th·s letter, to put this subject on
the "Discus~ List" for that Conference.

L. F. P. , Jr .
ss
cc:

Mr. Joseph F. apaniol, Jr .

'

arne 05/10/86

May 10, 1986
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky

As

I

mentioned

to you yesterday,

one of the cases being

held for Batson may be an appropriate vehicle in which to resolve
the

issue

Prejean v.

of

retroactivity.

The

Blackburn (cert. to CAS).

petition

is

No.

85-5609,

The case is attractive be-

cause it is here on federal habeas and because petr, through the
Debevoise & Plimpton firm, has filed a supplemental petition arguing that Batson should be applied retroactively.
Unfortunately, there is a problem with using the case.

In

addition to his Batson claim, petr argues that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of a person who was a minor at the time
that he committed the murder
state police officer).

(petr was seventeen when he killed a

The Court might be inclined to consider

that claim.
Petr also claims that

the lower courts erred

in denying

him an evidentiary hearing on his claim that the Louisiana death
penalty system is being administered in a racially discriminatory

page 2.

manner;

petr, who is black,

offered statistics that he claimed

showed that Louisiana capital juries discriminate against blacks
who have killed white victims.

CAS concluded that petr's statis-

tical offer was insufficient because it did not account for non(CAS believed that petr should offer statis-

racial variables.

tics showing that death sentences in the judicial district where
he was convicted were

imposed on the basis of race;

the court

also decided that petr 's statewide statistics were insufficient
because they showed only that a disproportionate number of capital defendants in the State were blacks who had killed white victims).

F

Kemp,

in which CAll rejected a similar challenge to the Georgia

Pending

before

death penalty system.

the

Court

is No.

84-6811,

McCleskey v.

McCleskey was held for Lockhart, and the

Court must now decide whether

it

is

inclined

to review CAll's

holding with respect to discriminatory application of the capital
punishment statute.

If the Court does grant McCleskey, some mem-

bers of the Court may want to hold this case for McCleskey.

If

this petition is held, I assume that we could not use it for reselution of retroactive application of Batson.
If McCleskey

is denied,

this case

is

the one we should

propose as the vehicle for resolving retroactivity.
is granted,

If McCleskey

I'm inclined to argue that this case should not be

held because it appears that the statistics offered by petr here
were far weaker than those offered in McCleskey.
CAll held that statistics contained in the

(In McCleskey,

"Baldus Study" were

insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.)

Moreover,

this case presents a challenge to Louisiana's death penalty sys-

page 3.

tern, whereas McCleskey challenges the Georgia system.

I will do

further thinking about whether this case needs to be held in the
event that the Court grants McCleskey.
case

need

not

be

held

is

based

(My impression that this

in part on my view

that CAll

reached the correct result in McCleskey, a view that surely needs
further thought on my part) •
Since only the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens have responded to your memo on this issue, do you think that we should

\ ask the

Clerk to relist the Batson holds for the May 22 Confer-

ence?

That option would give the Justices time to decide what

they want

to do on this question;

perhaps,

the

issue could be

placed on the May 15 Conference List for discussion.

Then,

in

the following week, we could make recommendations concerning the
being held.

lfp/ss 05/10/86

BATC SALLY-POW
84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERNCE:
In response to my inquiry of /'Vt~
only heard from the Chief and John Stevens.

cor,

,

I have

Several

Justices have been away, and both Byron and I now will be
away until next Wednesday, I suggest that we delay acting
on the "Holds" until our May 22.
It may be desirable to have a preliminary
discussion at our Conference on Thursday, May 15.

I am

requesting the Clerk, by a copy of this letter, to put
this subject on the "Discuss List" for that Conference.
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

jnvumt (!J1t1td d tqt ~ittb jtatt.i\'
Jl!U'ltingtlln.~.

Of.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 12, 1986

No. 84-6263

Batson v. Kentucky

Dear Lewis,
I will be attending the Sixth Circuit Conference
this week on the 15th and, therefore, unable to participate
in discussing the holds for Batson. I am inclined to think
it would be possible to take one of the "holds" and decide
the retroactivity issue by way of a per curiam. If enough
others agree you may add my name to such a vote.
In my
view, Batson should not be retroactively applied.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

~mtt <!fanrl uf tlrt~b .jhtlt.s
)luJrittgtDn. ~. Of. 211,5'1- ~
CHAMI!IERS 01'"

.JUSTICE

w ... . .J .

BRENNAN, .JR.

May 12, 1986

No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky

MEMO TO THE CONFERENCE

I agree with Lewis that we should discuss how to dispose of
the question whether Batson should be applied retroactively at
Conference on May 15, 1986.

lt/{j)·~!
i ·
,·
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'

..1'

Copies to the Conference
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arne 05/14/86

May 14, 1986
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky

In your absence, I spoke with Tim Flanigan, the Chief Justice's Super Clerk, and he informed me that a discussion of the
retroactivity of Batson is being placed on the agenda for tomorrow's Conference.

As we discussed,

you have endorsed Justice

Harlan's position on retroactivity, that is, a new constitutional
rule should apply to cases pending on direct appeal when the rule
is announced but not to cases on habeas review.

I am doing fur-

ther reading and research to be sure that there is no sound reason for you to adopt a different position in this case,
will prepare a brief memo before the end of today.

and

I

l

l

arne 05/14/86

May 14, 1986
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky

With respect to retroactivity of

the rule

in

this case,

the Court has, I believe, three options:

(1)
that

is,

The rule could be given complete retroactive effect,
the

rule

could be applied

~D

to cases pending on direct

appeal when Batson was announced and to final convictions on habeas corpus review.

This position is inconsistent with your ap-

preach to retroactivity, and need not be given further consideration.

(2)

The

rule

extent of applying

could

be given

retroactive

effect

to

the ~

it to cases pending on direct appeal at thelf"U,Mr

time that Batson was announced, but the rule would not be applied
in collateral
sents

attack

y~iew

of

on

final

convictions.

retroactivity.

This option repre-

My research and thinking on

the issue persuade me that you should adhere to this position in
this case.

As we have discussed, this position presents the only

"principled" approach to retroactivity.

You have repeatedly en-

page 2.
dorsed this position.
233,

246

(1977)

Missouri,

439

See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432

(Powell, J., concurring in judgment); Harlin v.

u.s.

459,

460

(1978)

judgments); Brown v. Louisiana, 447
J.,

joined

Stumes, 465
ment).

u.s.

by

Stevens,

u.s.

(Powell,

u.s.

638, 651 (1984)

concurring

323, 337 (1980)

concurring

J.,

J.,

in

judgment);

in

(Powell,
Solem v.

(Powell, J., concurring in judg-

As your opinions in these cases indicate, there are com-

pelling reasons for adopting this rule,

reasons grounded on the

even-handed administration of justice, fairness to litigants, the
proper role of the Court, and the purposes of habeas corpus review.

Moreover, as the Court's opinions in this area sadly il-

lustrate, the Court has not come up with any satisfactory alternative approach to the issue of retroactivity.
I#

(3)

The

rule could

,.

be applied prospectively only, _ t hat

-

is, it could be applied only in trials that take place after the
d ecision in Batson was announced.

(Of course, since the petr in

Batson himself was given the benefit of the new rule,

it is im-

possible at this point to hold that the case should be given comThere is a fairly substantial argu-

plete prospective effect.)

ment in favor of this position.
trial

If a black defendant objected at

to the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to

exclude

black

jurors

but

the

judge overruled

the objection

in

reliance on Swain, the prosecutor would not have been required to
come forward with his reasons, as now required under Batson, for
the

challenges.

If

Batson

is applied

retroactively to such a

case pending on direct appeal, it probably will be impossible for

page 3.

prosecutors to reconstruct their reasons for striking the jurors.
Thus,

application

of

the

rule

to

trials

that

occurred

before

Batson was handed down will cause some disruption of the administration of criminal justice.

As noted in point 2 above, I think

that the reasons that support your approach to retroactivity are
compelling; moreover,

I do not think that this argument in favor

of prospective application outweighs the reasons that have formerly persuaded you to adopt the intermediate approach.

While

I

realize that this

issue does need to be settled

for the guidance of the lower courts, I am reluctant to recommend
that you vote to dispose of the issue summarily this term.
have

discussed,

the

Court's

retroactivity decisions

with

constantly changing coalitions

for

varying

As we

are messy,

positions.

(I

have confidence that someday a majority will agree with your approach, but in this case I cannot predict what the Court is likely to do.)

Summary disposition here seems like a mistake because

the issue is an important one, and in view of the Court's confusing

precedents,

briefing would

be

helpful.

Moreover,

capital

cases may present special issues that we have not yet identified.
Therefore,

I

cases)

resolving the issue and direct the parties to submit - -

for

think

that

briefs on the issue.

the

Court

should designate

a case

(or

(Justice Stevens' suggestion that the Court

simply GVR in cases pending on direct appeal and deny those pending on habeas is another option to consider.

That option has the

merit of allowing the lower courts to consider the question and
to write opinions

illuminating

this Court's

review.

Moreover,

page 4.

the Court may be satisfied with the lower courts' resolution and
thus

never

have

to

take

the

question.

However,

likely to be divided on the question so that

the

Court

is

it would end up

granting a case in any event, and the Court may wish to resolve
the problem for the lower courts.)

I

am reviewing

case would

provide

the Holds at this time to identify which

the most appropriate vehicle

to Grant,

and

will give that case number to you by the end of today or first
thing tomorrow morning.

(I'm sorry for the delay. I fear that it

may take some time to decide which case is best for

these pur-

poses, and I wanted to have this portion of the memo before you
as soon as possible in case you would like further
the basic issue.)

research on

-
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arne 05/15/86

May 15, 1986
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky

Last night,
for

I

the cases held

spent a little time reading the pool memos
for

My reading of the memos con-

Batson.

vinces me that, at a minimum, the Court should direct parties in
one or more of these cases to brief the issue of retroactivity.
As I mentioned to you yesterday, it appears that virtually all of
Yk-

~

the petrs in these cases are making a Sixth Amendment argument
n t

relied

~ourt

on

Batson.

My

understanding

is

that

when

the

disposes of a case by summary disposition, ordinarily the

_- ~~~ petition and response discuss the issue that the Court is resolv-

~

ing.

Here, none of the petitions (with the exception of Prejean

v. Blackburn, No.
cussing
Under

85-5609, in which a supplemental petition dis-

retroactivity

those

has

been

circumstances,

filed)

addresses

retroactivity.

summary disposition without

briefing does not seem desirable.

further

(I make this point only be-

cause I suspect that the Chief Justice, from remarks made by his
law

clerk,

may

want

to

dispose

of

this

issue

summarily

this

("
I

page 2.

term.)

In

many

respects,

Prejean

would

be

an

ideal

vehicle,

since it is a capital case here on habeas and since the Debevoise
firm is representing the petr who seeks retroactive application
of Batson.

But as I mentioned, Prejean raises an issue similar

to that in McCleskey v. Kemp, No. 84-6811, which the Court may be
inclined to Grant.

(In my prior memo on this problem, I errone-

ously stated that McCleskey is being held for Lockhart v. McCree,
No.

84-1865.

/

Instead,

it is being held for Rose v. Clark, No.

84-1974).
The Clerk provided us of a list of cases being Held for
Batson;

the list contains 18 cases, and there are 2 more cases

that were Held for
addition,

Lockhart that also raise Batson claims.

In

I am sure that since the Clerk prepared the list, more

petitions with Batson claims have been filed; I'm not certain how
many.

Of the 20 on the list, 4 are here on habeas.

Of those 4,

two are not appropriate vehicles for resolving the retroactivity
issue because they were cases in which the CAs granted the habeas
petitioner relief on Sixth Amendment grounds.
appropriate

because

the

petr

is not

raising

One other is not
a

straight

Batson

claim, but rather is arguing ineffective assistance by reason of
his

lawyer's

failure

to object

peremptory challenges.
v.

Blackburn,

discussed

to exclusion of

blacks

through

The fourth case here on habeas is Prejean
above.

list are here on direct appeal.

The

remaining

16 cases on

the

;g_llW.
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~
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May 22, 1986
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Anne

Re:

Cases held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky

At the May 15, 1986, Conference, three cases for held for
Batson.

All three were here on direct appeal.

85-6552,

85-6678).

NJOT.

went through the books for

I

I

note

that one of

these,

(Nos.
No.

85-6350,

85-6678,

is

today' s Conference, and it

appears that no cases will be held for Batson this week.
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CH AMB E FIS OF"

..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , ..JR .

May 27, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky

No. 85-5823, Welch v. Rice

-

--

In 1979 petr was convicted for armed robbery. Following
direct appeal and state habeas proceedings, petr sought federal habeas review in the DC for the ED Va., arguing, among
other claims, that his lawyer was ineffective for failing to
make certain objections at trial.
Before considering petr's
allegations, the DC observed that the pertinent standard was
set out in Strickland v. Washington. First, petr, who is
black, alleged that his lawyer was ineffective for failing
to object to the seating of an all-white jury. Citing Swain
v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 202 (1965), the DC rejected this contention on the ground that any objection by counsel would
have been meritless.
Second, petr argued that counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to admission of evidence
of petr's bad character. The DC noted that the evidence was
elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination of the arresting officer, and concluded that counsel's action fell
"within the range of 'normal competency.'" Finally, the DC
rejected petr's assertion that counsel was ineffective for
f a i ling to object to the fact that a juror was acquainted
wi th the complaining witness. The juror stated at trial
that, although she knew the witness, she could remain impartial. Under these circumstances, petr had failed to carry
his "burden of proving partiality." Citing Irvin v. Dowd,
366 u.s. 717 (1975).
~
-CA4 denied a certificate of probable cause and dismissed
the appeal.
Appearing in this Court pro se, petr repeats the arguments described above.
I will vote to deny in view of the
Conference's decision that Batson will not be applied to
cases pending on habeas. Moreover, petr's ineffective ass i stance claim is weak in light of counsel's apparent and
u n derstandable reliance on Swain.
Petr's remaining contentions are not certworthy.

1. 7.(/.
L.F.P., Jr.

,iuprttttt

<Jfo-nrl of tltt ~t~ jhdts
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CHAMBERS Of'

JUSTICE LEWI S F. POWELL , JR .

May 28, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky

No. 84-1426! Abrams v. McCray
Resp, who is black, was convicted on robbery charges,
after a trial at which the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove seven blacks and one Hispanic from the
petit jury. Resp's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the state courts denied habeas relief.
He then
filed the habeas petition underlying this cert. petition in
the DC for the ED of NY. The DC held that the prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges violated both the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.
On appeal, CA2 first considered the decision in Swain v.
Alabama. Although urged to hold that Swain was no longer
good law, CA2 observed that it was constrained to follow
Swain, and accordingly declined to rest its decision on the
Equal Protection Clause. CA2 concluded, however, that Swain
did not set the standard for the Sixth Amendment. After
adopting an evidentiary standard based on the Sixth Amendment similar to that approved under the Equal Protection
Clause in Batson, CA2 remanded to the DC for a hearing at
which the State was entitled to come forward with evidence
rebutting resp's prima facie case.
The State filed a petition for cert. _jn which it argues
that {1) racial challenges also violate the Equal Protection
Clause, whether made by the prosecutor or defense counsel:
(2) resp did not establish prima facie that the prosecutor's
challenges were based on race: and {3) CA2 erred in placing
the burden of proof on the State to prove the absence of
discrimination.
In view of the Conference decision that Batson is not to
be applied retroactively on habeas review, my vote is to
deny. The evidentiary standard adopted here comports with
Batson, though CA2 relied on the Sixth Amendment.

t.t-.(1~
L.F.P., Jr.
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CHAMB E RS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

May 28, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky

No. 85-5609, Prejean v. Blackburn
Petr was convicted for murder and sentenced to death.
His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal,
and the state courts denied habeas relief.
Petr filed a
federal habeas petition, which the DC ultimately denied
without holding an evidentiary hearing. CA5 affirmed.
In his cert. petition, petr raises six claims, including
a Batson claim and a Lockhart v. McCree claim. Petr also
argues that the Louisiana death penalty is administered in a
racially discriminatory fashion and that he was improperly
denied an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
Petr has filed
a supplemental petition in which he argues that Batson
should be applied retroactively on habeas review.
In this
connection, he urges that capital cases present special concerns under the Court's discussion in Turner v. Murray, No.
84-6646, concerning the danger of racial bias infecting a
capital jury's sentencing discretion.
Petr's Lockhart claim lacks merit in light of the
Court's decision in that case.
Similarly, the Conference
has decided to reject petr's argument that Batson should
apply retroactively on habeas.
I will vote to continue to
hold this case, however, pending disposition of the cert.
petition in McCleskey v. Kemp, No. 84-68l~·
Petr's challenge to the Louisiana capital punishment system is similar
to the challenge raised in McCleskey to the Georgia scheme.
While petr's statistical evidence appears substantially
weaker than that presented in McCleskey, and the claim is
state-specific, I believe that we should consider the petitions together.
If we decide to grant in McCleskey, we then
will have the opportunity to decide how to handle this petition and similar challenges raised by capital defendants in
other states pending resolution of McCleskey.
My vote is to hold pending disposition of McCleskey v.
Kemp, No. 84-6811.

L .1-. (! 11r-L.F.P., Jr.

,

May 28,
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84-6263 Batson v. KentuckY

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
It was decided at our Conference on May 2 , that we
would grant one or two cases that are here on direct appeal,
lim'ted to the question hether Batson should apply retroactively in those cases, and set them for argument at the top
of our October docket.
At our last Conference w a so voted not to apply Batson to cases here on habeas corpus.
1 suggest that we grant one or both of the
following cases:
85-5221, Griffith v. Kentucky (cert. to the Supreme
Court of Kentucky). This case involves the same prosecutor
a Batson~ he truck four of f've black veniremen. Defense
counsel objected, and the record reflects the prosecutor's
reasons for striking some of the blacks.
85-5731, Brown v. united States (cert. to CAlO).
In this case, the prosecutor struck the only two black ven remen, and made some remarks concerning his desire to have
as few black jurors as possible because the defendant, who
is black, was represented by a rominent black attorney.
There was a time y ob'ection by defense counsel.
If we select only one case, 1 suggest that it be
the federal case as we will have the Solicitor General representing the United States. The Batson issue is clearly
presented in the cert. petitions in both cases.
1 have requested the Clerk to put these two cases
at the end of our discuss list in a special category. ln
addition, 1 have circulate hold memos in four habeas corpus
cases. In view of our vote with respect to habeas cases, 1
recommend deny in three of the cases, and that we hold or
relist 85-5609, Prejean v. Blackburn until we dispose of 846811, McCleskey v. Kemp - a case that presents a challenge
to capital punishment based on statistical evidence that it

'

2.

impacts unfairly on blacks. Incidentally, in two of these
AholdsA, the state- rather than the defendant- is the petitioner.

* * *
1 raise the question whether we shou d take any
action on the holds for Batson until we announce the granting, and setting for argument, of one or two cases that are
pending on direct appeal. When that announcement is made,
we can then dispose of the habeas cases being held.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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CHAM BER S Of'

JUST I CE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

May 28, 1986

84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
In our grant of cert. on one or more of the pending
cases, I suggest the grant be limited to the following
question:
In cases pending on direct appeal,~should the
holding in Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263,
be given retroactive effect?

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

)

May 28, 1986
Re: Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v.

entucky

Dear Joe,
Please place on the List for tomorrow's Con erence No.
85-5221, Griffith v. Kentucky, and No. 85-5731, Bro n v.
United States.

L.F.P., Jr.

Mr. Joe Spaniol

•
#84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky (Bill)
LFP for the Court 12/13/84
1st draft 1/22/86
2nd draft 1/24/86
3rd draft 3/3/86
4th draft 4/21/86
Joined by JPS 1/23/86
WJB 1/24/86
SOC may add concurrence 1/27/86
HAB 1/27/86
BRW 3/7/86
TM 4/17/86
BRW may join but may write separately 1/31/86
TM concurring in part
1st draft 2/18/86
2nd draft 3/4/86
3rd draft 3/18/86
4th draft 4/7/86
5th draft 4/17/86
6th draft 4/28/86
BRW concurring
1st draft 3/7/86
WHR dissenting
1st draft 2/28/86
2nd draft 3/7/86
3rd draft 4/15/86
4th draft 4/28/86
Joined by CJ 4/24/86
CJ dissenting
1st draft 4/16/86
2nd draft 4/25/86
Joined by WHR 4/16/86
JPS concurring
1st draft 4/17/86
2nd draft 4/18/86
3rd draft 4/25/86
Joined by WJB 4/17/86
SOC concurring
1st draft 4/17/86
WHR will dissent 1/23/86
CJ awaiting dissent 1/23/86
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE LEWIS F POWELL , .JR .

June 11, 1986

Batson Retroactivity

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I enclos e a draft of a proposed Per Curiam in Allen
v. Hardy, No. 85-6593, a habeas case pending here on cert to
CA7.
Both the District Court and CA7 rejected Allen's contention that the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges violated Swain and the Sixth Amendment.
In the pending petition for cert, Allen may fairly be viewed as arguing
that Batson should be applied retroactively on habeas.
On May 29, 1986, the Conference thought that the
Court should use Abrams v. McCray, 84-1426, as the case for
deciding whether Batson should be applied retroactively on
collateral review of convictions that became final before
Batson was announced.
In McCray, CA2 - applying Sixth
Amendment analysis - concluded that Swain was not a binding
precedent because it was decided on equal protection
grounds. On reflection, I concluded that the retroactivity
issue should not be resolved in McCray, primarily because
McCray adopted a Sixth Amendment standard that the Court has
not yet considered.
It would be difficult to write a decision holding that Batson did not apply retroactively in the
context of a case that applied a different constitutional
rule, without also saying something about the merits of that
rule.
If the Court approves a Per Curiam along the lines
of my draft, we then could dispose of McCray - and also
Michigan v. Booker, 84-1028 (a CA6 case similar to McCray) by a GVR in light of both Batson and Allen v. Hardy. That
disposition would inform CA2 and CA6 that they should reconsider their Sixth Amendment analysis in light of Batson, and
that they should not apply the new standard - whether under
the Equal Protection Clause or the Sixth Amendment - to
final convictions.
I should note that we called for a response in Allen v. Hardy on May 16, 1986. As the time for a response

'
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does not expire until June 16, we should not act on these
cases until the June 19 Conference. It is unlikely that
anything in the response will require a change in the enclosed draft.

L. 1-. rf

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

June 11, 1986

Batson Retroactivity

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
1 enclose a draft of a proposed Per Curiam in Allen
v. Hardy, No. 85-6593, a habeas case pending here on cert to
CA7. Both the District Court and CA7 rejected Allen's contention that the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges violated Swain and the Sixth Amendment. In the pending petition for cert, Allen may fairly be viewed as arguing
that Batson should be applied retroactively on habeas.
On May 29, 1986, the Conference thouqht that the
Court should use Abrams v. McCray, 84-1426, as the case for
deciding whether Batson should be applied retroactively on
collateral review of convictions th t became final before
Batson was announced. ln McCray, CA2 - applying Sixth
Amendment analysis - concluded that Swain was not a binding
precedent because it was decided on equal protection
grounds. On reflection, 1 concluded that the retroactivity
issue should not be resolved in McCray, primarily because
McCray adopted a Sixth Amendment standard that the Court has
not yet considered. It would be difficult to write a decision holding that Batson did not apply retroactively in the
context of a case that applied a different constitutional
rule, without also saying something about the merits of that
rule.
If the Court approves a Per Curiam along the lines
of my draft, we then could dispose of McCray - and also
Michigan v. Booker, 84-1028 (a CA6 case similar to McCray) by a GVR in light of both Batson and Allen v. Hardy. That
disposition would inform CA2 and CA6 that they should reconsider their Sixth Amendment analysis in light of Batson, and
that they should not apply the new standard - whether under
the Equal Protection Clause or the Sixth Amendment - to
final convictions.
1 should note that we called for a response in Allen v. Hardy on May 16, 1986. As the time for a response

'
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does not expire until June 16, we should not act on these
cases until the June 19 Conference. It is unlikely that
anything in the response will require a change in the enclosed draft.

L.P.P., Jr.

ss

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON , D. C. 20543

June 11,1986

To:

Ann Marie Coughlin
Joe Spaniol

A list of the Batson "holds" is attached.
Please let me know when they should be listed for
Conference.

Attachment

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F POWELL , JR .

June 18, 1986
Re:

Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Thinking it might be helpful, I summarize the status
of the cases held for Batson:
V'

(1)
There are 21 cert. petitions held for Batson.
~
One of these, No. 85-5609, Prejean v. BlackDurn, a case here
/ . A
on federal habeas, has been relisted with No. 84-6811,
~~
McCleskey v. Kemp (the case involving the Baldus study).
~Ju(~
The Batson claim raised by the petr in Prejean ultimately
{~~
will be rejected on the ground that Batson does not apply
~~)
retroactively on habeas review.
(2)
Of the remaining 20 petitions, I have circulated q ~
hold memos in 9 of the cases pending on dif e ~ r..ev_iew.
~~~
These 9 cases are on the discuss list for tomorrow's Confer- - c ~
ence.
In those cases in which the Batson claim was properly ~
preserved, I recommend a hold for No. 85-5221, Griffith v. ~ ~t
Kentucky, and No. 85-5731, Brown v. United States, in which ~
we will decide whether Batson should apply retroactively to ~
cases pending on direct appeal. Where the claim was not ~
preserved, I recommend we deny.
~; /~
~~-1-u,..v

/l

c.~

(3)
Eleven cases held for Batson, plus No. 85-6593, c~
Allen v. Hardy (my per curiam rejecting retroactive applica- ~
tion of Batson on habeas) , have been relisted for next
~~~
week's Conference.
I will be circulating hold memos for
those eleven cases.
Three of the cases are here on federal
habeas, and will be disposed of in light of my per cur1am
opiTHon.
There are six votes for the per curiam. Justice /
!AMarshall will circula~e a dis7ent.
Se~en of the remaining ~L~.~
eleven cases are pend1ng on d1rect rev1ew.
The hold memos
---,
for these cases will be drafted along the lines described in
point (2) above.
The eleventh case appears to be here on
state habeas.

J11

L.F.P., Jr.

June 18, 1986
Re:

Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky
MEMORANDUM TO TRE CONFERENCE:

Thinking it might be elpful, I summarize the status
of the cases held for Batson:
(1) There are 21 cert. petitions held fo~ Batson.
One of these, No. 85-5609, Prejean v. Blackburn, a case here
on federal habeas, has been relisted with No. 84-6811,
McCleskey v. Kemp (the case involving the Baldus study).
The Batson claim raised by the petr in Prejean ultimately
will be rejected on the ground that Batson does not apply
retroactively on habeas review.
(2} Of the remaining 20 petitions, 1 have circulated
hold memos in 9 of the cases pending on direct review.
These 9 cases are on the discuss list for tomorrow's Conference. In those cases in which the Batson claim was properly
preserved, 1 recommend a hold for o. 85-5221, Griffith v.
Kentucky, and No. 85-5731, Brown v. United States, in which
we will decide whether Batson should apply retroactively to
cases pending on direct appeal. Where the claim was not
preserved, 1 recommend we deny.
(3) Eleven cases held for Batson, plus No. 85-6593,
Allen v. Hardy (my per curiam rejecting retroactive application of Batson on habeas), have been relisted for next
week's Conference. 1 will be circulating hold memos for
those eleven cases. Three of the cases are here on federal
habeas, and will be disposed of in light of my per curiam
opinion. There are six votes for the per curiam. Justice
Marshall will circulate a dissent. Seven of the remaining
eleven cases are pending on direct review. The hold memos
for these cases will be drafted along the lines described in
point (2) above. The eleventh case appears to be here on
state habeas.

L.F.P., Jr.

June

8, 1986

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263

No. 85-6552, Jackson v. Ohio (cert. to Ohio Sup. Ct .)
During jury se ection at petr ' s tria for rape , the
prosecutor exercised two o
is four peremptory cha enges
against blac~s.
Petr, who is black, timely objecte on the
ground t~at the prosecutor's action violated petr's right to
be tried by a jury o
is peers , an move for a continuance
so that ~d tic al b ack veniremen could be ca ed . T e TC
denied the motion, and petr was convicted .
On appea , Ohio App. Ct . affirmed . The court rejected
numerous contentions raised by petr, including an argument
concerning the 5t te ' s exercise of peremptory challenges.
The court faun the rat ' onale of Swain v. Alabama, 380 u.s .
202 <1965), to be nispositive. Oh ' o Sup. t. denie
eave
to appea •
In his cert. petition, among four ot er c aims , petr
argues that the State's use of peremptory challenges violated his rights under the S xth Amendment and the EQual Protection Clause .
In response to that argument , the State
relies upon the analysis of S~ain an contends that the
record oes not support petr ' s claim that the prosecutor
used his cha lenges on racial groun s .
Since Ohio App . Ct. reste its decision on the merits,
not on any alleged inadequacy in the record, I will vote to
hold th's pet tion for the cases in which we will decide
whether Batson should be applied retroactively to cases
pending on direct review .
My vote is to hold for No . 85-5221, Griffith v. Kentucky
and No . 85-5 731 , Brown v. United States.

L.F.P., Jr.

June 18, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Ca~es

Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263

No. 85-6350, Po borny v. Ohio (cert. to Ohio Ct. App.)
Petr, a white woman, was tried along with two codefendants, black men, on criminal charges. During jury
selection, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the
ground that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges against three blacks. The prosecutor explained that
he had "not only excused black people from serving on the
jury, but had also excused white people." Ohio Ct. App. affirmed petr's conviction, rejecting her contention that the
State's use of peremptory challenges violated her constitutional rights. In the court's view, the facts did not give
rise to a prima facie case of discrimination, and the prosecutor's response "was a very pertinent argument against any
alleged practice of d scrimination.
In her cert. petition, petr asserts the Batson claim.
The State claims that petr did not properly present her objection to the TC and that the record does not disclose the
race of the excluded jurors.
Ohio Ct. App. did not rest its decision on a procedural
default. The only precedent cited by the court was Akins v.
Texas, 325 u.s. 398 (1945), which involved alleged discrimination in selection of the venire. While cases invo ving
the venire are not irrelevant in this context, it is not
clear that the court below rejected petr's claim under the
appropriate legal standard. Therefore, my vote is to hold
the petition for the cases in which we will decide whether
Batson should be applied retroactively to cases pending on
direct appeal.
In the event that Batson is so applied, the
state courts can consider whether petr has standing to raise
the claim and whether the claim is procedurally barred.
My vote is to hold for No. 85-5221, Griffith v.
tucky, and No. 85-5731, Brown v. United States.

L.F.P., Jr.

~

June 18 ,
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ME ORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re :

Cases Held for Batson v . Kentuck y, No . 84 - 6263

No . 85-6315, Williams v. l lJinois (cert . to 111 . App . Ct . )
Petr was conv ' cted for felony murder .
111 . App . Ct .
affirmed, rejecting petr ' s contention that the State violated is right to a representative jury when it used peremptory challenges to strike three black v eniremen .
The court
rejecte the c a·m un er state case a\ precedent adhering
to the evioentiary standard of Swain v . A ba~a, 380 u.s.
202 (1965).
In his cert . petition, petr reoeats his contention concerni ng th e Sta e·~ exerc:se of peremptory challenges and
alec rai~es Confrontati0n Clause claim .
Responning to the
Batson c ai , the State notes t ,1t oetr • s nnalysis s inconsistent with S a'n .
Since this ca e was pen ing on direct review when Batson
a announce , 1 wi 1 vote to hol the petition for the
cases in which we w'll decide whether Batson shoulo e applied retroactively on d rect appe~l .
vote is to hold for No . 85-5221 , GriffitP v . Kentucky, and No . 85-573] , Brown v . Uni t ed Sta t es .

L. F . P .,J r .

June 18, 1986
MEMORANDU

Re:

TO THE CONFERENCE

Cases Held for Batson v . Kentucky, No. 84-6263

No. 85-6253, Foro v . Georqia {cert . to Ga . Sup. Ct . )
Petr was convicte for mur er and sentenced to death .
Ga . Sup. Ct. affirmed , rejecting, among numerous contentions, petr's argument that the prosecutor ' s use of peremptory chal enges to exclude black veniremen vio ated his
right to a representative jury . The court rejected the
claim because petr had shown only that a large percentage of
black veniremen were struck in his case: he had offered no
evidence of systematic exclusion of jurors in the jurisdiction.
ln his cert . petition , in addition to raising a claim
premised on Lockhart v . HcCree , No . 84-1865 , and a prosecutorial misconduct claim , petr requests the Court to hold
this case pending recision in No . 84-6263 , Batson v. Kentucky . The State respond by arguing that Ga . Sup . Ct .
properly rejected the Batson claim , and points out that the
case is factually distinquishable from Batson because one
black citizen served on the jury .
I wi 1 vote to hold this petition for the cases in which
we will decide whether Batson should be applied retroactively to cases pen ing on direct appeal. If we conclude that
Batson is to be given retroactive effect , t e question
whether the facts of this case give rise to an inference of
discriminatory intent will be for the state courts to decide
on remand .
My vote is to hold for No . 85 - 5221 , Griffith v . Kentucky, and No . 85-5731 , Brown v . United States .

L.F.P.,J r .

June 18,
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re :

Cases Held for Batson v . Kentucky , No . 84-6263

No . 85-5940 , Holme s v . I ll i nois (cert . to 111 . App . Ct .)
In his cert . petition , petr raises the claim raised by
t e petr in No . 84-6263 , Batson v . Kentuc~y . The State re sponds by arguing that the trial record is "un eveloped , " in
that it does not reveal the number of black veniremen , the
number of b acks exc u ed ~y the prosecutor ' s use of peremptory chal enge~, or t e "raci
· aent•ty" of those excluded .
Citing to the record , petr contends that he objected to
the prosecutor's exercise of. cha lenges against blacks .
Moreover, Ill. App . Ct . di not re y on t e ina equacy of
the recor in rPjectinq the c1aiw . Therefore, I will vote
to hold this petition for the cases in which we will eci e
whet ~r Batson should e applle retroactively to cases
pending on 0irect a~pea1 . In the event that we conclude
that our holding should be given retroactive effect, the
state courts an cons · er on remand whether petr failed to
make a record supporting his leqal claim .
My vote is to hold for No . 85 - 5221 , Griffith v. Kentucky , and No . 85-5731 , Brown v . Uni t ed States .

L. F. P. , Jr .

June 18,
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MEMORANDUM TO TRE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Reld for Batson v . Kentucky , No . 84-6263

No. 85-5190, Nurse v. Illinois (cert. to 111. App. Ct.)
Petrs, who are black, claim that the State's use of peremptory challenges exclude nine black veniremen violated
petrs' rights to equal protection, and to an impartial jury
drawn from a cross-section of the community. ln response,
th St te suggests that petrs may not have properly pres rve~ t e'r equal Protection argument because their motion
for a new trial mere y alleged a enial of equal protection
without supplying any facts to support the claim.
Since 111. Apo. Ct. re'ecten the c aim on the merits,
without any mention of a procedural bar, 1 ~'ill vote to hold
this petition for the cases in whic. we will decide whether
Batson shoul be applied retroactively to cases pending on
direct review.
y vote is to hold for No. 85-5221, Griff'th v. Kentucky, and No. 85-5731, Brown v. United States.

L.F.P., Jr.

June 18, 1986
M£MORANDU
Re:

TO THE CONFERE CE

Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263

No. 84-6732, Orji v. United States (cert. to CAS)
Petr, a back an, as convicted on narcotics charges.
The overn ent used its peremptory c1allenges to strike the
s·x b ack ersons inc uae1 on the venire. After the jury
was s orn, petr's lawyer state~ that he had a motion to make
outside the :ury•s oresence. The judge excused the jury,
ana, w thout exola ning the ~elief sought, counsel stated
that he ~id not •understand the striking of every single
black juror."
On aopeal, petr claimed that the Government's exercise
of peremptory cha lenges vtolat~d his rights 11n~er the Equal
P otection Clause and the Sixth rnendment. CAS "put aside
the sufficiency of the obiection beforP the trial court and
~hether it was timely."
T e court t en rejecte~ the claim
on the mer ts because petr had not s tisfien the evtoentiary
bur en imposed by Swain v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 202 (196S).
In his cert. petition, petr rques that the Sixth Amendment forbids prosecutors to exercise peremptory challenges
sole y on the basis of race, and that we should prohibit
such ch lenges under our supervisory power.
In response,
the SG points out that there is a "question as to whether
[petr} adequately and timely preserved an objection to the
prosecution's use of peremptory challenges."
Since CAS did not in fact rest its decision on a procedural default, I will vote to hold this petition for the
cases ·n which we will decide whether Batson should be applied retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal.
In
the event that we decide that Batson is to be g ven ret~oac
tive effect, CAS can consider the issue of procedural default on remand.
My vote is to hold for No. 85-S221, Griffith v. Kentucky, and No. 85-5731, Brown v. United States, No. 85-5731.

L.F.P.,Jr.

June 18 , 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re :

Cases Held for Batson v . Ken t ucky , No . 84-6263

No. 84 - 6698, Carter v. Uni t ed States (cert . to CA3)
Petr, who is black , was conv icted for bank robbery .
During jury se ect'on, petr objected to the prosecutor ' s
exercise o a peremptory challenge to remove the only black
veniremen . The DC overruled the objection .
On appeal, oetr primari y arque that the Government
vio ated Fed. R. Crim. P. 12. by fa' ' ng to give him notice
of ts alibi rebutta_ witnesses and that the DC erre . in
refusing to suppress the testimony of those witnesses.
Though agreeinq that the prosecutor should have qiven oetr
not ' ce, CA3 conclu ed that the DC did not abuse its discret'on in declining to suppress the evidence . After rejecting
other cla'ms, CA3 affirmed.
The third question pre~ented in the cert. petition is a
Batson claim. CA3's dec'sion ists the claims raised by
petr on appeal, but does not mention a Batson claim . The SG
states that petr did not press a Batson claim in CA3, and
petr does not a1lege that he in so. Since 1 conc _ude that
petr failed to raise the cla'm below , 1 wil vote to deny on
this claim .
The first and second questions challenge CA3 ' s disposition of the Government's Rule 2 . 1 violation . These questions are not certworthy. F ' rst, contrary to petr ' s assertion, th's case does not conflict with United States v . ~
ers, 550 F.2d 1036 (CAS 977). Second , there is no merit to
petr's contention that the DC ' s application of Rule 12 . 1
violates Wardius v. Oregon, 412 u. s . 470 (1973 ). Unlike the
statute in ~ardius , Rule 12 . 1 requires reciprocal d'scovery
rights, and petr ' s allegation that he was denied due process
is unconvincing in v iew of CA3 ' s conc lusion that he had ac tual knowledge of the identi t ies of the rebuttal witnesses .
My vote is to deny .

L. F.P., Jr.

June 18, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263

No. 84-6633, Williams v. Texas (cert. to Tx. Ct. Crim. App.)
Petr, a black man, was convicted for murdering a white
po ice officer, and sentenced to death. Tx. Ct. Crim. App.
rejected on the merits petr•s argument that the State violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment by
using peremptory challenges to strike al five blacks on the
venire. In his cert. petition, petr repeats, among other
claims, his argument concerning the State's exercise of its
chal enges.
Since this case was pending on direct appeal when our
opinion in Batson was announced, 1 will vote to hold the
petition for the cases in which we will decide whether
Batson should be applied retroactively to cases pending on
direct review.
My vote is to hold for No. 85-522 , Griffith v. Kentucky, and No. 85-5731, Brown v. United States.

L.F.P., Jr.

Jun

26,
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263

No. 85-6678,

alker v. Oh'o (cert. to Oh. Sup. Ct.)

After his first trial ended in a hung jury and his second conviction was vacated on fe eral habeas, petr's third
trial resulted 'n a conviction for murder. On appeal, petr
argued that the prosecutor improperly exercised a peremptory
challenge on racial grounds, striking the only black on the
jury panel. Ohio Ct. App. rejected this claim because "a
peremptory chal enge 1oes not require a reason." Petr also
c aimed that the evidence of his guilt was insufficient to
support the jury's verdict. Observing that the record presented a "mass of conf icting testimony," the court held
that there waq "sufficient competent evidence" to support
the verdict. Oh. Sup. Ct. denied leave to appeal.
Petr filed a petition for cert., which is NJOT. Be contends that the evidence was insuf icient under the standard
of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 u.s. 307 (1979). He also claims
that the prosecu or c allenged the only black venireman because he was black and that this action eprived him of his
right to an impartial jury selected from a cross-section of
the community. The State argues that there was ample evidence to support petr's conviction and that petr di not
estab ish systematic exc usion of black 'urors. The State
also contends that the record does not support petr's assertions that the prosecutor's chal enge was racially motivated
or that there was only one black on the venire.
1 will vote to hold this petition for the cases in which
we wi 1 decide whether Batson will be applied retroactively
on direct appeal. lf Batson is so applied, the state court
should decide in the first instance whether this record
gives rise to an inference of purposeful discrimination.

My vote is to hold for No. 85-5221, Griffith v. Kentucky, nd No. 85-5731, Brown v. United States.

L.F.P., Jr.

June 24, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky

No. 85-1028, Michigan v. Booker
Resp, a black man, was convicted for armed robbery, and
his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. He then
sought fe eral habeas corpus relief, arguing that the jury
selection process at his trial was so infected with racism
as to violate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
recor d shows that the prosecutor used h's peremptory challenges to exclude twenty-two black veniremen, while defense
counsel excused thirty-seven white veniremen. The DC denied
relief, and CA6 reversed.
CA6 concluded that the Sixth Amendment prohibits parties
in a criminal case from using peremptory challenges to exclude black persons from the petit jury. CA6 observed that
Swain v. Alabama foreclosed the Equal Protection claim
raised by resp.
But for the decision in Swain, CA6 stated
that it would find that resp was denied equal protection by
the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. CA6 then
~ent on to adopt an evidentiary stan ard under the Sixth
Amendment simi ar to that approved in Batson under the Equal
Protection C ause, holding its new standard applicable to
both prosecutors and defense counsel.
CA6 remanded, ordering the DC to grant the writ unless the State promptly retries resp. The State filed a petition for cert.
My vote is to GVR in light of Batson v. Kentucky, No.
84-6263, to afford CA6 the opportunity to reconsider its
Sixth Amendment analysis, and in 'ght of A len v. Hardy,
No. 85-6593, to inform CA6 not to apply its new rule retroactively on habeas.

L.F.P., Jr.

June 24,
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky

No. 84- 426, Abrams v. McCray
Resp, who is black, was convicted for robbery, after a
trial at w ich the prosecutor used peremptory cha en es
against seven b acks nd one Htspanic.
Resp•~ conviction
tas affirmed on d'rect appea , and the state courts den ed
habeas relief. He then f' ed th habeas petition underlying
this c rt. etition in the DC for t e ED of NY.
Th~ DC held
that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenqes v'olated
both the Sixth Amendment nd the Equal Protect'on Clause.
On appeal, CA2 observed that it was onstrained to follow the decjsion in w~in v. Alabam , and accordinqlv dec ined to rest its decision on the Bqual Protect on Clause.
CA2 conclu e , however, that s~ain d'd not set the standar
for the Sixth Amendm nt. After adopting an ev dentiary
standar based on the Sixth Amendment sim lar to that approved un er the Equal Protection Clause in Batson, CA2 reman ed to the DC for
hearing at w ich the State w s entitle to com
orwar with evidence re utting resp's p rna
facie case.
The State has filed a petition for cert. in which it
argues that (1) racial challenges a so violate the Equal
Protection Clause, whether made by the prosecutor or defense
counsel: (2) resp did not establish prima acie that the
prosecutor's chal enges were based on race: and (3) CA2
erred in p acing the burden of proof on the State to prove
the absence of discrim'nation.
y vot is to GVR in ight of Batson v. ~entucky, o.
84-6263, to afford CA2 the opoortunity to reconsider ts
Sixth Amendment nalys·s, and in light of Allen v. Hardy,
o. 85-6593, to inform CA2 not to apply its new rule retroactively on habeas.

L.F.P., Jr.

June 24, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky

No. 85-5823, Welch v. Rice
In 1979 petr as convicted for armed robbery. Following
direct revie an state habeas proceedings, petr. sought habeas relief in federal DC, asserting, among other c .aims,
that his lawyer wa ineffective for f iling to make certain
objections at tri
Before consider'ng Petr's allegations,
the DC observed that the pertin ~t standard was et out ·n
Str'cklan~ v.
shington. First, petr, who is b ck, allege that his awyer as ineffective for f il'ng to obiect
to the seating of an
l-\h'te jury. C ttng Swa·n v. A abama, the DC rejected thi contention on the ground that any
o jection by counsel would have been meritles~. Second,
petr argued that counse wa ineffective for f
ling to object to admission of evi ence of petr's bad character. The
DC noted th t the ev'd nee was e ic'ted by defense counsel
on cross-examination o the arresting officer, and concluded
that counsel's action fell "within the range of 'normal competency.•ft Fin lly, the DC re'ect
petr's assertion that
counsel was ineffective for fu ing to object to the fact
that a juror wa acquainted with the complaining witness.
The juror stated at trial that, although she knew the itness, she coul remain impartial. Under these circumstances, petr had failed to carry his "burden of proving
partiality." Citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 u.s. 717 (1975). CA4
denied a certificate of probable cause and dismissed the
appeal.
Appearing here pro se, petr repeats the arguments described above. 1 will vote to deny in view of. our decision
in Allen v. Hardy, No. 85-6593, that Batson wil not be applied retroactively to cases pending on habeas.
Petr's ineffective assistance claim is weak since counsel apparently
and understan ably relied on Swain, and his remaining contentions are not certworthy.
My vote is to deny.

L.F.P., Jr.

June 24, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky,

No. 84-6504,

~ack

o. 84-6263

v. Illinois (cert. to Ill. Sup. Ct.)

Following a bench tr'al, oetr, a b ack man, was convicted for murder. During selection of the 'ury for the
penalty hearing, the prosecutor exercise1 2 Peremptory
challenges against blacks, with the result that only one
black juror was seated. The jury fixed punishment at death.
Ill. Sup. Ct. affirmed, rejecting, among other claims,
petr's contention that he ~as den e due Process b the
State's use of eremptory chal enges. The court reaqoned
that a defendant does not make out a constitutional violation by proving that th~ State exercised Peremptory challenges to exclude b acks from his jurv. R~th , the defendant had the burden of proving system
c exclusion,
burden
that etr ha not carried in th's case.
In his cert. petition, petr raises two clai s, one of
which argues that
s S'xth menom nt riqhts wer violated
by the State's use o~ per mptory ch 1 enges. Respon ing to
that c aim, the State urges t e rotrt tore ffir Swain v.
Alabama and contends that th record i t is cas reflects
neutral reasons supporti g t e prosecu or's challenges.
111. Sup. Ct. rejected
m un er the Swain
standard, not n the groun
r sons suooorte .
the prosecutor's challenges. Therefore, 1 will vote to hold
this petition for the cases in ~hich we will 1 cide whether
Batson should be applied retroactively to cases pending on
direct apoea • If Batso is so ?pplied, the state courts
should decide whether petr has est lis ed a prima f cie
case of discrimination and, if so, whether the prosecutor's
explanations rebut that case.

My vote is to hold for Griffith v. Kentucky, No. 855221, and Brown v. United States, o. 85-5731.

L.F.P., Jr •

•

June 24, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO TBE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263

No. 84-6536, White v. Alabama (cert. to Ala. Crim. App.)
Petr was convicted for robbery. During jury selection,
petr objected to the prosecutor's exercise of six peremptory
challenges against blacks. The TC overruled the objection.
On direct appeal, Ala. Crim. App. rejected petr•s claim
that he was denied a "fair trial" because t e State use
peremptory chal enges to exclude black veniremen.
The
court held that petr ha not satisfied his burden of proving
"systematic exclusion." The court cited Carpenter v. State,
404 So.2d 89 (Ala. cr·m. App. 1980), which in turn cited
Thigpen v. State, 270 So.2d 666 (Ala. 1972), which relied on
the standard of Swain v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 202 (1965).
Appearing in t is Court pro se, petr raises eight
claims, one of which concerns the State's use of peremptory
challenges. Petr primarily argues that he was enied his
right to a fair tria under the state constitution, but he
also claims that he ~uffered a deprivation of his rights
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal
Constitution. In response, the State cites S1ain, asserting
that the Constitution does not require an examination of the
reasons un erlying 'ts exercise of peremptory challenges.
While petr's inartful papers raise some question as to
whether he pressed a federal claim below, the State does not
suggest that petr did not preserve a federal question.
Moreover, it seems clear that Ala. Crim. App. re'ected the
claim under a line of state decisions that rested on Swain.
Therefore, 1 will vote to hold this petition for the cases
in which we will decide whether Batson should be applied
retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal.

My vote is to hold for Griffith v. Kentucky, No. 855221, and Brown v. United States, No. 85-5731.

L.F.P., Jr.

June 25, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CO FERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263

No. 85-5949, White v. Missouri (cert. to Mo. Ct. App.)
Petr, who is b ack, was tried for murder. An all-white
jury was selected after the prosecutor exercised peremptory
challenges against four black veniremen. Petr moved to
quash the jury "because of the discriminatory use by the
state of its peremptory challenges." The TC enied the motion. Petr was convicted and sentenced to a prison term.
On direct appeal, petr raise an argument concerning
the State's exerci e of peremptory challenges. Mo. ct. App.
rejected that claim on the grounds that petr had failed to
show a violation of the cross-section requirement imposed by
Duren v. Missouri, that the actu 1 petit jury need not constitute a cross-section, that petr failed to prove that the
"representation of blacks was unfair in relat"on to the number of blacks in the community," an that he failed to establish systematic exclusion of "blacks as veniremen." The
court re ected petr's r maining content"ons, nd affirmed.
Mo. Sup. Ct. denied review.
Among the c a·ms raise in his cert. petition, petr
includes his argument concerning the State's use of peremptory challenges, contending that the prosecutor'~ action
vio ated petr's right to an impartial jury selected from a
fair cross-section of t e commun ty. Respondinq to that
claim, the State asserts only that 't need not iscuss the
issue because we wi
reso v the ·ssue in Bat on.
Since this case was pending on direct appeal when Batson
was announced, I will vote to hold it for the cases ·n which
we will decide whether Batson should apply retroactively on
direct appeal.
My vote is to hold for Griffith v. Kentucky, No. 855221, and Brown v. United States, No. 85-5731.

L.F.P., Jr.

June 26, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263

No. 85-1317, Tucker v. Un'ted States (cert. to CA7)
Petr is a b ack man who was tried for fraud along with
the petr in No. 85-976, a white woman.
After the prosecutor used four of his seven peremotory cha lenges against
blacks, an all-white jury was selected. Defense counsel
objected to exc usion of the black veniremen. When the DJ
asked for an explanation, the prosecutor stated that, because the case invo ved comp ex commerc'a transactions, he
sought educated jurors with business experience, and that
the blacks on the venire were uneducated. Accepting that
explanation, the DC overruled defense counsel's objection.
Petr was convict d.
On appeal, petr raised three relevant claims. He
claimed that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's in camera
submissions to the OJ, that the DC erroneously excluded a
letter written by a prosecution witness, and that the prosecutor impermissibly exe cised his peremptory challenges on
racial grounds. CA7 rejected these arguments. First, CA7
concluded that the prosecutor acted prudently in submitting
certain documents to the DJ for a decision as to whether
they constituted Brady material. CA7 found petr's suggestion that the documents poisoned the DJ's mind to be "ridiculous" since DJs must be trusted impartially to preside over
trials at which they possess information adverse to the defendants that the jurors do not know. Second, CA7 agreed
that the DJ erre in excluding the letter. But A7 observed
that the letter had been used extensively to impeach the
witness' testimony and that it did not establish that his
testimony was false. Under these circumstances, the error
was "harmless." Finally, CA7 rejected petr's argument concerning the Government's use of peremptory challenges. CA7
noted that Batson was pending before us, but believed that
Batson would not help petr, whatever its holding, since the
DJ already ha satisfied himself that the prosecutor's challenges were not motivated by racial bias. CA7 held that the
DC's finding in this connection were "not clearly erroneous."
ln his cert. petition, petr raises the Batson claim,
emphasizing that the prosecutor's explanation was given ex
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parte and claiming that the explanation was a pretext. He
also claims that he was denied due process because the in
camera submissions biased the DJ against him and that the
improper evidentiary ruling was such a fundamental error as
to require reversal w thout nalysis for harmless error.
For the reasons stated in my hold memo in No. 85-976,
Be 1 v. United States, 1 will vote to deny th's oetition.
Consistent with Batson, the DJ asked the prosPcutor to explain why he challenged blacks. The OJ found that the challenges were not racia y motiv ted, an CA7 he d that this
finding was not clear y erroneous.
hile there rna be merit
to petr's argument that an ex parte hearing w s inappropriate, Batson refrained from saying anythinq about the Procedures that the ower courts shou
fo low. Thus, a GVR
would not be helpful. Petr's remaining arguments are not
certworthy.
~y

vote is to deny.

L.F.P., Jr.

June 27, 1986
MEMORANDUM 'I'O THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263

No. 85-5451, Riley v. Delaware (cert. to Del. Sup. Ct.)
During ;urv selection at petr's murder trial, the prosecutor use 0 3 of
is 12 peremptory c allenges against the
three blacks rem in ng on the venire after challenges for
cause.
Petr
' 0 not make a contemporaneou ohjPction to the
prosecutor'
c allenges, but after the 'ury wa~ selected he
renewed an earlier motion to " ischarge the venire for racial imbalance." The TC denied the motion.
Pe r was convicted for both 'ntentional murder and felony murder, and
sentenced to eat for the f.e1on murder.
On appeal, Del. Sup. ct. considerPd petr's argument that
the proqecutor ex rcised his peremptory challenges for "racial reasons" in violation of the ;:,'x h Arne dment.
The
court rejected the argument on t~o grounds .
F'rst, tt concluded that DPtr ~id not present his bixth Amendment claim
to the TC ecause he never suggested there that the State
had used 'ts challenges on raci l grounds.
Second, the
court decided th t, even if petr h d presented the claim, he
failed to establ'sh a "pr'ma fac·e claim that the State exercised its peremptory challenges on racial grounds."
The
court was persuaded by precedent from other jurisdictions
that had rejecten the standard of S1ain v. Alabama, and accord'ngly held that a defendant could make out a violation
of the Delaware Constitution by relying solely on the orosecutor's exercise of challenges at h'c; trial.
Apo ying that
new standard, the court found no vio ation on this record.
Petr raised two additional arguments that are re . evant
to this petition . First, he claimed that his rights under
the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause were
violated when the venire became "rac'ally d'sproportionate~
through the TC's excusal of black ;urors for personal reasons. Del. Sup. Ct. rejected that argument on the ground
that s'mply proving a reduction ' n the number of black veniremen through su~h exc sa1s did not violate the Constitution.
Second, pPtr challenged the State's use of the underly'ng felony (first-degree robbery) (1) to elevate the offense from a reckless ki ling to a first degree felony murder offense an~ (2) as an aggravating circumstance to permit
imposition of capital punishment .
Petr argued that such

t
2.

wdual use" placed him in double jeopardy and sub ected him
to wcruel and inhuman punishment." Del. Sup. Ct. reiected
that claim under its decision in Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d
552 (1985). Finally, Del. Sup. Ct. considered an argument
raised by the ACLO as am'cus concerning remarks made by the
prosecutor during the sentencing hearing. The prosecutor
explained that the sentence was subject to automat'c reviP-w
by Del. Sup. Ct. and that the jurors therefore were required
to complete interrogatories explaining their findings.
Since petr had not raised this i~sue either at tr'a or on
appeal, Del. Sup. Ct. stated that any error would be reversible only if it constituted "manifest injustice." The court
then discussed our holding in Caldwell v. Mississippi, OS
s.ct. 2633 (1985), and concluded that, unlike the remarks
there, these remarks were not c lcu1ated to dimin'sh the
jurors' sense of respons'bility, but rather accur tely described the governing statute.
In his cert. pe tion, petr repe ts the c a'ms described
above. 1 will vote to deny. Del. Sup. Ct. gave a ternative
holdinqs with respect to petr•s Batson cl 'm, one of which
rested on a procedural default. Th court's decision therefore is suPported by adequate and independent state law
grounds. Moreover, the court re'ecte~ petr•s claim on the
merits under a stand rd that is not 'neon i~tent w'th
Batson.
Petr's remaininq claims are not cer.tworthy. His challenge to the composition of the venire i rneritless since
the claim rests solelv on the fact that a larqe number of
black veniremen were excu ed for personal reasonsJ he concedes that he has made no showing of racial discrimination
in selection of the venire. Whether or not there is any
merit to petr's argument concern'ng "dual use" of the underlying felony, the issue is not squarely presentP.d here since
petr was convicted both for 'ntentional murder and for felony murder. Finally, Del. Sup. Ct. proper y app ied the
standard of Caldwell and reasonab y cone uded that the rosecutor•s comment about the ava'lab'l ty of utomatic review
was simply an accurate description of state law.
My vote is to deny.

L.F.P., Jr.

